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long been made by metaphysicians. Father Malebranche says, There are geniuses of two sorts. The one remarks easily the “ differences existing between objects, and these are the excellent

geniuses ; the others imagine and suppose resemblances between “ things, and these are the superficial minds."* Locke makes the same distinction.

After speaking of Wit “as lying most “ in the assemblage of ideas wherein any resemblance is to be

found,”+ he proceeds thus :-" Judgment, on the contrary, lies “ quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, “ ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid “ being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing “ for another.”I Lord Bacon says, that “the chief, and as it were “ radical distinction betwixt minds, in regard to philosophy and

science, is this,--that some minds may have greater power, and

are more fitted for the observation of the differences, others for " the observation of the resemblances of things."

Having stated three such authorities, in addition to what I conceive to be matter of common observation to all who have given their attention to the varieties of intellectual genius,) we may be entitled to hold these to outweigh the unsupported opinion of Dr Spurzheim ; and, following the observations of Dr Gall, we may assume that there is a separate and distinct organ, the function of which is to perceive resemblances and analogies; and, therefore, without entering into any farther argument, we shall proceed to consider more minutely the true nature and limits of the faculty, and the various important uses which it is calculated to serve in the intellectual economy.

In the first place, it is to be observed, that the faculty now under consideration does not seem to be required for the perceiving of every kind of resemblance, still less for the perception of identity, the latter of which obviously falls within the province of Individuality and the lower observing powers. That sort of resemblance which approaches nearest to identi

• Rech. de la Verité, liv. ii. part 2, chap. 9.

+ Mr Locke is not here speaking of the phrenological faculty to which the name of Wit has been given, but of what is generally termed wit in common discourse, which depends more upon the discovery of resemblances than the nice distinguishing of differences.

& Essay, book II chap. xi. S 2.

taphors and figures used by others to adorn and illustrate their discourses, are all founded on some sort of resemblance, real or supposed, between the examples, analogies, and figures adduced, and the subjects which they are intended to illustrate. But Dr Spurzheim does not seem inclined to limit the faculty to the perception of resemblance ;-he goes on to say, “ It compares the sensations and ideas of all the “ other faculties, and points out their difference, analogy, « similitude, or identity.” And as he conceives it to take cognizance of difference as well as resemblance, he has changed the name of “ organ of Analogy," adopted by Dr Gall, to “ organ of Comparison;" but he has given no proof, nor even one solitary instance, of this faculty being concerned with differences.

In his more recent work, entitled “ Phrenology,” Dr Spurzheim alludes to certain views of this faculty, and of the neighbouring organs of Causality and Wit, taken by the Edinburgh Phrenologists, and, in particular, to a suggestion of mine which is mentioned by Mr Combe, that difference or contrast is taken notice of by the last-mentioned faculty. He then says, “ as to the view taken by Mr Wil“ liam Scott, I reply, that, in my opinion, the same power which

perceives resemblances perceives differences also. I see no reason for adopting two faculties for the act of discrimination."

With all due respect to the authority of Dr Spurzheim, I cannot subscribe to his opinion on this point, or rather I conceive it to be demonstrable that there are separate powers for perceiving resemblances and distinguishing differences. This seems sufficiently proved by the very familiar fact, that there are some minds more disposed to recognize resemblances and analogies, even the most remote, while others are remarkable for detecting the minutest points of difference. On their different dispositions, in this respect, depends, in a great measure, the intellectual character of different minds. This observation, Mr Combe remarks,* has

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• Combe's System, p. 354.

long been made by metaphysicians. Father Malebranche says, “ There are geniuses of two sorts. The one remarks easily the “ differences existing between objects, and these are the excellent “ geniuses ; the others imagine and suppose resemblances between

things, and these are the superficial minds."* Locke makes the same distinction. After speaking of Wit “ as lying most “ in the assemblage of ideas wherein any resemblance is to be “ found,"+ he proceeds thus :-"Judgment, on the contrary, lies

quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, “ ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid “ being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing " for another."I Lord Bacon says, that "the chief, and as it were “ radical distinction betwixt minds, in regard to philosophy and “ science, is this,--that some minds may have greater power, and

are more fitted for the observation of the differences, others for “ the observation of the resemblances of things.”

