"Or

Order corresponds to Lord Kames's sense of der," vol. IV., p. 125, and of " Symmetry," vol. I., p. 116.

66

Time,} These are not recognized by metaphysicians.

Language is admitted by Mr Stewart "as an auxiliary faculty and principle," (Outlines, p. 68); and Dr Thomas Brown's power of "Simple Suggestion" includes the whole, from Individuality downwards.

Comparison.-Malebranche and Lord Bacon have both discriminated a "radical distinction" betwixt minds; "that 66 some have greater power, and are more fitted for the ob"servation of the differences, others for the observation of "the resemblances of things." (Quoted in System of Phrenology, pp. 354—5.) This power of observing "resem

blances" is Comparison.

Causality-This and Comparison correspond to the power of "Relative Suggestion" of Dr Thomas Brown. Lord Kames speaks of a "Sense of Cause," vol. IV. p. 103.

Wit is the "Sense of the Ludicrous" of the metaphysicians. Lord Kames admits " a Sense of Ridicule."

Imitation is recognized by almost all writers on the mind. In fact, twenty of the phrenological faculties are recognized by Lord Kames alone.

To return to your objections to the phrenological faculties:-"Our perception of sounds," you say, " is quite in"dependent of our perception of colours, odours, or tastes; "and would be precisely what it is, though none of those per"ceptions, or the objects of them, existed in the universe. It is "in truth this palpable separation and independence of these dif"ferent classes of sensations which leads us to describe the ca"pacity of receiving them as a separate function or faculty of "the mind."-P. 263. To all this I readily accede; but when you say, that, "in this respect, the case of the imaginary faculties "of the Phrenologists is not only in no degree analogous, but "directly the reverse," I simply refer you to the authorities just cited, which prove, that the existence of at least sevenVOL. IV.-No XIII.

C

tenths of them, as "separate and independent classes" of emotions or intellectual powers, is actually admitted by the most accurate and profound metaphysicians of Britain.

Immediately after the passage last cited, you proceed :— "In this way it is obvious, that our knowledge of the organ "(of an external sense) is antecedent to our knowledge of the faculty, and that it is truly by reference to the former that the "latter is recognized and determined.".

There is much reason to doubt the soundness of this proposition. The infant mind knows that it sees, hears, smells, tastes, and feels long before it knows that it has optic, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and sentiatory nerves. In fact, mankind could not have assigned functions to the organs of sense at all, until after they had experienced and discriminated the sensations; because the organ, contemplated by itself, is a mere unmeaning mass of matter. Imagine that you were to present the ear to a man born deaf, and to desire him to describe the use of it, could he do so? and yet this is a fair and appropriate example of the possibility of discovering the faculty by antecedently knowing the organ.

66

You tell us that, in this respect also, the case of the phrenological faculties is "not only in no degree analogous, but directly the reverse. As to these, it must be admitted that we "have no antecedent knowledge of the existence of any mate"rial organs; and the existence of the faculties, therefore, must "be assumed on quite different data, if it is not rather imagined "without any reason at all."-P. 263.

The order of Dr Gall's discoveries was the following. He first distinguished different mental talents and dispositions in his brothers, sisters, and school-fellows; secondly, he observed differences in the forms of their heads; thirdly, he ascertained that the forms indicated particular developments of brain; and, lastly, he ascertained, by extensive observation, that particular forms and particular talents or dispositions, were concomitant in all sane and healthy individuals. This is exactly analogous to the real method with the senses. We first know that we see, and then, "by anatomy and experiment," discover the connexion of the optic nerve with this operation. After the principle of distinct organs is de

termined, we may infer, that a particular unappropriated part of the brain is an organ, before we know its functions; but this knowledge does not enable us at once to designate its uses.

Near the beginning of your article the following sentence occurs" If it were asserted that every man detected

cheating at play would be found to have the figure of a nine "of diamonds in the transverse section of the nail of his great"toe, we suspect there are not many people who would think it "worth while to verify the fact by experiment."-P. 256; and you insinuate by this, that it is equally idle to look for the organs of the mental faculties in the brain. There are three distinctions, however, between the cases, which are worth noticing. In the First place, it is a well-established principle in physiology, that different functions are never performed by the same organ. The optic nerve does not both see and hear; and we already know, that the great-toe performs a certain function,—that of muscular motion,→ distinct from cheating at cards. Secondly, the brain has no ascertained function, if it is not the organ of mind. Dr Roget, your fellow-labourer in the refutation of Phrenology, says, that "the brain is still as incomprehensible in its func"tions as it is subtile and complex in its anatomy."-(Art. Cranioscopy in Sup. to Encyc. Brit.) Thirdly, Consciousness localizes the mind in the head, although it does not reveal what organs are in the interior of the skull; and as the brain is found, by observation, to occupy that cavity, there are much better reasons, even a priori, for looking for the organs of mind in the encephalon than in the nail of the great

toe.

