zation is even less suited to it. But when did the ruin of a neighbour teach a man with a favourite theory?

Thiers, the man of unblemished private character, of the purest and most ardent patriotism, of abilities rarely equalled; Thiers, the experienced statesman, the diplomatist, the historian, the patriot ready to die for his country, brought it to ruin by stimulating its warlike ambition. An English counterpart of Thiers would not endanger this country by such means; but could he by taking the very opposite course and winning a cheap popularity by discouraging every feeling which constitutes our military strength, and by neglecting our national defences? A reduction of our navy and army would be popular with the masses; and how far might it be carried? All armaments cost money, and their necessity in peace-time is not evident to the masses, who think they can be extemporized in war. But quarrels we have seen arise in a perfectly clear sky,' and only ten days elapsed in 1870 between the first pretext and the declaration of war. In 1867, without the shadow of a pretext, France resolved to appropriate Belgium, when we little suspected that our faithful ally was about to spring a mine under our feet. Then we have military stations at Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda; they cost us much money; why not abolish them and thus reduce taxation? Mr. Cobden (said to have been offered a seat in the Cabinet) published reasons for surrendering Gibraltar, and Mr. Gladstone prepared the way for ceding the Ionian Islands. The Ionian people desired it, England professes to rule in conformity with the people's wishes, she must withdraw and leave them free. But a Minister guided by reasons of abstract right and by theories logically defensible, may have to go further than the Ionian Islands in his concessions. There is India occupied by 80,000 British troops; there is Ireland calling for Home Rule; there is a question-only in the

germ now-which gave some trouble to the Roman Republic, and might well, under unsteady statesmanship, upset a quasi-republican monarchy-the Land Question.

With the Ballot established, and further extension of the suffrage half promised, that question might mature rapidly. The cry of Free Air, Free Water, and Free 'Land!' would find favour with English Reds, Irish Greens, and neo-Republicans.* In fact, there is a large and promising field for any English statesman who would rival Thiers, and who might add to genius, eloquence, energy, and popular sympathies a little intellectual unsteadiness.

* Though we do not, like the French, run to phrases' in England, we have our stock fallacies and claptraps. Many liberal measures, ' denounced at the time as dangerous to the constitution, have not ' proved so:' therefore, we may advance indefinitely in the path of demo. cracy, is one of the most plausible and least logical.

CHAPTER VI.

COUNT BENEDETTI.

*

COUNT BENEDETTI is not a man of mark like Thiers, and cannot be compared to him either in mental calibre or the influence exercised over his countrymen. But the name of Benedetti will ever be associated with two events, one among the most disastrous, the other among the most discreditable, in the annals of European diplomacy. In the French rupture with Prussia in 1870, he followed his instructions only too successfully in making war inevitable. In the earlier transaction of 1866-67, the secret plot against Belgium, he reaped for France all the dishonour, but missed the benefit, of a projected treachery. It is to the latter subject, the plot of the ex-Emperor to seize Belgium, a friendly and inoffensive State which he was bound by treaty and good faith to respect, that this chapter will be devoted.

There is something marvellous and unaccountable in the apathy with which England passed over a transaction almost unparalleled in modern history and nearly affecting her honour and interests. Yet had the projected appropriation of Belgium taken place, England would have been compelled in honour to go to war with France; no country could have felt safer from attack in peace than

*Of course no personal reflection on Count Benedetti is implied in his private character. It was his misfortune to represent au unprincipled policy.

in war; Europe would have reverted to the violence and spoliation of barbarous ages, and the only law would have been that of the strongest. England as a guarantor is peculiarly bound to uphold the standard of Right, and if on this occasion she appeared indifferent to the meditated wrong, it may have been her reluctance to believe in the dishonesty of a "loyal ally."

Yet the guilt of the ex-Emperor is as clearly demonstrated as any incident in history, and the admitted facts proving that guilt are few, simple, and decisive. They illustrate, moreover, the principles of the Second Empire, and show that they were essentially the same as those of the First, and therefore incompatible with the safety of Europe. But, further, irrespective of its instructiveness and importance, the history of the Benedetti plot is so striking, so full even of dramatic interest, that it well repays attention. Had Shakespeare dramatized the story, and with his disregard of 'the unities' brought the chief characters and events on the stage, what a striking drama would he have produced! It would have ended too, as dramas ought to end, in the complete exposure and confusion of the guilty agents, the signal punishment of the chief delinquents, and the happy deliverance of the intended victim (Belgium). What, then, are the admitted facts (postponing those that are controversial) which establish the intention of France to invade and appropriate a friendly neighbour's territory in profound peace?

First, it is admitted that in 1866-67 France sought territorial compensation' for the German acquisitions and alliance of Prussia in the AustroGerman war. Count Benedetti tells us that he was instructed to ask for this and that German territory and fortress, and for the Duchy of Luxembourg. He tells us further that Prussia refused to make such concessions, and suggested that France should seek the compensation

she desired in other quarters. It is further admitted by Benedetti that the subject of annexing Belgium to France was made a matter of discussion, but, as he asserts, upon the suggestion of Count Bismarck. From these demands of Prussia and negociations thereon no results followed until 1870.

In that year, France having declared war against Prussia, Count Bismarck, in the month of July, published the Secret Project of a Treaty' between France and Prussia, alleging that it was proposed by Count Benedetti, the French Ambassador, in the year 1867.*

The French Government indignantly repudiated the 'Project.' Whereupon Count Bismarck gave the world a lithographed facsimile of the original document, with all its erasures, corrections, and alterations, stating that the original in his possession was in Count Benedetti's handwriting, upon the official paper of the French Embassy.

Count Benedetti upon this admitted that the alleged 'Project' was in his handwriting, but alleged that it was only a rough sketch made by him, giving the substance of suggestions thrown out by Count Bismarck, but not accepted by France.

As this assertion was not supported by any evidence, Count Bismarck, who was not then in the possession of the papers captured at Cerçay, left Count Benedetti's excuse to the judgment of the world.

After the peace, M. Benedetti undertook to mend his case by means of a book, Ma Mission en Prusse, in which he repeated at greater length his former assertion of entire innocence in the matter of the Project.' As the documents needed to support his denials were still

* Upon the question of this date it is probable that Count Benedetti is right in fixing it in 1866 rather than 1867. It is of little importance.