ment. "Juniors" were classified as "apprentices" without prescribing any test of capacity as condition to admission as senior members. "Junior" members were denied the right to participate in the formulation of the union's policies and management. The power to determine wage scales, working conditions, and apportionment of work was given to senior members exclusively. Junior members could not make agreements with employers as to work or salaries, and seniors could bar juniors from membership in the union proper. Such a contract was held invalid as an unreasonable restraint of junior members' constitutional right to liberty of contract (Const. U. S., Amend. V; Const. art. I, par. 1). The rights given senior members in the contract was an attempt to create a monopoly to the detriment of junior members, and therefore void. Cameron v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692 (E. & App., 1935), rev'g 114 N. J. Eq. 495, 169 Atl. 116 (1933), cert. den., 298 U. S. 659, 56 Sup. Ct. 681, 80 L. Ed. 1385 (1936). See also Id., 119 N. J. Eq. 577, 183 Atl. 157 (1936); Collins et al. v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 119 N. J. Eq. 230, 182 Atl. 37 (1935); Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 159 Atl. 661 (1932); Fleming v. Motion Picture Operators, Local 244, 16 N. J. Misc. 502, 1 Atl. (2d) 850, aff'd 124 N. J. Eq. 269, 1 Atl. (2d) 386 (E. & App., 1938).

An agreement between an association representing the majority of building contractors in the Metropolitan area of New York City and Long Island with an association of labor unions in the same territory, providing for a "closed-shop" in such area, was held void as having for its object the monopolization of the labor market. An injunction restraining such union activity was granted. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works, 92 N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 376 (1920). See also Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Local 560, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 91 N. J. Eq. 240, 109 Atl. 147 (1920); Blakely Laundry Co. v. Cleaners & Dyers Local No. 18, 422, 11 N. J. Misc. 915, 169 Atl. 541 (1933); Upholsterers, etc. Union, Local No. 76 et al. v. Essex Reed & Fibre Co., Inc., 12 N. J. Misc. 637, 174 Atl. 207; Wasilewski v. Bakers Union, 118 N. J. Eq. 349, 179 Atl. 284 (1935); International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, 122 N. J. Eq. 222, 193 Atl. 808 (1937).

Complainant applied for membership in a union, after his employer made a closed-shop contract, and was rejected because the books of the union were closed to new membership. The union demanded that complainant be discharged. In an action brought by employer to restrain union from interfering with his employees, the court held that an agreement which creates a substantial monopoly

of labor is void and unenforceable. An injunction issued restraining the union from interfering with complainant's employment. Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union of New York, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938).

C. SPECIAL ANTITRUST LAWS

1. Special Industry Antitrust Acts

Rev. Stat. (1937)
Railroads

Section 48: 12-126 provides that any railroad company may lease its road or any part thereof to any other company organized in New Jersey or any other State, and that any such railroad company may take a lease of the road or any part thereof of any other company organized in New Jersey or any other State. A railroad company may also unite or consolidate as well as merge its stock, property, franchise, and roads with those of any other company or companies, or may acquire by merger the stock, property, franchise, and roads of any other company or companies, or may do both.

After such lease, consolidation, or merger the acquiring company may operate and collect fares and freight as provided for companies organized under this law but not in excess of the charges on the line of any of the consolidated or merged companies, nor in excess of the rates limited by any special act incorporating such companies.

Such leasing, consolidation, or merger may be made where the roads of the companies involved connect, either directly or over the intervening lines of one or more other railroad companies.

Milk

App. A: 8-1 to App. A: 8-49 regulating the production, purchase, distribution, and sale of milk and cream provides (App. A: 8-34) that no milk dealers, processors, sub-dealers, or stores shall operate in any municipality under any secret or mutual agreement, arrangement, combination, contract, or common understanding whereby the price of fluid milk paid to the producers in this state is reduced, or the price to be paid to the consumers for such milk is decreased; any such arrangement is declared to be contrary to the public interest and in restraint of trade and commerce. The Milk Control Board, after a hearing, may decline to grant a license or may revoke a license already granted where the licensee has been a party to a combination to fix prices.

Stat. Ann. (1940)
Liquor

Section 33:1-43 provides that it shall be unlawful for any owner, part owner, stockholder, or officer or director of any corporation, or any other person whatsoever interested in any way whatsoever in any brewery, winery, distillery, or rectifying and blending plant or any wholesaler of alcoholic beverages, to conduct, own either in whole or in part, or be directly or indirectly interested in the retailing of any alcoholic beverages except as provided in this chapter. Any ownership, mortgage, or interest in such licensed premises, existing on December 6, 1933, shall not be deemed to be an interest in the retailing of alcoholic beverages up to December 6, 1940. Thereafter it shall continue not to be deemed a prohibited interest provided none of the products of the brewery, winery, distillery, rectifying, and blending plant, or wholesaler, are sold directly or indirectly at the licensed premises. Similar prohibitions are made against any interest in any of the above businesses when located outside of the state. The ownership, delivery, or loan of interior signs for advertising one's products shall not constitute an interest in the retailing of alcoholic beverages.

