CHAPTER I. PROOFS OF A MORAL NATURE. § 207. Reference to the general division. In entering upon the examination of the interesting and important department of the mental nature which now presents itself to our notice, it is proper to revert a moment to that general division of the mind which we have endeavoured throughout to adhere to as the basis of our inquiries. The general classification, it will be recollected, was into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. In passing from the purely intellectual region to that of the Sensibilities, we first find ourselves in the subordinate department of the Emotions. And leaving the emotions, we may advance onward, and come in contact with the still more interior and remote department of the Will, either by passing through the region of the Desires on the one hand, or through the space occupied, if we may be allowed to use such expressions in connexion with the mind, by the feelings of Moral Obligation on the other. In accordance with this plan, we made it our first object to examine some of the leading emotions which come under the head of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. And then, taking the direction of the Desires, endeavoured, in a variety of remarks on the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections, to explain what may properly be included under that head. Having completed, in such manner as we were able, that part of the subject, we propose to return again to the region of the Emotions, a part of which are included under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, and to approach the Will in the opposite direction. But, in carrying this plan into effect, and in giving a philosophical account of the Moral, in distinction from the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities, we shall attempt, in the first place, to consider the general question, whether, in point of fact, man possesses such Moral Sensibilities or not. After having satisfied ourselves as to the general fact of the existence of a conscientious or moral nature, we shall be prepared to enter with more satisfaction into the consideration of the subordinate elements and the characteristics of that nature. § 208. Proof of a moral nature from consciousness. (I.) In proceeding, in the present chapter, to bring forward some considerations in proof that man has a moral nature, the first remark we have to offer is, that we have evidence of this in the intimations of our own Consciousness. In other words, we shall find evidence of the fact under consideration by consulting our own internal experience, and carefully noticing what takes place there. If it be a fact that we have a moral nature, it may, of course, be expected to follow, that this nature will manifest itself on suitable occasions in the exercise of its appropriate acts. Accordingly, it is generally the case, that in those instances of actual right and wrong in which we ourselves are the agents, we possess unquestionable evidence of such inward manifestations. In other words, we find ourselves conscious or cognizant, according as we act right or wrong, of an internal sanctioning or condemnation, approval or disapproval. The results of our moral nature, when we are not in action ourselves, but are simply noticing the conduct of others, are the same; at some times we approve, at others condemn. It merely remains to be added here, that the emotions we have at such times, and which we commonly designate as emotions of approval and disapproval, are sur GENERIS; that is to say, they have a distinct and specific nature. It is true we are not able to define them, for the reason that they are elementary and simple. But it is certain, as they are manifested in our Consciousness, we never find any difficulty in distinguishing them from other emotions, those of beauty or sublimity, for instance. 209. Evidence of a moral nature discoverable in what we notice in children. (II.) Again, we may unquestionably discover the evi dences of a moral nature in the operations of the mind, as they develope themselves in early life. It can hardly have escaped the notice of any one, that if some affecting story of cruelty and crime on the one hand, or of benevolence and virtue on the other, be rehearsed in the presence of children, they will generally discover decided feelings, not only of mere joy or sorrow, but of approval or condemnation, corresponding to the facts in the case. Beattie, in his poem of the Minstrel, describes Edwin, the progress of whose thoughts and feelings it is his principal object to unfold, as being made acquainted at an early period with the affecting old Ballad called the Children in the Wood. "Behold, with berries smear'd, with brambles torn, Nor friend nor stranger hears their dying cry." But when, in the conclusion of the Ballad, it appears that the awakened anger of Heaven, in the most terrible forms of want and death, overtook the uncle, who for private ends had been guilty of this horrible cruelty, the poet adds, with entire truth to nature, "A stifled smile of stern, vindictive joy Brighten'd one moment Edwin's starting tear." But it is unnecessary to appeal, in support of what is a matter of every day's observation, to testimonies of this kind, however frequently they may be found, particularly in the earlier and simpler forms of Literature. It is not easy to witness the sports of children, even for a few moments, without having evidence, loud and eloquent evidence, of their disposition to appeal to the right and wrong of actions. The often-repeated declaration that wrong play will never prosper, expresses the secretly lurking conviction, not only that there is such a thing as justice, but that justice will be found capable, in some way or other, of vindicating its own rights. While, however, we may properly appeal, in support of our general proposition, to those exhibitions of moral sentiments which we often notice in early life, we are aware that some exceptions are to be made, and some explanations to be offered, in order to present this view of the subject in a proper light. We do not mean to say, nor is it true, that children will give a correct moral decision on all possible moral subjects. There are many subjects involving high moral principles, which, in whatever aspect they may appear to mature minds, will probably fail of eliciting from children and youth either approbation or disapprobation. And the simple reason is, because they have not capacity enough to understand them. It is one of the leading characteristics of the moral nature, as we shall have occasion to see more fully hereafter, that its operation depends upon the antecedent operation of the intellect; in other words, that it cannot act otherwise than in view of knowledge. When, therefore, we maintain that there are decided evidences of a moral nature in children, it is proper to add, that this is the case so far, and so far only, as they are capable of understanding the subjects brought before them. When the matter proposed to them is one level to their comprehension, if it involve anything of a moral nature, they seldom fail to show, and that, too, promptly and decisively, that they have a knowledge of it in that respect. 210. Proofs of a moral nature from the manner of our intercourse with our fellow-men. (III.) In the third place, the existence of conscience is taken for granted in our intercourse with our fellowmen. We make our agreements and bargains with them (we do not say always, but, at least, as a general thing) as if they had a conscience; we converse with them, and consult with them, and rejoice with them, and weep with them, as if they had a conscience; and in our more formal addresses and exhortations, we always take the same thing for granted. How many customers would a tradesman have, how long would any person be admitted into good company, how many public and responsible duties would any citizen whatever be called to fulfil, if it were known or suspected that they had no conscience! We shall feel more fully the force of the facts we have now in view, if we consider the mode of address which is usually employed when a person wishes to persuade men to pursue a certain course. He appeals at first, we will suppose, to their INTEREST; he tells them of the various advantages which would attend the course he proposes; but he reserves, as his last and most efficacious argument, an appeal to their sense of DUTY. If every other consideration is found to fail, the orator assures them of his perfect persuasion that they will not so disgrace themselves in the eyes of the whole world as to refuse obedience to the calls of conscience. He calls upon conscience to speak out on this important occasion, and he knows full well, if that voice of God and nature, implanted in the human bosom, can be made to utter itself, there will no longer be occasion for his own humble efforts. 211. Proofs of a moral nature from the terms used in different languages. (IV.) Another proof of the existence of a moral nature is to be found in the fact, that there are terms in all languages, probably we may say without a single exception, expressive of such a nature and its operations. If it be true that there is no such thing as a moral nature and no such thing as original moral sentiments in men, the fact is obviously unprecedented and unaccountable, that terms expressive of a moral power, and of moral distinctions and sentiments, are to be found so generally. The ancients, it is well-known, were accustomed to speak of the SENSUS RECTI ET HONESTI; by which there can be no question they intended to intimate what at the present time we commonly express by the term Conscience. They also, in particular, made a distinction between the HONESTUM or honourable, and the UTILE or beneficial, considered as principles of action; and it certainly would be easy to show that like distinctions are to be found in all modern tongues. In English, for instance, we not only constantly speak of a man's acting from interest and also acting from the sense of duty, but always regard these two modes of action as involving, in our apprehension, two distinct active or motive principles. We repeat, therefore, that, on the doctrine of the negation or absence of a moral nature, the use of such terms and the making of such distinctions is inexplicable. With |