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been unfolded ;---nay, the simplest operations of the mind could not have been retained for one moment. It is by means of this faculty that we are regulated in our most ordinary as well as in our most difficult pursuits. We must possess the power of recollecting the relation in which we stand to external objects, otherwise all the feelings and sentiments with which we are endowed would be utterly useless.
Mr Combe states, that the mind has no power of calling up into fresh existence the emotions experienced by means of the propensities and sentiments by merely willing them to be felt, and cc hence we hold these faculties not to possess memory.”
But this statement we conceive to be a mere evasion of the difficulty. The mere feeling, it is admitted, cannot confer the power of recalling the relation in which we may have stood to some being. The feeling itself is a simple and single phe. nomenon, as is likewise the individual object by which it may have been excited; and it is therefore plain, that the same faculty of the mind remembers both. But no account is given of the faculty, by means of which we are enabled to remember the relation in which the internal feeling stood to the external object. Without this faculty, the mind would have been made up of so many successive emotions, without any link by which to connect them with external nature. External circumstances might have excited our feelings, but without a faculty by which we are enabled to recollect the relation between the internal feeling and the external object, the external circumstances would no sooner cease to operate upon our feelings than every trace of these phenomena having existed in connexion would be utterly obliterated. It would be needless to proceed to illustration to show how much of our knowledge depends upon this principle of the mind. We may generally refer to the amazing knowledge of life and character possessed by Shakspeare. His perceptions were not only quick and powerful, but, in addition, he possessed the faculty, by means of which he stored up his own rich speculations on life and manners. This power of the mind, therefore, is of the highest importance, whether we regard
it simply by itself, or in reference to the influence which its comparative strength or weakness has over the individual character. As we are possessed of one faculty of mind, by which we recollect individual phenomena or events, so we are possessed of another, by which we recollect the relations which we trace or perceive among these phenomena or events. To the former power a place is assigned by Phrenologists; but the latter, according to their present views, is referable to a variety of faculties, varying in their functions, and attended with very different effects. Thus, the power, which we possess of remembering relations is scattered over a variety of powers, and has no distinct or independent existence , from these,-or, in the language of Mr. Combe, “. The ideas “ formed by the reflecting faculties can be recalled by an act of “ recollection, and they are therefore said to have mémory.” We are compelled to give this statement a positive denial, and shall now proceed to give our own views on the subject, and illustrate them by a reference to facts.
We are of opinion, that each of the Individualities is a faculty of the mind quite distinct from the other. To the lower we ascribe that function by which we are enabled to remember single unconnected phenomena or events. To
Το Upper Individuality belongs that function by which we remember relations of every description, whether these subsist between external phenomena, or between these phenomena and the mind itself. These positions, we maintain, are founded upon accurate observations. An individual who has Lower Individuality large, with the Upper small, will recollect phenomena or events which come under his notice very unconnectedly. He will be unable to remember the order in which they occurred, or, in other words, he will forget the relationship of one to another, though he may
stil recollect all the individual phenomena themselves. A person who has Upper Individuality very full, with the Lower moderate, will be unable to form a very vivid or clear conception of any individual object or phenomenon. These will be
suggested to him in consequence : of recollecting relations which he had previously traced or observed, or in consequence of recollecting the order in which such objects of phenomena were presented to his mind... A person who has both Lower and Upper large will, on the contrary, manifest an uncommon facility in recollecting both individual pheno mena or events, and the order in which such phenomena or events occurred or were presented to his mind. In illustration of our principles, we take the liberty of availing outselves of the example which Mr Combe quotes from Shakspeare, in page 279 of his System.We allude to Mrs. Quickly's speech to FalstaffShe is reminding him of his promise of marriage, and says
" Thou didst swear to me '" on a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my dolphin-chamber at the “ round table, by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitsun"week, when the Prince broke thy head for likening his father “to a singing-man of Windsor; thou didst swear to me then, “as I was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my “lady thy wife. Canst thou deny it?- Did not goodwife
Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Gossip ** Quickly? coming in to borrow a mess of vinegar, telling us « she had a good dish of prawns; whereby thou didst desire to “ eat some ; whereby I told thee they were, ill for a green “ wound ; and didst not thou, when she was gone down stairs, “ desire me to be no more so familiarity with such poor people, “saying that, ere long, they should call me madam? And didst “ not thou kiss me, and bid me fetch thee thirty shillings? I
put thee now to thy book-oath ; deny it if thou canst." "Here,” Mr Combe remarks,s is a surprising variety of trivial "circumstances connected by no link but that of the order of “their occurrence.” But Mr Combe does not distinguish be tween the power of recollecting the individual events and that of recollecting their connexion with each other. Aecording to our views of the mind, we remember individual phenomena or events by a distinct power from that by which we remember their connexion or order of occurrence. If a character such as Mrs Quickly had possessed Upper Individuality large, with the Lower moderate, these minute circumstances would have been suggested to her rather by recollecting the order of their occurrence than by directly re collecting the circumstances themselves; and, in consequence,
there would have been awanting that vivid and distinct con. ception of eachi minute circumstance which so strikingly, marks her character throughout Wii ou
We next proceed to show the connexion which Upper Individuality has with the reflecting faculties, and shall simply state the abstract principle, and give a few examples by way of illustration. We maintain, then, that Upper Individu, ality remembers the relations which the reflecting faculties trace or observe either in external nature, or between erternal nature and the mind itself. When we speak of phenomena, we refer to those of mind as well as matter; and our doctrine is this, that all unconnected phenomena are taken cog: nizance of by Lower Individuality, that the reflecting facul. ties observe or trace relations between these phenomena, and that these relations are stored up by Upper Individuality.
Causality simply traces or perceives the relation of cause and effect between phenomena ; Comparison compares
objects or phenomena ; Wit perceives the difference between phenomena or ideas; and Upper Individuality remembers all the relations which these powers have traced or observed. An individual, therefore, who has all the reflecting organs large, if his Upper Individuality is small, how. ever quickly he may trace relations between phenomena stored up in Lower Individuality, will be much inferior in memory of relations to the man who has the reflecting powers only full, with Upper Individuality large, supposing the condition of cæteris paribus to hold in regard to the other powers of both. So much for the connexion which Upper Individuality has with the reflecting faculties. We may here notice the manner of the operation of Upper Individuality in regard to Ideality, which seems to hold a place between our intellectual powers and sentiments. Mr Combe, in his chapter on Ideality, seems to be of opinion that this power confers the sentiment of beauty, and is accordingly necessary to the conception of the sublime. This view of Ideality we admit to accord strikingly with the fact -When a person with this
organ large looks on 'a beautiful landscape, he pereeives nothing externally which a person with the organ small does not perceive, but he feels the emotion' of beauty in his own mind with a degree of vividness which the other cannot feel. Every thing he looks on has a degree of exquisiteness and perfectibility about it which a person with the organ small cannot experience. The individual object and the feeling, as separate and distinct phenomená, are remembered by Lower Individuality ; but how do we remember the relation-" ship between the object and the feeling? At the time when the external object is perceived and the sentiment of beauty is felt, it is Causality which perceives the relation of cause and effect, as between the external' object and the sentiment of beauty, and it is Upper Individuality which remembers this relation. We may thus recollect both the object and the feeling or emotion separately by means of Lower Individuality, but we remember the relation in which they stood to each other by means of Upper Individuality,—or, in other words, we remember that the perception of the object excited the vivid emotion described. This influence of Upper Individuality in reference to Ideality is borne out by observation. We have visited Westminster Abbey, St Paul's, and many other public places in London, where busts of poets are to be found, but in vain, to discover one very deficient in Upper Individuality. Most of them have it very full, some only full, but none have it small.
After what we have stated in regard to the function of Upper Individuality with reference to Ideality, it will not be necessary to go into detail in order to show its connexion with the other sentiments and feelings. We may observe generally, that Upper Individuality gives the power of recollecting the relation in which we stand to external objects calculated to excite our sentiments or feelings; Causality perceives the relation of cause and effect as between these objects and our sentiments or feelings, and Upper Individuality retains the relation so perceived. If a single example is pro