APPENDIX. Extracted from the 'NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW,' April, 1872. THE Article which reviews M. Benedetti's book, Ma Mission en Prusse, gives the early history of the now famous Belgian Project, substantially as it has been given in Chapter VI. It recounts the interview between Benedetti and Bismarck, before the return of the former to Paris, early in August, 1866, which ended with this remarkable warning from Von Bismarck : 'Please to call his Majesty's attention to this. Should a war arise out of this complication, it might be attended by a ' revolutionary crisis. In such a case, the thrones of the German dynasties are likely to prove more solid than that of the 'Emperor Napoleon.' After this conversation Count Benedetti returned to Paris. On the 12th August the Emperor's letter was published, in which matters were smoothed over. It was only after the Mayence question was thus disposed of, that the Belgian Project was brought forward. This was done through the means of a letter dated August 16th, which M. Chauvry brought to Count Benedetti from Paris, and which contained an accurate and precise abstract of his instructions. This letter of instructions contains the whole gist of the matter, and settles the whole question in dispute. The instructions were as follows: 1. Negotiations are to preserve an amicable character. 2. The negotiations must be strictly confidential.' (Then follows a list of the persons to whom the confidence of the Ambassador is to be confined.) 3. In proportion to the chance of success our demands will 'have to be graduated as follows: X 6 In the first place you have to combine into one proposition the recovery of the frontier of 1814 and the annexation of Belgium. You have therefore to ask the extradition, by formal treaty, of Landau, Saarbruck, Saarlouis, and the Duchy of 'Luxembourg; and you have to aim at the annexation of Belgium, by the conclusion of an offensive and defensive treaty, 'which is to be kept secret. Secondly, should this basis appear 'to promise no result, you will resign Saarlouis, Saarbruck, and ' even Landau, which is but a dilapidated nest of a place, the 'occupation of which might excite German national feeling ' against us. In this eventuality your public agreement will be 'confined to the Duchy of Luxembourg, and your secret treaty 'to the reunion of Belgium with France. Thirdly, in case a clear, unmistakeable reference to the incorporation of Belgium 'should be found unpalatable, you are authorised to assent to a clause in which, to obviate the intervention of England, Antwerp ' is to be made a free port. 6 In no case, however, are you permitted to allow the reunion ' of Antwerp to Holland, or the incorporation of Maestricht with 'Prussia. Should Herr von Bismarck put the question, What 'advantage would accrue to him from such a treaty ? the simple ' reply would be, He would thereby secure a powerful ally; that 'he would consolidate his recent acquisitions; that he was only ' desired to consent to the cession of that which did not belong to him; and that he makes no sacrifice in any way to be compared to his gain. 'To sum up, the minimum we require is an ostensible treaty ' which gives us Luxembourg, and a secret treaty, which, stipulating for an offensive and defensive alliance, leaves us the opportunity of annexing Belgium at the right moment, Prussia engaging to assist us, if necessary, by force of arms, in carrying out this purpose.' These instructions, which bore date August 16th, were answered by Benedetti the 23rd of the same month. The reply is declared by Bismarck to be, like so many other interesting 'documents of the same kind,' in the handwriting of Benedetti. It is now in possession of the German Foreign Office. It con * This passage of course, even by itself, disposes of the allegation that the suggested annexation of Belgium came from Prussia. If it had, how could it 'be found unpalatable' to her? tains a draft, also in Benedetti's handwriting, conceived in strict accordance with the above instructions. On the margin of the draft are sundry amendments added in another hand at Paris. The revision agrees perfectly with the famous 'Project' published by Count Bismarck last year. In a letter accompanying the draft of August 23rd, Benedetti explains the reasons of some alterations which he had ventured to make. Landau and Saarbruck had been omitted. He assures the Government that he had had occasion to convince himself that they would encounter insuperable difficulties, were they to insist upon those places. He had accordingly confined himself to Luxembourg and Belgium. He had also deemed it better to have a single treaty instead of two. To this letter of Benedetti's there is also in the hands of the Germans a rough sketch of the reply. It is written on official paper, and shows that Benedetti's draft had made a favourable impression. It alludes to the necessity of indemnifying Holland for the loss of Luxembourg by means of Prussian territory. It considers the pecuniary sacrifice that might be necessary in carrying out the treaty. It asserts that the Prussian right to