man, if he is able, tell me in what important respects the rule of life has varied since that distant period. Let the Institutes of Menu be explored with the same view; we shall arrive at the same conclusion. Let the books of false religion be opened; it will be found that their moral system is, in all its grand features, the same.. .The impostors who composed them were compelled to pay this homage to the uniform moral sentiments of the world. Examine the codes of nations, those authentic depositories of the moral judgments of men; you everywhere find the same rules prescribed, the same duties imposed: even the boldest of those ingenious skeptics, who have attacked every other opinion, has spared the sacred and immutable simplicity of the rules of life. In our common duties, Bayle and Hume agree with Bossuet and Barrow. Such as the rule was at the first dawn of history, such it continues till the present day. Ages roll over mankind; mighty nations pass away like a shadow; virtue alone remains the same, immortal and unchangeable."*

Perhaps the best illustration of the idea which we wish to impress in this section, unless some should see reason to make an exception in favour of the Spirit of Laws of Montesquieu, is to be found in the great work of Grotius on the Law of Nations. It is rather a remarkable feature in respect to the principles which this great writer lays down, that they are supported throughout by a variety of quotations from the poets, historians, orators, and philosophers of different ages and countries. In doing this, it is to be presumed he had a more important and ennobling object than the mere display of the variety and extent of his learning. He wished to show, as he himself gives us to understand, by the conspiring testimonies of such various authorities, that the whole human race, with no exceptions whatever that are not explainable in consistency with the general statement, have one opinion, one feeling, and one voice in respect to the leading principles of po litical justice.

We infer from the unanimity of mankind in respect to the great principles of right and wrong, as they develope themselves in their systems of Law, both internal and in* Memoirs of the Life of Sir James Mackintosh, 2d Lond. ed., p. 120.

ternational, that there is, and must of necessity be, as the basis of this unanimity, a conscience, a moral element of some kind, existing as an essential attribute in the universal mind of man.

217. Evidences of a moral nature even among Savage nations.

(X.) The leading principles of morals and justice, both as seen in the conventional rules which regulate the intercourse of life, and also in the few and simple laws which support the civil and political fabric of their little communities, are known and distinctly recognised, as a general statement, among barbarous and Savage tribes.. We do not doubt that there have been, and that there are, among Savage tribes, great perversions of the moral nature; but we speak now of the general fact simply, and not of the exceptions. Mr. Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers (bk. ii., chap. iv.), speaks expressly of the gratification which a liberal mind experiences in recognising under the ignorance, superstition, and sensualities of Savage life, the kindred features of humanity, and the indelible vestiges of that Divine image after which man was originally formed. In illustration of his remark, he introduces, with no small degree of satisfaction, a short statement from Sparman's Travels through the Southern Parts of Africa, in relation to a portion of the human race who have generally been regarded as ranking among the lowest in the scale of civilization." A Hottentot," says this traveller, " is rich in proportion to the number of his cattle; but the richest is clothed, fed, and attended no better than the poor." After some other remarks in illustration of what he had just said, he adds, "That which constitutes the distinction of rank in this simple race of men, is the divine pleasure of doing good to their fellow-creatures." The testimony of Vaillant in respect to the same ignorant and degraded people is much to the same effect. "To convey some idea of the character of the savage Hottentots," he observes (Travels in Africa, p. 179)," and of what I had to expect from them, it will be sufficient to offer one remark, which is a truth confirmed by experience. In all countries, wherever the Savages are

absolutely separated from civilized nations, and live sequestered, their manners are mild; but they change and become corrupted the nearer they approach to them.". "When on the northward of the Cape, I found myself under the Tropic among remote nations; when I saw whole hordes surround me with signs of surprise and of the most childish curiosity, and, approaching me with confidence, stroke my beard, my hair, and my face with their hands, I said to myself, I have nothing to fear from these people; this is the first time they ever saw a white man." A portion of Dillon's Narrative of a Voyage in the South Seas is occupied with giving some account of the religion, morals, and customs of the inhabitants of the islands in those seas, called the Friendly Islands. "There is implanted," says the writer, speaking, in particular, of the people of Tonga (vol. ii., p. 27)," a knowledge or sentiment, which enables us sometimes, if not always, to distinguish between the beauty of disinterestedness and the foul ugliness of what is low, sordid, and selfish and the effect of this sentiment is one of the strongest marks of character in the natives of these islands. Many of the chiefs, on being asked by Mr. Mariner what motives they had for conducting themselves with propriety besides the fear of misfortune in this life, replied, the agreeable and happy feelings which a man experiences within himself when he does any good action, or conducts himself nobly and generously, as a man ought to do:' and this question they answered as if they wondered that such a question should be asked. After this, we cannot but suppose (unless we are led by prejudice) that the seeds of very great virtues are implanted in their breasts."

