have just been referred to. A person of genuine wit excites emotions of the ludicrous in a thousand ways, and which will be so diverse from each other, that it will be found exceedingly difficult to subject them to any rules. It would be difficult, for instance, to bring within any established classification of the specific sources of wit many passages of the poet Butler. In the first Canto of his poem of Hudibras, we have a particular account of the hero's horse, in which the writer very singularly compares the animal to a Spaniard in majesty and deliberation of gait, and in some other respects to the celebrated horse of Cæsar, as follows:

"He was well stay'd, and in his gait
Preserved a grave, majestic state.
At spur or switch no more he skipp'd,
Or mended pace, than Spaniard whipp'd;
And yet so fiery he would bound,
As if he grieved to touch the ground.
That Caesar's horse, who, as fame goes,
Had corns upon his feet and toes,
Was not by half so tender hoof'd,
Or trod upon the ground so soft;
And as that beast would kneel and stoop
(Some write) to take his rider up,
So Hudibras's ('tis well known)
Would do the same to set him down."

81. Of the character and occasions of humour.

Closely connected with the general subject of ludicrous emotions and of wit is that of Humour. It is well known that we often apply the terms humour and humorous to descriptions of a particular character, whether written or given in conversation, and which may be explained as follows.

It so happens that we frequently find among men what seems to us a disproportion in their passions; for instance, when they are noisy and violent, but not durable. We find inconsistencies, contradictions, and disproportions in their actions. They have their foibles (hardly any one is without them), such as self-conceit, caprice, foolish partialities, and jealousies. Such incongruities in feeling and action cause an emotion of surprise like an unexpected combination of ideas in wit. Observing them, as we do, in connexion with the acknowledged high traits and

responsibilities of human nature, we can no more refrain from an emotion of the ludicrous than we can on seeing a gentleman of fine clothes and high dignity making a false step and tumbling into a gutter. A person who can seize upon these specialities in temper and conduct, and set them forth in a lively and exact manner, is called a man of humour; and his descriptions are termed humorous descriptions.

Mr. Addison has given many examples of the humorous in the incidents and characters of the Tattler and Spectator. But excellence in this species of writing is not very frequently found, and is an attainment of considerable difficulty. In general it implies something peculiar in the character of the writer. There are some persons who seem to have a natural inclination for noticing those traits in the feelings and actions of men which cause ludicrous emotions. Whatever may be the cause of it, there can hardly be a question as to the fact that some possess this characteristic more than others. This was particularly true of Swift, and the same characteristic has been ascribed to Fontaine. Writers who have a natural turn of this sort will be more likely to excel in the humorous than others.

◊ 82. Of the practical utility of feelings of the ludicrous.

It is not impossible that the feelings which we have examined in this chapter may have the appearance to some minds of being practically useless. If this were the fact, it would be at variance with the economy of the mind in other respects, which gives evidence everywhere that its original tendencies are ingrafted upon it for some practical ends. But it is not so. The feeling of the ludicrous (or, as it is sometimes called, the sense of ridicule) is attended with results which, although they may not be perfectly obvious at first, will be found, on a little examination, to be of no small moment. It is entirely clear that it constitutes one of the important guides and aids which nature has appointed of human conduct. Scarcely any one is willing to undergo ridicule even in its milder and more acceptable forms, much less to subject himself to the "world's dread laugh." And many per

sons would be less attentive to the decencies and proprieties of personal conduct and of the intercourse of life, than they are in fact, were it not for the fear of this species of retribution. It is true, it is not powerful enough, nor is it the appropriate instrument, to attack the more marked depravities incident to our nature, the strongholds of its sin; but it is unquestionably an effective and useful agent in its application to whatever is mean, incongruous, and unseemly.-See, in connexion with this subject, Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, bk. i., ch. iii., and Beattie on Laughter and Ludicrous Compositions.

83. Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, and gladness.

UNDER the general head of Emotions there are many other simple feelings which merit some attention. Although they are, perhaps, not less essential to our nature, and not less important than those which have been already attended to, we do not find so many difficulties in their examination, and but a few remarks will be wanting to explain them.

