punishment annexed to transgression. If therefore, after this declaration of God, that sin shall meet its punishment; sin, through the exercise of God's mercy find no punishment, how shall God be true?

II. The next opinion to be noticed, is that God will pardon us for the sake of our repentance. But if a debtor express his sorrow to the creditor for having contracted the debt, and promise to incur no new debt with him hereafter, will the creditor be satisfied with this declaration? The debtor's future good conduct will be of no advantage to him; he requires payment therefore; and in default of payment, will imprison. Or if a criminal acknowledge before a judge, his sorrow for his past offences, and promise amendment, will his acknowledgments, or his promises arrest the arm of justice? by no means-the law must take its course, or it may as well be abolished, Now God is the judge of the universe. He sitteth upon his throne judging right; if therefore every sinner, for the sake of his repentance, must find pardon, disorder would, as necessarily be introduced into God's moral government of the world, as it would be in human governments from the same cause. A due consideration of this truth would tend to remove many erroneous imaginations. A father, it is allowed, pardons his child out of love to it, and a master his servant, on account of his repentance: but God is not a father or a master only, but a judge and a governor.

Now a poor and ignorant man, brought before a judge, often wonders why he might not as well be pardoned and liberated, especially when conscious that he should be careful to offend no more. These are his thoughts because he is too short-sighted to look beyond himself, and to watch the distant consequences of indiscriminating lenity, in its effects on the community at large. We in the same way, think it extremely easy, and certain as it is easy, that God should pardon sinners for the sake of their repentance, because we consider only our own individual case: but when it is considered that God is, in the strictest sense, a judge, as well as a father or a master, it becomes a far greater difficulty than at first sight it appears, to believe that he should pardon men for their repentance. In addition to what has been said, it may be observed, that a judge's peculiar duties are comparatively so indispensable, that a man in that situation, acting conscientiously, will punish a servant, or even his own child, whom he would have forgiven if acting only in the capacity of a master or father. The former considerations also of the truth of God, may be again referred to in evidence against the supposition that repentance and pardon are necessarily connected. It may be asked as before, if God's law threatens punishment for sin, and makes no provision for repentance, which it does not any more than human laws, how shall God be true if

our sins go unpunished? But here it will be asked, Do not the Scriptures themselves say, that if we repent, we shall be saved? Yes, because repentance is necessary to our accepting that way of pardon which God has provided: but it can no where be inferred from Scripture that repentance is the primary cause of our pardon, or that it is of itself sufficient.

III. The third way of obtaining pardon for our offences which we notice, is the way of good works. The followers of this way suppose, that future good works will make amends for past bad ones-that money given for charity will atone for former extravagance -that attendance at church and sacrament, will make up for past profanations of sabbaths -and that extraordinary strictness in religious duties, will work out the pardon of past remissness. This is the Popish doctrine of works of supererogation. But concerning these good works which we do, it must be said, that they are either not commanded of God, or they are: if they are not, they are unlawful and unnecessary if they are, they are absolutely necessary to be done at every time in such a sense, that to omit doing them is a sin.

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the good works that can possibly be done in any hour, with all their perfection and excellence, belong to that hour, and, consequently the merit of them cannot be transferable, to supply the defects of another hour: to attempt to do it, is but to cover one part of the body with a garment which leaves another part

naked. One of our Savior's arguments is in point here: Which of you having a servant plowing, or feeding cattle, will say unto him by and by when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat; and will not rather say unto him, Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself, and serve me till I have eaten and drank. After the servant has done his work in the field, the master does not think himself obliged to shew him particular kindness and indulgence, but gives him other work; and when he has finished that too, doth he thank that servant our Savior asks, because he did the things that were commanded him? I trow not. So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all these things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which was our duty to do: that is, Say, and therefore know, that if you do every possible good work, you have done no more than God commanded you, and have therefore brought no profit to God, any more than a servant, who does his appointed duty, brings any gain to his master, or lays him under an obligation.

IV. Upon the whole then, it appears that neither God's mercy, nor our repentance, nor our good works can be allowed to be the way of pardon. By these there is no remission. Yet since it is undeniable that sins may be forgiven, we are compelled to adopt the only supposition that remains. If it is indeed necessary for the sake of the truth and justice of God, that sin should be punished, and sal

vation consists not in our suffering, it immediately follows that some one must suffer for us. There seems no possible way of reconciling mercy and justice, grace and truth, but this. Yet here again, when we search for an atonement, not for one sin, but for all the sins of all the human race, reason, not informed by revelation, must despair of succeeding in its search: for sin is an infinite evil:-an offence against a fellow-creature, an equal, a superior, a king-or again, against a friend, a brother, a father, is in every step more aggravated; since the offence increases always in proportion to the dignity of the person whom we offend, and the obligations we are under to him. Hence it must be concluded, that since the dignity of God is infinite, and the obligations we are under to him infinite, the wickedness of sinners against him is also infinite; therefore if we suffer for sin in hell, no finite time of suffering can be a sufficient punishment for sin; it must be for an infinite time, for eternity. On the other hand, if our sins are to be cancelled by an atonement, that atonement must be of infinite value in order to be equivalent to the evil of sin; and if the atonement be a person, that person must be of infinite dignity. But infinite dignity belongs only to God. In this dilemma the book of Revelation appears for our information and relief, and teaches us that the Deity exists in three persons, all equal; that the second of these in love consented to become the atonement required, and the