218. Further remarks on the morality of Savage tribes.

We have not the least doubt (and we make the remark, not as a matter of conjecture, but from an examination prosecuted to no small extent, in reference to this very subject) that the testimony of travellers among Savage tribes will show conclusively that there is no tribe of men so ignorant and degraded as not to give some evidences of a natural regard for kindness, truth, and justice. At

the same time, it is due to the truth to admit, that we find among some of these tribes instances of cruelty and violations of right which are abhorrent to the nature and moral sensibilities of a Christian people. We shall endeavour to show, however, in its proper place, that these deviations from the more common and predominant features of humanity may be explained in consistency with the general statement.

As we do not feel at liberty to multiply quotations, especially as we do not suppose that those who read these remarks will generally consider it necessary, we leave the subject of this section, with merely opening a train of thought in connexion with it, which has very seldom been alluded to. We refer to the fact, that all savage tribes, so far as we have been able to learn, not only have some form of religion, but, as a general thing, recognise the duty, on certain occasions of a private or public nature, or both, of performing expiatory ceremonies and offering expiatory sacrifices. They seem to feel that something must be done, either by enduring suffering in their own persons, or by inflicting suffering somewhere else, to prevent those evils, either to themselves personally or their country, which they believe will be the result of their transgressions. What we have to add is, that expiatory ceremonies and expiatory sacrifices, wherever they are found to prevail, clearly imply as their basis the existence of certain sentiments of ill-desert or wrong, and, of course, involve the existence of the elements of a moral nature.

219. The existence of civil or political society implies a moral nature. (XI.) We may add to the other considerations which have been brought forward, the circumstance that society, in its civil or political form, is supported, in a very considerable degree, by the sentiment of moral obligation. If we are asked, why obedience is rendered to the civil laws, the answer is, because they are enacted by the society or social body. If we are asked why we render so much deference to the will of the society or social body, the answer is, because we have agreed to. In other words, we have promised, have pledged ourselves, either expressly or by implication, to conform to it. If we are

asked why we so strictly fulfil our promise, why we so scrupulously conform to our word, all the answer we can give is, that we feel under a moral obligation to do it. In other words, in order to give anything like a satisfactory answer to this question, we are obviously thrown back upon our moral constitution.

There is no doubt that the natural desire of society, especially when stimulated, as it sometimes is, by a knowledge of the benefits which flow from social intercourse, tends powerfully to keep men together in masses or bodies. But, after all, whatever suggestions may sometimes be made to the contrary, the principal secret of the stability of the social position, when it exists in the form of civil and political society, that which, more than anything else, keeps it from disastrous fluctuations, and gives it a degree of permanency and uniformity sufficient to enable it to sustain the vast fabric of government and laws, is to be found in the strong and broad column of the Moral Sensibilities.

§ 220. A moral nature implied in the motives of human conduct which are recognised in historical works.

(XII.) We find an additional proof of the existence of the department of the Moral Sensibilities in those principles, in relation to the estimate of the conduct and characters of men, which pervade historical composition. History, in distinction from the mere registers and annals of events, professes to give us not only the acts, which, as subjects of history, are proper to be recorded, but, so far as they are ascertainable, the motives and characters of the agents. Accordingly, the historians of all ages and countries, while they have condemned some actions, have been equally warm in their commendations of others. In a multitude of cases, the highest possible commendations have been bestowed, and for no other reason, in connexion with the perception or supposed perception of high moral traits in the actors. If it could be ascertained in any way that Leonidas and his companions bled at the pass of Thermopyla from views of a pecuniary nature or from a selfish desire of fame, and not from a sense of the duty which they owed to their country, the glory of that celebrated action would be blasted at once.