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“ judicium) tam purè mentis sunt, ut primo intuitu haud quica

quam corporei iis inesse videatur: Docent tamen morbi qui, “eas impediunt certum cerebri statum, ut bene exerceantur requiri: idque sensuum internorum primarium esse organum."

Magendie, whose name stands so high both in France and Britain, says, “ The brain is the material instrument of

thought. This is proved by a multitude (une foule) of ex

periments and facts."* -Precis Elementaire de Physiologie, tome I., p. 115. edit. 1816.

Your next objection is the following :-" If the theory of { “ the Phrenologists be right, it would seem to follow, a fortiori, First, that all the five external senses must have organs in the brain, as well as a connected apparatus or machinery beyond “it ;-and, secondly, it is, at all events, a fundamental point in “their creed, that the mind is not in any way conscious or aware, “ even as to them, that it acts by means of organs having any « locality at all. Now, the first and most plausible of these “propositions they have themselves been forced to abandon ; « and both, we humbly conceive, are not only gratuitous, bnt, in any sound sense, entirely unfounded and erroneous.-P.258.

In answer to the assertion, that " all the five external senses “ must have organs in the brain," I beg to state, that, from the views entertained by Phrenologists regarding the senses, (some of which are stated in a subsequent part of this Letter,) no other organs than those already known appear to be necessary ;but, secondly, we are quite ready to admit such organs whenever you prove their existence as matter of fact. You reply, however, that “it will not do to suggest here, or in other “ cases, where the allowance of faculties is plainly insufficient, “ that these are mere omissions, which may still be supplied “ if necessary, and do not affect the principle of the system. The

system, it must be remembered, rests not on principle, but on observation alone. Its advocates peril their cause on the as“sertion, that it is proved by observation, and as matter of fact, “ that their thirty-six bumps are the organs of thirty-six parti“ cular faculties, and no other,--that these organs have a cer“ tain definite shape and relative place and size,mand that

• These authorities are all cited in my “ Essays on Phrenology," published in 1819, in answer to a denial, in the 49th Number of the Edinburgh Review, that the brain is the organ of mind. They were not reprinted in the System, because the objection had been, till you took it up again, abandoned as utterly untenable. *1...


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" among them they cover the whole skull, and occupy the whole

surface of the brain."-P. 287. This jis your statement ; but the following is mine, printed in the work which


have reviewed : There are parts at the base of the brain, in the middle and posterior regions, the size of which cannot be discover« ed during life, and whose functions in consequence are still unknown. From analogy, and from some pathological facts,

they are supposed to be the organs of the sensations of hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and of some other mental affections, for which cerebral organs have not been discovered;

but “ demonstrative evidence to this effect being wanting, this con“jecture is merely stated to incite to farther investigation.”— System of Phrenology, p. 31. If, then, you can show that there are mental affections attending the activity of the five senses, which cannot be referred to the external organs, nor to any of the internal organs admitted by Phrenologists, it will undoubtedly follow, on the principles of this science, that such affections must have organs also; but the objection, that “ there is no room for them to extend their position," is utterly unfounded.

As to the mind's consciousness of organs, I shall notice, first, the real phrenological doctrine on that point; and, secondly, your commentary upon it. In the System of Phre. nology it is stated, that “the mind is not conscious of acting

by means of organs; and hence the material instruments, by " means of which it performs its operations in this life, and “ communicates with the external world, cannot be discovered “ by reflection on consciousness.”-P. 25.

In the Essays on Phrenology this doctrine is illustrated at some length ; but the illustrations were omitted in “ the System” as superfluous, the point having been conceded by every person who had considered the subject. Allow me, however, to repeat them, as you still dispute the accuracy of this fundamental principle of the science. “ The organs, by means of which the mind acts

upon, and by means of which it receives impressions from the “ external world, perform their functions without any con“ sciousness in the mind either of their existence or their ope“rations. For example, voice is produced by the contraction and relaxation of a number of muscles connected with the “ larynx, at the command of the will; and yet consciousness “ gives us no intimation either of the existence or functions of

“ these muscles. In like manner, the leg and arm are extended “ and withdrawn by means of the nerves of voluntary motion, “and a great number of muscles at the command of the will; " and yet of the existence and operation of these nerves and “muscles consciousness gives us no intimation. We are con " scious of the act of volition which puts them motion, and “ of the result produced, but not of the existence and operation “ of the special nerves and muscles themselves.”Essay on Phrenology, p. 3.

Phrenologists then say, that the mind is not conscious of smelling by means of the olfactory nerves, hearing by the auditory, or seeing by the optic nerves.

