Bazaine loitered at Metz, and caused the ruin both of his own and Mac-Mahon's army by his culpable delays. He was totally unequal to the responsibilities of the onerous command he held, and appeared incapable of forming a proper idea of the magnitude of the dangers that threatened to environ him, and did so. He assumed the chief command on the 8th of August. He had ample time to provision Metz for a siege, and make all necessary arrangements for his own retreat between the 8th, when it was quite possible for him to retreat by any route he pleased, and the 18th, when it became quite impossible for him to escape by any route at all.

The emperor left Metz on the 14th with the vanguard-why did Bazaine not follow on the 15th? He knew from the defeat of a portion of his force on the 14th at Courcelles, that the enemy was rapidly advancing in force to surround him, and on the 15th the road to Châlons was open to him. But on the 16th the battle of Vionville was fought, and he sustained a defeat that rendered his escape very improbable. And then on the 18th the terrible battle of Rézonville or Gravelotte took place, in which the French suffered fearfully, and Bazaine was foiled at all points.

It is inexplicable, save on the assumption quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat, how after such a sanguinary and complete defeat on the 18th Bazaine could have sent the telegram on the 19th that so cruelly deceived Mac-Mahon, and betrayed him to his ruin. He said he had maintained his positions on the 18th. Why, that was the very thing the enemy wanted him to do! It was for this they fought. More than half a million of men were in motion, straining onward, eager as hounds on the leash, to surround Metz; and it was the policy of the advance to engage Bazaine in a succession of battles, for the very purpose of compelling him to remain in his positions, of delaying him, until the main bodies of the enemy came up and enfolded him in their toils. This is exactly what was done, and most successfully too.

The utter condemnation of Bazaine's generalship lies in this, that he allowed himself to be caught in such toils. It is totally incredible that some 230,000 men could have been imprisoned in Metz, as Bazaine was, had they been properly commanded. No fault can be found with the fighting qualities of the men; they fought bravely enough, and indeed did more than there was reason to expect from them under the circumstances. The only explanation of so astounding a disaster, lies in the fact, that Bazaine was a most over-rated and incompetent commander-totally unequal to the tremendous emergency in which he found himself.*

Leaving Bazaine hopelessly surrounded and shut up in Metz, let us now open the Map. and follow the fortunes of Mac-Mahon, and observe how a dire "fatality" thwarted all his best intentions.

On the 23rd the camp of Châlons was broken up, and the fatal march towards Montmédy was commenced. The emperor accompanied Mac- Mahon, but did not interfere with his command. From the very

* Notwithstanding the fearful carnage caused by the various conflicts in which the army of Metz was engaged from the 14th of August to the 27th of October, when Bazaine capitulated, the force he then surrendered consisted of 3 marshals, Bazaine, Canrobert, and the chief cause of all the military disasters, Le Bouf: 66 generals; about 6000 officers; 173,000 men, including the imperial guard; 400 pieces of artillery; 100 mitrailleuses; and 53 eagles or standards; besides a vast amount of war material. Between the 14th of August and the 27th of October the total deaths may be taken at 56,000, so that Bazaine must have had more than 229,000 men at first under his command.

first everything went wrong. It was essential to success that the army should march rapidly, but this was soon found to be impracticable. There was a good deal of demoralization in various corps owing to the disastrous defeats that had been sustained, and the exhaustion caused by the rapid and disorderly retreat from the frontier. A large number of the soldiers were mere youths incapable of bearing the fatigue even of ordinary marching. Then there was also a good deal of insubordination in the ranks, and the roads soon became almost impassable from the number of stragglers intermingled with artillery, baggage, store-wagons, &c. Then Mac-Mahon says, in his evidence,

“Precise orders were given that on leaving Rheims the men should carry with them four days' provisions. I saw that this order was executed as far as two corps d'armée were concerned, and I concluded that it had been carried out in the others. But on the very first day-viz., on the evening of the 23rd, two generals commanding corps d'armée, General Ducrot and General le Brun, informed me that their soldiers were already in want of provisions for the next day. The nonexecution of the precise order I had given was attributable to the bad state of the administration. I felt the grave inconvenience of losing a day's march under such circumstances, but as the country through which I was about to pass did not possess resources sufficient to keep an army alive, and as I was near a line of railway, I directed a portion of the army on Rethel, and then resumed my march towards Stenay."

