noticed that we do not speak here of the permanency of desires, which is a very different thing, but simply of their intensity or strength for the time being. 97. Tendency to excite movement an attribute of desire. We shall conclude this notice of the nature of desire with remarking that there is one other characteristic attribute which particularly distinguishes it, and which undoubtedly must enter as an element into every perfect delineation of it. Such is the nature of desire, that it is of itself, in virtue of its own essence, a prompting, exciting, or, as Mr. Hobbes would term it, a motive state of the mind. In other words, its very existence involves the probability of action; it sets the mind upon the alert; it arouses the faculties, both mental and bodily, and places them in the attitude of movement.-It is true that the desire does not, in point of fact, always result in action. Before action can be consummated, another power, still more remote in the interior structure of the mind, must be consulted, that of the Will. If the Will decidedly opposes the desire, its tendency is, of course, frustrated in the object aimed at; but the tendency itself, although disappointed of its object, still remains. It is there, and cannot be otherwise than there, while the desire exists. This important tendency does not exist, as a general thing, in other departments of the mind. It does not exist, for instance, in the cognitive or intellective part of the mind, in itself considered. If the intellect were insulated from the nature which is back of it, man would be a being of speculation merely, not of action. Nor does it exist in the emotions. If man were formed with the emotive sensibilities only, without the accompaniment of those ulterior sensibilities which are built upon them, he would be as unmoved and inoperative as if he were constituted with the single attribute of perceptivity. He would be like a ship anchored in the centre of the ocean, agitated, and thrown up and down on the rising and falling billows, but wholly incapable of any movement in latitude or longitude. The tendency to excite movement, as an inherent or essential characteristic, exists in the desires, and nowhere else, except in the corresponding por tion of the moral sensibilities, viz., the feelings of moral obligation. The tendency in question belongs to these two mental states alike. It is the office of the Will, as a separate and relatively a higher part of our nature, to act in reference to this tendency, either in checking or aiding, in annulling or consummating it. 98. Classification of this part of the sensibilities. If we were called upon to consider the Desires in their simplest form only, we might perhaps feel at liberty to dismiss the subject with what has already been said. But the circumstance that they are subject to many modifications and combinations, sets us upon a new field of inquiry of great extent and interest. The Desires are sometimes modified by being directed to particular ends. In other words, they are constituted with specific tendencies, from which they seldom vary. This is the case with the Instincts, properly so called; and probably not less so, in their original and unperverted action, with the Appetites. In regard to the Affections, a distinct class of the active or sensitive principles which come under this general head, it seems, as far as we can judge, to be the fact, that DESIRES exist in a close and inseparable combination with certain emotions, and are thus made to assume an aspect which they would not otherwise possess. Accordingly, we have a basis, an ample and distinctly defined one, for a subordinate classification. And it is to the examination of the Desires, as they exist in this classification, that we now proceed; beginning with those which, in the gradations of regard we are naturally led to bestow upon them, are generally adjudged as lowest in point of rank, and proceeding upward to those which are higher. In accordance with this plan, they will present themselves to notice, and be made the subject of distinct consideration, in the order of the Instincts, the Appetites, the Propensities, and the Affections. We will only add, that a classification in any case ought not to be made without reasons. In the present instance, however, it would clearly be out of place to anticipate the reasons, any further than what has already, in a general way, been said of that arrangement of the DESIRES which is now proposed. As we advance in our inquiries, we shall see that it is founded in nature and authenticated by the forms of language, as well as by the prevalent practice and sentiments of mankind. 