"cording to this view, (continues Mr Combe), would consist "in conceptions formed by the higher power imbued with "the sentiment in question;" that is, the conception of difference imbued with the feeling of the ludicrous. Now if to unite together, as the operation of one faculty, two functions, between which nature seems to have drawn a line of separation so broad and distinct, be unphilosophical, it seems wonderful that this incongruity should not have so arrested the attention of a mind, acute as that of Dr Spurzheim undoubtly was to have led him to discover whether or no there be a separate organ for the feeling of the ludicrous.

Mr Scott, endowed, as he undoubtedly is, with a philosophical mind of a high order, seems, nevertheless, to have stumbled upon the same unphilosophical account of the faculty of Wit. From his opinion, however, as to the function of Wit being both to distinguish differences and to give the feeling of the ludicrous, we must be permitted to withhold our assent until we see a satisfactory reason for modifying so considerably, as in this case we must do, all our previously-acquired notions respecting the functions of sentiment and intellect, which, as we both love and seek the truth, we, upon good cause being shown, are very willing to do.*

Mr Scott, in support, we suppose, of his views respecting the combination of the ludicrous with discrimination as the functions of this faculty, affirms, that all instances of Wit, in the common acceptation of the word, are resolvable into the perception of difference, or of " congruity amid incongruity." If this be correct, Wit has, in the common acceptation of the term, as much to do with the faculty of Comparison as with the phrenological faculty of Wit; because, according to Mr Scott's definition, all instances of Wit are resolvable into the

The present essay was printed before the author had an opportunity of seeing Mr Scott's article in our last Number; but in our next we shall insert the observations with which he has since favoured us on the same subject. -EDITOR.

perception of congruity amid incongruity, or, which is the same thing, of unexpected and ludicrous resemblances or analogies, which includes not only the perception of difference, the function of Wit phrenologically so called, but likewise the operation of the faculty of Comparison. But, if we are not very much mistaken as to what is meant by Wit, in the common acceptation of the term, Mr Scott, in including the perception of difference in his definition, is rather incorrect. For Wit, in the common acceptation of the term, seems not only not to include this function, but, in fact, in many instances, perhaps in all, to run counter to this function of the phrenological faculty of Wit. It is more than probable that Mr Scott is better acquainted both with the theory and practice of Wit, commonly so called, than we pretend to be; it becomes us therefore to speak modestly; but we suspect he cannot adduce any instance of Wit being a perception of unexpected differences; whereas we can adduce many bearing the character of unexpected or ludicrous resemblance or analogy. In this opinion we are supported by no less authority than that of Mr Locke, who evidently considered Wit, in the popular acceptation of the word, as opposed to judgment; by which he evidently meant the discriminating faculty, ascribing to it the very same function as that which the Phrenologist ascribes to his faculty of Wit. He represents Wit "as ly

ing in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together "with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resem"blance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures in "the fancy. Judgment, on the contrary, lies in separating carefully one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude."

If then it be true, that, after all, the phrenological faculty of Wit has just nothing at all to do with Wit, commonly so called, and if it be admitted, that Comparison is chiefly, if not exclusively, employed about all that is intellectual in Wit, commonly so called; if we are to combine the feeling of ludicrous with any of the intellectual faculties, it ought to be with the faculty of Comparison, rather than with the phreno

logical faculty of Wit; but it should likewise be combined with Causality, because we may sometimes meet with most exquisite specimens of ludicrous reasoning. Nay more, if we are to ascribe the function of giving ludicrous feeling or drollery to any one of the intellectual powers, we have, we think, about as good a reason to associate it with the function of every one of the intellectual faculties, knowing as well as reflective.

II. This brings us to the consideration of our second objection to the combination of the function of giving ludicrous feeling with that of discrimination in the phrenological faculty of Wit; that it is only, we think, apparently but not really supported by correct observation. What we think we have noticed in our observation of character seems to militate against this unphilosophical combination of functions; and it is this, that many seem to possess a faculty of infusing the essence of drollery, and of thereby giving a ludicrous effect to what they say and do, who do not possess the discriminating faculty in any proportionable degree, or indeed, perhaps, in any degree at all; and, vice versa, we have seen many with a sound acute discriminating faculty, who seemed incapable of giving a ludicrous effect to what they said, or at least to do so in any degree proportioned to the measure in which they were endowed with that faculty phrenologically called Wit.