Having stated three such authorities, in addition to what I conceive to be matter of common observation to all who have given their attention to the varieties of intellectual genius) we may be entitled to hold these to outweigh the unsupported opinion of Dr Spurzheim ; and, following the observations of Dr Gall, we may assume that there is a separate and distinct organ, the function of which is to perceive resemblances and analogies ; and, therefore, without entering into any farther argument, we shall proceed to consider more minutely the true nature and limits of the faculty, and the various important uses which it is calculated to serve in the intellectual economy.

In the first place, it is to be observed, that the faculty now under consideration does not seem to be required for the perceiving of every kind of resemblance, still less for the perception of identity, the latter of which obviously falls within the province of Individuality and the lower observing powers. That sort of resemblance which approaches nearest to identi

• Rech. de la Verité, liv. ii. part 2, chap. 9.

+ Mr Locke is not here speaking of the phrenological faculty to which the name of Wit has been given, but of what is generally termed wit in common discourse, which depends more upon the discovery of resemblances than the nice distinguishing of differences.

+ Essay, book II. chap. xi. 8 2.

ty, such, for instance, as we find between one egg and another, or between the different individuals of our species, where the resemblances are the greatest possible, and the differences hardly perceptible, seems to require no higher power of mind for its discovery than those which are necessary for the perception of the objects themselves. Nay, to go lower in the scale, the resemblance between one form and another may be sufficiently perceived by the organ of Form alone ; that between one colour and another by the organ of Colour, and so on ; while Individuality, which combines the activity of these lower observing powers in the perception of one concrete individual object, may perceive the likeness which exists between that and another individual object of the same kind.

In all these cases, the resemblances discovered will be limited by the nature of the faculty to which we attribute them. Form may compare forms, and Colour may compare colours.

Tune may compare sounds, and Individuality may compare individuals. But none of these faculties, nor all of them together, can compare a colour to a sound, nor an object of the external senses to a feeling of the mind. This can only be accomplished by a faculty which takes within its

grasp the whole range of nature. Such is the faculty we are now considering. It compares things of the most opposite kind, draws analogies, and discovers resemblances between them often the most unexpected and surprising. It compares a light, seen afar off in a dark night, to “ a good “ deed shining in a naughty world :"_it compares the kingdom of heaven to a grain of mustard-seed.

If we would describe more minutely and accurately what are the kinds of resemblances which this faculty discovers, it will perhaps be found that they are in no case direct resemblances, such as are perceived by the observing powers, but relative resemblances, or, to speak more accurately, resemblances not between the objects themselves, but between their relations to other objects. What resemblance is there,

instance, between a good action and the light of a candle ?

None whatever directly ; but relatively there is felt to be a resemblance, when the light appears brighter because of the surrounding darkness, and when the good action is set off by the contrast afforded by the wickedness of the world.

In short, this faculty seems to be the same as that which is described by Dr Thomas Brown under the name of “ Feel

ing of Resemblance," although he does not attribute this to a separate and distinct faculty, but classes it with those other feelings which he supposes to belong to relative suggestion. Dr Brown seems to have been led here, by an extreme love of simplification, to attribute to one faculty what actually belongs to several, and to have been prevented by this alone from arriving at the discovery of the simple phrenological faculty now under consideration. As it is, he has come wonderfully near to the phrenological doctrines; and the account he has given of those relative suggestions," which are included in the “ Feelings of Resemblance,” may be adopted, almost without alteration, as a complete metaphysical analysis of that faculty to which Spurzheim has given the name of Comparison, but which seems to have been more accurately designated by Dr Gall as the “ Sense of Ana

logy."

We may first examine the similes, metaphors, and figures, which are used to embellish poetry and other ornamented compositions, and see if the description we have now given applies to them. The most direct of these is the simile, which consists in an open and undisguised comparison of one object to another, in order to point out a resemblance. Take as an instance the following from Homer :

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As when from Ida's craggy forehead torn
“ A rock’s vast fragment flies; with fury borne,
From steep to steep the rolling ruin bounds,
“ At every shock the crackling wood resounds ;
“Still gath’ring force, it smokes, and, urged amain,
“Whirls, leaps, and thunders down, impetuous to the plain :
“There stops.—So Hector, their whole force he proved,
Resistless when he raged, and when he stopp’d, unmoved."

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