The next objection is, that "so far from supplying ori"ginal, definite, and independent impressions, the greater part "of the phrenological faculties presuppose the existence of such

* You have one merit, however, that of consistency in your positions, which it is but fair to acknowledge. You maintain, that knowledge of the organ must precede knowledge of the faculty; but as you admit some faculties in the mind of which you do not know the organs, you very properly deny that they have organs at all. This, at least, is consistency in error.

rr

"impressions, and seem to have little other function than to modify or direct the functions of other faculties. Thus, Love of Approbation presupposes an habitual communication of sen"timents with other men ;-Veneration, a custom of observing "and comparing the powers and qualities of different beings;"Acquisitiveness, the general development of the idea of property-and Cautiousness, an experience of the occasions and consequences of many forms of danger."-P. 263.

I admit the soundness of the greater number of these observations; but what then?-Do not the eyes presuppose light, and objects to be seen,-the stomach hunger, and objects to be eaten,-the horns of the buffalo enemies to be overcome, and the claws of the lion prey to be caught and devoured? and are we to infer from this, that these different instruments are not primitive institutions of nature, but fashioned by the animals themselves, after the occasions for using them have occurred? If the Creator framed man for the obvious purpose of living in society,-of comparing himself with other beings,-of subsisting upon property, and of occasionally encountering dangers, what could be more reasonable than to bestow on him, in anticipation of these circumstances, the primitive faculties and organs to which you here object? Could be make these for himself after he came to need them, or ought the work of creation to have proceeded piecemeal, each faculty being supplied for the first time only when a demand was made for its services ?

You enter into a train of gratuitous assertion and confused argument to establish the unreasonableness of admitting several of the phrenological faculties as primitive principles of mind. I might simply refer to the authorities already cited, which show that principles precisely similar to by far the greater number of them have been recognized by the profoundest metaphysicians of the present and preceding ages, and, on this account, doubt whether your dicta on this subject should be received in opposition to the opinions of so many distinguished men. But it may be worth while briefly to examine a few of your positions, and to judge of them by their intrinsic merits.

You say that "our old philosophers were all pretty well

"agreed, that it was the same principle (namely Benevolence), "that was, in every case, at the bottom of our regard and affec"tion for sentient beings of all descriptions; though it was va"riously modified by a consideration of the different qualities of "the objects to which it was directed, and the different relations "in which they might happen to stand to us; and when their "attention was called to the distinctions that might be pointed "out between the kind of love they bore to their children and "that they felt for their parents, or the attachment they cherish"ed to their young female friends, as compared with their an "cient male ones, or to the worthies of their own country and "those of foreign lands,—or to inferiors and superiors of their "own or of other races, they thought all this pretty well explained "by saying, that it was the GENERAL BENEVOLENT FEELING " modified, in the case of children, by a sense of the weakness, “innocence, and dependence of their condition; in the case of pa"rents, by respect for their experience and authority, and grati"tude for the obligations they had conferred ;-in the case of young women, by emotions of sex-of our own countrymen, by associations of patriotic partiality," &c.-P. 265.

Now, in the first place, it is not true that the old philosophers gave any such explanation as is here laid in their names. They admitted sexual love, love of children, and desire of society, as distinct principles from Benevolence; and you are not supported by them in asserting that all these are mere modifications of one general benevolent feeling. But, in point of fact, you only intend to maintain this doctrine, and do not in reality do so. The benevolent feeling, you say, is modified;-by what ?-by itself,-if there be only one general feeling.-But this is not what you allege ;—it is modified, you say, in the case of children, by "a sense of weakness," (Philoprogenitiveness); in the case of parents, by "respect for their experience and authority," (Veneration); in the case of young women by "emotions of sex,” (Amativeness); of our own countrymen, "by associations of patriotic partiality,” (Adhesiveness). All these modifying feelings then must necessarily subsist distinct, not only from Benevolence, but from each other, otherwise there is no sense in your words. The phrenological analysis of these mental affections is, that they arise from Benevolence, acting in combination with the other faculties now specified;