99. The principles, based upon desire, susceptible of a twofold oper ation. There is one important remark, which is applicable to all the principles, with the exception of the Instincts, which now present themselves for examination. It is, that, with the exception just mentioned, they all have a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. This state for ment, of course, will not apply to the pure Instincts; the very idea of their being instincts, in the proper sense of the term, seems to imply an absolute exclusion of their being voluntary. But as we advance from the Instincts to the Appetites, and still upward to the Propensities and Affections, we find each and all of these important principles susceptible of being contemplated in this twofold aspect. Each, under circumstances of such a nature as to preclude inquiry and reflection, is susceptible of an instinctive action; and each, under other circumstances more favourable to the exercise of reasoning, is susceptible of a deliberate or voluntary action. This remark is important in our estimate of these principles, considered in a moral point of view. CHAPTER II. INSTINCTS. § 100. Of the instincts of man as compared with those of the inferior animals. In proceeding to examine that part of our sensitive constitution which is comprehended under the general name of Desires, we naturally begin with instincts, which are nothing more than desires existing under a particular and definite modification.-It is generally conceded that there are in our nature some strong and invariable tendencies to do certain things, without previous forethought and deliberation, which bear that name. The actions of men are not always governed by feelings founded on reasoning, but are sometimes prompted by quick and de.cisive impulses, which set themselves in array before reason has time to operate. It is from this circumstance that these mental tendencies or desires are termed instinctive; a word which implies, in its original meaning, a movement or action, whether mental or bodily, without reflection and foresight. Although such instinctive tendencies are undoubtedly found in men, it must be admitted that they are less frequent, and, in general, less effective, than in the lower animals. And, in truth, it could not be expected to be otherwise, when we remember that the brute creation are wholly destitute of the powers of abstraction and reasoning, or, at most, possess them only in a small degree. The provident oversight of the Supreme Being, without whose notice not a sparrow falleth to the ground, has met this deficiency by endowing them with instincts, the most various in kind, and strikingly adapted to the exigencies of their situation. We find the proofs of this remark in the nests of birds, in the ball of the silkworm, in the house of the beaver, in the return and flight of birds at their appointed seasons, and in a multitude of other instances. § 101. Of the nature of the instincts of brute animals. So abundantly has the great Father of all things provided, by means of their instincts, for the preservation and enjoyment of the inferior animals, that they even, in some respects, seem to have the advantage over man, with all his high and excellent capacities. In the early periods of the human race, men looked abroad upon the great ocean with timidity; they launched their frail vessels, and directed their course by the heavenly bodies; but, with all their care and wisdom, they were often baffled, and obliged to put back again into the place of their departure, or run, perhaps, upon some unknown shore. But flocks of migratory birds are frequently seen naviga ting the boundless fields of air, passing wide tracks of unknown land and water, and returning again at the set time, and with scarcely making a mistake, or wandering a league from their course; and yet they are without any histories of former voyages, without chart or compass, and without the ability, so far as we are able to determine, of reading the way of their flight in the bright letters of the stars. This is only one of the facts or classes of facts which illustrate this subject; but it shows very clearly the unerring guidance, the fixed and definite adaptation to a particular end, which is the characteristic of instincts. "Who bade the stork Columbus-like explore Heavens not his own, and worlds unknown before? Who forms the phalanx, and who points the way?" The ways in which this unerring tendency, this divine guidance, shows itself, are almost innumerable. The philosopher Galen once took a kid from its dead mother by dissection, and, before it had tasted any food, brought it into a certain room having many vessels full, some of wine, some of oil, some of honey, some of milk, or some other liquor, and many others filled with the different sorts of grain and fruit, and there laid it. After a little time the embryon had acquired strength enough to get up on its feet; and it was with sentiments of strong admiration that the spectators saw it advance towards the liquors, fruit, and grain, which were placed round the room, and, having smelled all of them, at last sup the milk alone. About two months afterward, the tender sprouts of plants and shrubs were brought to it, and, after smelling all of them and tasting some, it began to eat of such as are the usual food of goats. The cells constructed by the united efforts of a hive of bees have often been referred to as illustrating the nature of instincts." It is a curious mathematical problem," says Dr. Reid, "at what precise angle the three planes which compose the bottom of a cell in a honeycomb ought to meet in order to make the greatest saving, or the least expense of material and labour. This is one of those problems, belonging to the higher parts of mathematics, VOL. II.-L |