Mac-Mahon arrived at Chène-Populeuse on the 27th, and was greeted by most disastrous intelligence. He learned that the two corps under Generals Ducrot and de Failly, composing his right wing, had been severely attacked by the cavalry of the Crown Prince of Prussia, which proved he was in active pursuit; and he was also informed that on the 25th Bazaine was still in Metz. This satisfied him that prompt and decisive measures were necessary to save his own command from destruction. Accordingly he again changed his plans, and wisely so. He resolved to abandon the attempt to reach Montmédy, and to retreat as rapidly as possible by Mezières. He sent a telegram to the Minister of War, giving his reasons for this movement, and never were reasons more cogent or more conclusive. He said,——

"The 1st and 2nd German armies, upwards of 200,000 strong, surround Metz, principally on the left bank; a force estimated at 50,000 men is established on the right bank of the Meuse in order to intercept my march towards Metz.

"Other information has been received to the effect that the army of the Prince Royal of Prussia is making to-day towards the Ardennes, 150,000 strong; it has already arrived at Ardeuil. I am at Chène, with a little more than 100,000

men.

"I have received no news from Bazaine since the 19th. If I march to meet him I shall be attacked in front by a portion of the 1st and 2nd armies, and at the same time I should be attacked by the army of the Prince Royal of Prussia, cutting me off my line of retreat. I shall proceed towards Mezières to-morrow, whence I shall continue my retreat, according to events, towards the west."

It is thus evident that on the 25th Mac-Mahon was fully alive to the dangerous position in which he was placed. He knew for certain that Bazaine had not succeeded in escaping from Metz; and he also knew that every day was increasing the weakness of Bazaine, while adding to the strength of the forces surrounding him. What reasonable hope was there, then, that Bazaine would be able to do after the 25th, what-notwithstanding the sacrifice up to that time of more than 30,000 of his best

soldiers he had so far signally failed in doing? If he was utterly unable to cut his way through the investing forces, and escape from Metz before its investment was completed, and before he had sustained successive defeats, was there any well-grounded reason to believe that he would be able to do so when the enemy had completed the investment, when their forces had been nearly doubled, and flushed with a succession of unlookedfor conquests, while he was shut up with diminished forces, their spirits saddened by a succession of tremendous reverses, and confidence in themselves and their leaders rudely shaken?

It was, therefore, on the 25th, a military and a logical certainty that Bazaine would not be able to fight his way out of Metz and join Mac-Mahon. Then came the other consideration-what reasonable probability existed that Mac-Mahon would be able to fight his way to Metz and release Bazaine? This question is completely answered by Mac-Mahon himself, when he tells the Minister of War that he knew the Germans had at least 400,000 men to bar his way-400,000 soldiers flushed with victory, and in the highest state of discipline, with a powerful artillery, and an abundance of every requisite, while he had only 100,000 men, dispirited by defeat, ill-organized, ill-disciplined, ill-officered, and deficient in almost all the material necessary for a campaign! Was it not perfect madness, under such circumstances, to suppose that Mac-Mahon could successfully fight his way and deliver Bazaine? Mac-Mahon was not afflicted with any such insanity. He is most explicit and clear as to the impracticability of his march on Metz, and a sounder judgment was never exercised than when he resolved to abandon an enterprise that necessarily involved the sacrifice of his army, and determined on withdrawing from the perils of his position by a rapid retreat on Mezières.

According he commenced his retreat on the night of the 27th. The baggage and reserve artillery were sent forward, and arrived at Mezières the next day. But most unfortunately, after all his dispositions had been made to retire on Mezières, a despatch from the Minister of War arrived at one o'clock in the morning (28th) urging in strong terms the continuance of the march on Montmédy. If you abandon Bazaine a revolution will break out in Paris, and you yourself will be attacked by all the enemy's force." Such was the burden of this fatal despatch, which was based on assumptions that were in direct opposition to actual fact. Mac-Mahon was assured he was "at least thirty-six hours before the Prince Royal of Prussia, perhaps forty-eight:" whereas, even assuming the fact, the advantage was of no moment whatever, for the Prussians could overlap him in marching, cover more ground in three days than he could in five, and with far less inconvenience and fatigue. The marching capacity of Mac-Mahon's troops was very low indeed; and this was one of the reasons why he never should have entered on the wild-goose chase after Bazaine, wherein his own safety depended so much on celerity of movement and promptitude in action.* Yet, in ignorance of the great disadvantages under which Mac

* In his examination before the Committee of Inquiry Mac-Mahon was asked by the Vice-President, "Is it true that the marches were only on an average four leagues a day ?" And he admitted that this was about the average, and explained that a large portion of his troops were unable and unused to march, while the roads became blocked with baggage. “It must be observed," he said, "that the corps d'armée commanded by General le Brun was composed, for the greater part, of young men who had never been trained to military life, and of marines-very brave and very energetic, but little accustomed to such marches."