Section 33:1-43.1 provides that no owner, part owner, stockholder, officer, or director of any corporation, or any other person whatsoever interested in any way whatsoever in any brewery shall make any loan, directly or indirectly, to any retail licensee; but the foregoing shall not prohibit the extension, subject to rules and regulations, of reasonable credit in respect to ordinary current sales of brewery products; nor shall they furnish, repair, or replace fixtures in any such licensed retail business, except that the cleaning and repairing of pipes and similar matters may be permitted by rules and regulations.

Section 33:1-51 provides that any person who shall violate any of the other provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine not less than $50 and not more than $250, or by imprisonment for not less than ten days and not more than ninety days, or by both.

Section 33:1-52 provides that any person who shall knowingly aid or abet another in the violation of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable in the same manner as the violation aided or abetted.

Section 33:1-53 provides that in case any person shall be convicted of a second or subsequent offense, he shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, the maximum and minimum of which shall be twice the limits otherwise imposed by this chapter, or by both

in the discretion of the court. See Tying Contracts and Exclusive Dealing Arrangements, infra.

Section 33:1-43 provides that it shall be unlawful for any owner, part owner, stockholder, or officer or director of any corporation, or any other person whatsoever interested in any way whatsoever in any brewery, winery, distillery, or rectifying and blending plant or any wholesaler of alcoholic beverages, to conduct, own either in whole or in part, or be directly or indirectly interested in the retailing of any alcoholic beverages except as provided in this chapter, and such interest shall include any payments or delivery of money or property by way of loan or otherwise accompanied by an agreement to sell the product of said brewery, winery, distillery, rectifying, and blending plant or wholesaler. See Special Antitrust Laws: Liquor, supra. 2. Public Contracts

No provisions.

No provisions.

3. Anticoercive Financing Statutes

Judicial Decisions

It is within the power of the legislature to delegate to the public utility commission the power to approve the leases or articles of merger or consolidation of railroads. Section 48: 12-126 is limited to this extent by the Public Utility Act, sections 48:2-1 et seq. (L. 1911, c. 195). West Jersey & S. R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commisisoners, 85 N. J. L. 468, 89 Atl. 1017 (1914), affd, 87 N. J. L. 170, 94 Atl. 57 (1915).

Resolution of board of alderman of a city which required that all printing for the board be done in printing shops who recognize trade unions and pay union wages to their employees was held to be void as it excluded all persons except those of a specified class. This tends toward monopoly. Paterson Chronicle Co. v. City of Paterson, 66 N. J. L. 129, 48 Atl. 589 (1901).

Commissioners of a city, attempting by resolution to grant an exclusive franchise for the collection and cremation of garbage for a period of 20 years, had no power, without legislative authority, to create such monopoly. Conover et al. v. Long Branch Commission, 65 N. J. L. 167, 47 Atl. 222 (1900). See also Schwarz Bros. Co. v. Board of Health, 84 N. J. L. 735, 87 Atl. 463 (1913).

II. CONTRACTS NOT TO COMPETE

No statutory provisions.

Judicial Decisions

Restrictive Covenants Ancillary to the Sale of a Business.

Vendor of private banking business agreed not to compete in same city for 10 years was held valid and enforceable. Hoagland v. Segur, 38 N. J. L. 230 (1876); in such an agreement it is competent for the parties to liquidate the damages to be recovered in case of breach. Id. Vendor of stockyards business agreeing not to compete for 15 years in same city or within 200 miles thereof is not an unreasonable restraint and is valid. Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Rys. & Union Stock-Yards Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 217, 23 Atl. 287 (1891).

A covenant by vendors of a sheet-iron business not to compete in city where business sold was located was held valid. Carll v. Snyder et al., 26 Atl. 977 (1893).

Vendor of a factory engaged in business of manufacturing and selling sanitary pottery ware agreed not to compete for a period of 50 years "within any State of the United States of America, or within the District of Columbia, except in the State of Nevada and the territory of Arizona." Although sale of such products had never been carried on by the sellers in some of the territory described, the contract was divisible and could be enforced in such territory wherein the business had been carried on. Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723 (E. & App., 1899), mod'g Trenton Potteries v. Oliphant, 56 N. J. Eq. 680, 39 Atl. 923 (1898).

Vendor, who was principal stockholder of a meat business agreed not to compete for 20 years "within 500 miles of Jersey City." This is interpreted as meaning two areas, Jersey City and the area within a radius of 500 miles from Jersey City. The covenant was held enforceable in the area where the business was carried on (Jersey City). Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N. J. L. 613, 71 Atl. 265 (E. & App., 1908).

Vendor of business manufacturing white porcelain doorknobs agreed not to compete for a period of 5 years. The covenant was held valid. Artistic Porcelain Co. v. Boch, 76 N. J. Eq. 533, 74 Atl. 681 (1909).

Vendor of shoe-repair business agreed not to compete in same city for 5 years; during such period vendee resold said business, and the