On this doctrine you remark, “but they are all agreed, “ it seems, that the mind has no knowledge of the existence “of the organs of sense, or of the functions performed by 56 them."-P. 267. Here you have used the freedom to substitute “ Knowledge,” which I did not write, for “ Consciousness,” the word actually employed; and your reason for doing so will speedily appear. You proceed, This, 'to most “ people, will probably appear more surprising still. Is it s meant to be said, that we do not know, certainly, naturally, “ and immediately, that we see with our eyes, and hear with our ears, and feel with

hat part of our bodies on which an “external impression is made ?" This objection is absolutely created by your substituting the assertion, that “the mind has

no knowledge of the organs of sense,” for the real proposition, that it has “ no consciousnessof them. The Phrenologists have not said, that we do not know that we see by the optic nerves, but only affirm, that this fact is ascertained by observation, and not by instinctive consciousness; and the inference which they draw is, that if we cannot discover the existence even of such palpable organs as the auditory and olfactory nerves by means of simple consciousness or feeling, but must resort to observation to find them out, it is not wonderful that we should not be conscious of the internal or. gans of the mind, or that observation should be requisite to determine them also.

You anticipate this correction, and the answer that will be founded on it, and try to show that the words "immediately


“ know and feel," are synonimous with being conscious." You then proceed :-“The true question upon either supposition “ is, whether, knowing and feeling, as, in one way or other, we “ do with the most perfect distinctness, that we see with our

eyes, and hear with our ears, and that it is by these organs “ alone that the mind performs these functions, it can be truly " or even imtelligibly said, that we are as little aware of acting by

material organs when we so see or hear, as we are that we love our children, by bumps on the back of the head, or perceive the

beauty of music by a small protuberance in the middle of the “ eyebrow."-P. 260. The only shadow of plausibility in this argument depends on your confounding facts and propositions that are altogether distinct. The ears, in popular language, include the whole auditory apparatus, namely, the external ear, the tympanum, labyrinth, semicircular canals, numerous small bones, and the auditory nerve which connects these with the brain ; and the “eyes,” in common speech, include the eyeballs and the optic nerves. Now,

are we aware” of any thing more than the mere locality of the senses of hearing and seeing? Do you assert that we are aware” of all the organic apparatus noro enumerated, and that you are conscious that the existence of an external object becomes known to you, through the eye, only by means of an image depicted on your own retina ? You certainly cannot maintain this. But we have the same general impression of the locality of the mind; we know that we do not love children by tnę foot, nor write reviews by the calf of the leg, but that thinking in general is performed by the liead. If we go one step farther, however, and inquire whether we know that there is a brain, or an apparatus of organs in the interior of the skull, by means of which the processes of thinking are accomplished ? the answer must be, that we do not know until we have ascertained the fact by observation. In like manner, I venture to assert, that mankind have found out the optic nerve to be the organ of vision, solely by observing, that vision never existed without it; or, in your own words, “ by anatomy and experiment.” If this be sound physiology, does it warrant you to object to the doctrine which teaches, that,


in order to discover a particular portion of the brain to be the organ of Benevolence, we must observe the relation between the power of experiencing this emotion and the condition of that organic part ? and yet this is the proposition which you adduce it to refute.

After stating your objections to the organs, you proceed, “ These last considerations lead us naturally to another class of “ objections which, we confess, have always appeared to us of “ themselves conclusive against this new philosophy,—those we “ mean which apply to the strange apparatus of separate facullies and sentiments into which it has parcelled out and divided o the mind.

“We are a little jealous of the word faculties in any philoso“phical discussion. The mind, we take it, is one and indivisible ; “and if by faculties is meant parts, portions, or members, by " the aggregation of which the mind is made up, we must not “ only deny their existence, but confess that we have no great “ favour for a term which tends naturally to familiarize us with “ such an assumption. What are called faculties of the mind, “ we would consider as different acts, or rather states of it; but “ if this be the just view of the matter, it is plain that it renders “ it in the highest degree improbable, if not truly inconceivable, that those supposed faculties should have each a separate material organ.”---P. 261.

This objection has been long ago answered in the Phrenological Journal, vol. I. p. 206, and by the Rev. David Welsh, in a note to his Life of Dr Thomas Brown, quoted on page 54 of the “System” which you were reviewing. Dr Brown maintains, that the word faculties means only states of the mind; and Mr Welsh observes, that “ the only differ

ence that the doctrines of Phrenology introduce in regard to “Dr Brown's principle is, that, instead of the feelings and " thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance mind, to its own former states, or to external objects, they are “ the relations of the simple substance mind to certain portions “ of the encephalon.

" In looking upon any object—as snow-we have the notion “ of a certain colour. Now, the notion is not in the snow, but “ in the mind ; that is, the notion of colour is the mind existing “ in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed, on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the “ snow and the mind. There is an affection of the optic nerve. “ It will be conceded, that this does not alter the question as to “ the simplicity of the mind; and if this is conceded, it is abun



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