garrison the Federal fortresses had become extinct, and that to maintain it in Southern Germany would be incompatible with the independence of the South German States. It renounces Landau and Saarbruck, but says that Prussia is expected to perform an act of courtesy by destroying their fortifications, and divesting them of their threatening character. It repeats the declaration that the acquisition of Luxembourg is the immediate object of the convention, and the annexation of Belgium its ulterior aim. Then follows this passage: It is obvious that the extension of Prussian supremacy across the Maine will, as a matter of course, compel us to seize Belgium. But the same necessity may be brought on by other events, on which subject we must reserve to ourselves the 'exclusive right to judge. In this respect the clear and exact wording of the draft is of inestimable value. . . . This com'bination reconciles all parties. By giving us an immediate ' satisfaction in setting people on the right scent in regard to the disposal of Belgium, it quiets public opinion in France. It maintains secresy concerning the alliance as well as the That is, in the opinion of the French Government, the French people would be greatly pleased by an unprincipled robbery and perfidy to an ally.---THE AUTHOR. 6 contemplated annexation. If you think that the annexation ' of Luxembourg had better be concealed until we lay hands on ⚫ Belgium, I should be obliged by your giving your reasons in 'detail. You will perceive that to suspend the beginning of operations for an indefinite time might result in bringing the Belgian question to a premature close.' To this communication from Paris, Benedetti writes in reply on the 29th of August. Now for the first time he expressed a doubt whether France could count upon the sincerity of Prussia. He thought that Bismarck suspected France of attempting to sow discord between England and Germany. He refers to the mission of General Manteuffel to St. Petersburg, and expresses the fear that Prussia has received assurances from another quarter, 'which will enable her to dispense with the countenance ' of France.' He states that Bismarck professes to have told the King that Prussia must have the assistance of one Great Power. Should the co-operation of France be declined, it will be solely for the reason that the Berlin Cabinet is otherwise provided for, or hopes soon to be. He concluded by declaring that, in the uncertain state of affairs, he had determined to go to Carlsbad, as he had been authorised to do if he should find it necessary. Prince Bismarck closes his chapter of revelations in the following characteristic manner :— 'But we have no wish to indulge in disclosures beyond those 'imperatively required for defensive purposes. We accordingly 'confine ourselves to the correcting of statements which might 'occasion erroneous ideas as to German policy. Until forced to resume this task, we shall resist the temptation to make a more undeserved use of the copious materials at our disposal.' The defiance, or rather the challenge, with which Count Bismarck closed his letter has not been accepted by Count Benedetti. The Ambassador has not denied the genuineness of the documents. On the contrary, he is represented as expending his indignation upon his old friends that they neglected to inform him of the captures of Cerçay. It is scarcely necessary to dwell in detail upon the motives which induced Count Benedetti to enter into this course of misrepresentation. The first publication of the 'Project of Treaty' in 1870 placed France in a trying position. The Ambassador knew that some-at least in France-would regard his word as of equal value with Bismarck's. He knew, moreover, that the Prussian Government had no means of proving the falseness of his allegations. He, therefore, determined to array his assertion against that of his enemy. Having once entered upon the path of misrepresentation, there was now left him no choice but that of either confessing his falsehood or pushing on concealing or inventing, as there might seem necessity. Supposing that M. Rouher had taken good care to destroy the documents which in the interest of France ought never to see the light, it was not difficult for him to decide upon his course. He wrote a narrative that is full of indignant virtue. He offered to the world a satisfactory account of all that happened in the matter. He carefully concealed all that could be arrayed against him. He omitted to publish his correspondence. Finally, with a grand climax of audacity, he assigns as a reason for such omission a virtuous unwillingness to bring forward a single witness who could not be cross-examined, when, in fact, he well knew that, if these witnesses were to be brought on the stand, it would be for his instant destruction. We cannot but add that, even if ingenuous, the motive which he assigned for his reserve would pass for what Horace so well characterized as 'prave pudens.' As the truth has been revealed, there seems to be more than poetic justice in the fact that by the very letters thus concealed he is finally overwhelmed. LONDON: PRINTED BY |