337. Of natural or congenital moral derangement 338. Of moral accountability in cases of natural or congenital moral CHAP. V.-CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBIL- ITIES. 341. Of casual associations in connexion with the propensities 342. Other instances of casual association in connexion with the pro- 345. Casual association in connexion with objects and places 346. Of casual association in connexion with particular days MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. DIVISION SECOND. THE SENSIBILITIES. SENTIENT OR SENSITIVE STATES OF THE MIND. SENTIMENTS. VOL. II.-B INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER I. RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE SENSIBILITIES. 1. Reference to the general division of the whole mind. Ir will be recollected that we proposed, as the basis of our inquiries, the general division of the mind into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. These great departments of the mind are not only generically distinct, but the difference between them is so clear and marked, it is surprising they should have been so often confounded together. They are not only different in their nature, a fact which is clearly ascertained by Consciousness, in its cognizance of their respective acts, but are separated from each other, as all observation shows, by the relations which they respectively sustain. The Intellect or Understanding comes first in order, and furnishes the basis of action to the other great departments of the mind. It is this portion of the mind which we have endeavoured to examine, and which we are now about to leave for the purpose of advancing into departments of our mental nature, which, considered in reference to the Intellect, may be regarded as more remote and interior. In examining the INTELLECT, we were aided by adopting the classification, founded in nature, into intellectual states of External origin, and intellectual states of Internal origin. A classification which seems sufficiently to authorize the expressions External Intellect and Internal Intellect; expressions founded on the fact that the intellectual action sometimes takes place in direct connexion with outward objects, and sometimes independently of such connexion. This distinction is important in enabling us to get a true idea of the intellect itself and in suggesting the best methods of cultivating and applying our perceptive powers; but, considered in relation to the Sensibilities, is perhaps of less consequence. In both of its great departments alike, as also in its more subordinate modes of action, the Intellect furnishes the broad and deep foundation for that vast variety of mental states which are commonly included under the denomination of the emotions and passions. § 2. Difference between intellections or states of the intellect, and sentiments or states of the sensibility. In advancing into what we assert to be a different part of our spiritual being, we are aware that some may be disposed to inquire whether the assertion of such difference, notwithstanding the general remarks of the last section, is well founded; whether, in other words, there is such a marked line of distinction between the intellectual and sensitive nature as to authorize our speaking of them as distinct and different mental departments. We do not propose, however, nor does it appear necessary, to go into this topic here, any further than to refer briefly to what has already been said upon it on a former occasion. In the chapter in the Introduction to the first volume, the object of which was to ascertain the outlines of a General Classification, we attempted to show the difference between the intellect and the sensibilities, between intellections and sentiments or sensitive states of the mind, by a reference to consciousness, to the terms found in different languages, to the incidental remarks frequently found in English writers, besides the more direct and specific testimony of those who have written professedly on the mind. That this distinction is involved, wholly or almost without an exception, in the structure of languages, is a well-known fact; and that it is commonly made by the leading writers on the philosophy of the mind, is no less undeniable. Not only this, it finds its way incidentally into the remarks of writers (and, such is the nature of their convictions, it cannot well be otherwise) who were writing upon other subjects, and who, at the time, were far from being aware that they were enunciating, either directly or indirectly, any |