We said, that the feeling of the ludicrous might be with as good a reason combined with the function of any other of the intellectual faculties, knowing and reflective, as with that of the discriminating faculty. Why should we not combine it with Individuality, and perhaps with Form, Size, Locality, Order, Tune, and Language? We have witnessed some interesting instances of the combination of the feeling of the ludicrous with the operation of individuality, and that in persons no way remarkable for, nay, in many cases, very deficient in the faculty of discrimination. Very frequently have

we heard a person tell a story, in itself so simple, and, when read, so unentertaining as not to excite any emotion, with such ludicrous effect, that the inclination to laughter was irresistible. We have heard another tell the same story without any sensible change in the narration, and nobody could see why he took the trouble to tell a story so unentertaining and so pointless; nor could the unlucky wight himself tell what it had lost in his hands, nor give any other reason for telling it than this very natural one, that he had had a good hearty laugh at it himself when he heard it; and that all his fellow-hearers had likewise laughed; and that they were all very happy; and that, therefore, it must surely be an entertaining story, though he could not well tell why. There are persons equally deficient in, or, at least, no way remarkable for discrimination, who have something'so very comical in their gesture and in their expression of countenance, that, at first sight at least, you cannot look at them without feeling an irresistible inclination to smile. When such drollery is accompanied with large Secretiveness and powerful reflective qualities, the effect of the whole combination is sometimes tremendous. But there are many instances of persons possessing all the reflective qualities in a high degree, with little or nothing of the faculty of giving a ludicrous effect to the operation of these faculties. If this and what has been advanced above be true, neither the phrenological faculty of Wit, nor any other intellectual faculty, is or can be the source of the ludicrous. We would, therefore, propose an amendment on Mr Scott's analysis of Humour. Instead of saying, the talent for it is produced by Secretiveness in combination with Wit, we would be disposed to say, the talent of Humour is produced by Secretiveness in combination with some faculty, the organ of which has not been discovered, and is, therefore, still a desideratum; a faculty the function of which is to give the feeling of the ludicrous; the former giving "the slyness, the latter the ludicrous colouring, which toge"ther constitute Humour, imitation aiding those powers in producing the ludicrous effect."

We have an organ for the feeling of the sublime and beautiful, for the wonderful, and for most, if not for all, of our other original feelings; why then should there not be among the sentiments an organ for the feeling of the ludicrous? To ascribe the feeling of the ludicrous to an intellectual faculty as its function is, as we have said, both unphilosophical and contradicted by observation. But we might say farther, that if we are to combine the feeling of the ludicrous with the function of Wit, or of any other of the intellectual faculties, with as good reason may we join the feeling of Sublime and Beautiful, of Wonder, Benevolence, Veneration, Hope, or any other of the sentiments, with Wit, Causality, Comparison, or any other of the faculties of the understanding.

That the mind does not more certainly possess the susceptibility of the various primitive feelings of Fear, Hope, Benevolence, Veneration, Wonder, and Sublimity, than it possesses the susceptibility of the primitive feeling of the ludicrous, appears from the dictates of Consciousness, as well as from observation of character, to be most evident; and that this feeling does not rise out of the operation of any of the intellectual faculties, is, for the same reason, we think, not less evident. If, then, it be true, that the feeling of the ludicrous is a primitive feeling, not resolvable into any other feeling, or combination of feelings, and if it likewise be true, that observation of character militates against the unphilosophical idea of combining it with the function of any intellectual faculty as its source, it seems necessary towards the completion of the system of Phrenology, that it should be put upon the same footing with the other primitive feelings and sentiments of which the mind is susceptible, by the discovery of a cerebral organ on which its manifestation depends.

III. Our third and last objection to the combination of the feeling of the ludicrous with the power of discrimination, as the function of the faculty of Wit, arises from the obser