We begin with the emotion of cheerfulness. Of the nature of this feeling none can be supposed to be ignorant. It exists, in a greater or less degree, throughout the whole course of our life. It is seen in the benignant looks, and is heard in the garrulity of old age; it sheds its consolations over the anxieties and toils of manhood, and reigns with a sort of perpetual spring in youth.

The words joy and delight express a high degree of cheerfulness; the feeling is the same; the difference is in its greater intensity. The word gladness is nearly synonymous with these last, but seems to be applied particularly when the joy is of a more sudden and less permanent

character.

84. Emotions of melancholy, sorrow, and grief.

While there are many things in life which are fitted to make us cheerful and happy, every one must know

that for wise purposes a degree of bitterness is mingled in our cup, and that circumstances occur from time to time which are of an opposite tendency. And these prove to us occasions of melancholy, which is the name of another specific simple emotion.

There are different degrees of this emotion, as well as of that of cheerfulness. We sometimes express the very slightest degree of it by the words uneasiness or discontent. When the feeling of melancholy is from any circumstance greatly increased, we usually give it the name of sorrow; so that sorrow seems to hold nearly the same relation to melancholy that joy does to cheerfulness.

The word grief also has nearly the same relation to sorrow that gladness has to joy. As far as the mere feeling is concerned which they represent, the two words grief and sorrow may be regarded as synonymous with each other; with this exception, that the term grief is commonly employed when the sorrow exists suddenly and with great strength. Hence grief sometimes shows itself by external signs, and even in frantic transports; while sorrow, even when it is deeply rooted, is more tacit, enduring, and uncommunicative.

§ 85. Emotions of surprise, astonishment, and wonder.

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Whenever anything novel and unexpected presents itself to our notice, whether in nature or in ordinary events, we experience a new simple emotion, distinct from any which has hitherto been mentioned, which we call a feeling of surprise. We are aware that this view is not adopted by Dr. Adam Smith. Surprise," he remarks, in one of his Philosophical Essays, "is not to be regarded as an original emotion, distinct from all others. The violent and sudden change produced upon the mind when an emotion of any kind is brought upon it, constitutes the whole nature of surprise." This remark, although coming from a person of acknowledged acuteness, seems to have been unadvisedly made. If there be actually no such feeling as that of surprise, it cannot easily be accounted for, that a term expressive of it is found in all languages. And, furthermore, the existence of such a feeling, of a specific nature and distinct from

all others, seems to be as fully warranted by our own consciousness and the general testimony of men, as that of any feeling whatever. If Mr. Smith had said, a violent and sudden change of the mind (that is, some new, sudden, and unexpected perception) constitutes, not the emotion itself, but, in general, the occasion of the emotion of surprise, his language would have been less objection

able.

We sometimes use the word astonishment, which does not express a different emotion, but the same emotion in a different degree. When the feeling is exceedingly strong, it seems to suspend for a time the whole action of the mind, and we say of a person in such a situation, not merely that he is surprised, but is astonished or amazed.

When the facts or events which occasion the surprise are of such a singular and complicated character as to induce us to dwell upon them for a length of time, the feeling arising is then often called wonder. It is not, however, a different emotion from what we ordinarily call surprise, but the same emotion, modified by different circumstances.

It may be added here, that this emotion is highly important to our preservation, security, and improvement. It is in new circumstances, in untried and unexplored situations, that we are particularly required to be upon our guard, since we know not what effects may attend them, nor whether these effects may prove good or evil to us.

Happily for us, the emotion of surprise and astonishment which we experience at such times, is very vivid, so much so as to arrest for a time both our perceptions and our conduct, and to compel us to pause and consider where we are, and what is to be done. Certainly this is a beneficent provision; for if nature had formed us unsusceptible of such vivid feelings, we should have gone on without being apprehensive of the consequences, and in that way often have plunged amid inexpressible evils.

86. Emotions of dissatisfaction, displeasure, and disgust. There is another emotion, which approaches very near to the feeling of melancholy, and still slightly differs from