about to commend his political course during the last years of his life. We never think of it but with mortification and regret, feeling that his sun set under a cloud. But the eloquence, which kindled a nation, was not then employed in the defense of wrong; the logic, which carried conviction to all minds, which was embodied by political opponents, then in power, in the form of a proclamation from the President, was not sophistry. That principle which was right in 1830 is not wrong now. It is better for the north, it is better for the south, it is always better, to follow the principles of right, than by consulting expedients of temporary advantage to put everything at hazard.

The question now presented is, have the state courts the right to release from imprisonment those who have been convicted and sentenced for crime in the federal courts, in cases where, in the opinion of the state courts, the federal courts have erred? We can answer this question if we determine the nature and relation of the federal and state governments and in whom the decision of questions of constitutional law is vested.

We hold to the doctrine that the constitution of the United States and the government formed under it derive their obligatory force from the people, who having the right and the power have established this constitution as the supreme law of the land. The state governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can be said to be primary, in relation to the other; neither supreme as respects the other; although each is supreme in its own sphere, as respects the people. The people of the United States owe a double allegiance to the general government in all matters within its delegated powers, and to the state governments in all matters not conferred upon the general government. The nature of government and of law is not changed, but the powers of government are divided, a part being given to the federal union and a part remaining with the states.

In the language of Mr. Webster, "The people erected this government. They gave it a constitution, and in that constitution they have enumerated the powers which they bestow

upon it. They have made it a limited government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it to the exercise of such powers as are granted; and all others, they declare, are reserved to the states or to the people. But they have not stopped here. If they had they would have accomplished but half their work. No definition can be so clear, as to avoid possibility of doubt; no limitation so precise as to exclude all uncertainty. Who, then, shall construe this grant of the people? Who shall interpret their will, where it may be supposed they have left it doubtful? With whom do they repose the ultimate right of deciding on the powers of the government? They have settled all this in the fullest manner. They have left it with the government itself in its appropriate branches. The very chief end, the main design, for which the whole constitution was framed and adopted, was to establish a government that should not be obliged to act through state agency, or depend upon state opinion and state discretion. The people have wisely provided in the constitution itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of constitutional law. There are, in the constitution, grants of powers to Congress; and restrictions on these powers. There are, also, prohibitions on the states. Some authority must, therefore, necessarily exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the interpretation of these grants, restrictions and prohibitions. The constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By declaring that the constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

To

"But who shall decide the question of interference? whom lies the last appeal? This the constitution itself decides, also, by declaring that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. These two provisions cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of the arch. With these it is a constitution, without them it is a confederacy. In pursuance

of these clear and express provisions, Congress established at its very first session, in the judicial act, a mode for carrying them into full effect and for bringing all questions of constitutional power to the final decision of the Supreme Court. It then became a government. It then had the means of selfprotection. Having constituted the government and declared its powers, the people have further said that since somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the government shall itself decide; subject, always, like other popular governments, to its responsibility to the people. And now, I repeat, how is it that a state legislature [or court] acquires any power to interfere? Who, or what, gives them the right to say to the people, 'We, who are your agents and servants for one purpose, will undertake to decide that your other agents and servants, appointed by you for another purpose, have transcended the authority you gave them!' The reply would, I think, not be impertinent, Who made you a judge over another's servants? To their own masters they stand or fall.""

We can hardly add anything to this able exposition of constitutional law. Obedience is the correlative of law, and if the right of resistance on the part of individuals cannot be maintained, as we have argued in a former part of this Article, the right of resistance by organized bodies, whether legislatures, courts or states, cannot be maintained. Law and resist ance, government and rebellion are inconsistent ideas, and cannot exist together. They inevitably result in collision, force against force, and "this is war-civil war."

The people have established the constitution of the United States as the supreme law of the land. In this constitution, they have provided that "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States," &c. There is no tribunal authorized to revise the decisions of this supreme court, and to declare that they have committed error. True it is, that the same people who

have collectively constituted the federal courts for the purposes stated in the federal constitution, have separately under their state organizations, constituted other courts with different powers, and for other purposes. But they have given to these state courts no authority to pass upon the decisions of the federal courts.

The question is sometimes put in this form, may not the courts of a state protect the citizens of that state from the unconstitutional decisions of the federal courts? May not a state court, where the process of a federal court is informal, set at liberty a person held in custody under such informal process? We need add nothing to what has been said to show that the federal courts are the sole judges of questions arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. With regard to the other question we say, if an inferior federal court issues process which is regarded as informal, the constitutional mode of ascertaining the fact, is in the federal courts themselves, for the jurisdiction of these courts extends to precisely these matters as well as to the weightier matters of constitutionality. The fact that an individual holds the office of judge under a state organization, gives him no more right, in a case arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, to oppose the federal courts, than any individual has who is not a judicial officer. His jurisdiction does not extend to this class of subjects. The people, from whom he derives his authority, have given to other tribunals the right to decide these questions, and have restricted him. He may have his opinions, as an individual, upon these as upon all other subjects, but the fact that he is a judge for one purpose, does not make him a judge for all purposes. So that while we agree in the main with the views expressed by Judge Brinkerhoff of the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio, in his dissenting opinion, and while his legal opinions are entitled to weight, as those of a learned jurist, they can have no practical force, because they cannot be carried into practical effect, without direct opposition-rebellion rather to the supreme law of the land.

But it is said "the state must protect the citizen," and so it can and ought to do in all cases, where it has jurisdiction.

But the people, who gave the state its being, have submitted certain questions affecting their rights to a different tribunal, and have placed in that fortress all the defenses they have deemed necessary. They did not organize the state to stand between the general government and the individual citizen; nor is the general government responsible to the states, but to the people. The people in their sovereign capacity are their own defenders against the oppression, either of the states or of the general government.

If it is said this ought not to be,-it is dangerous to lodge so much power in the general government, we reply, We are not now engaged in the formation of a constitution of government, discussing its provisions and defining and limiting powers under it. The question is not what we should do under such circumstances. It is a question of the construction of a constitution already formed. The question is not what ought to be, but what is the law of the land. If that law is unjust and oppressive, it may be repealed or changed in a peaceable way, under the provisions of the constitution, or in an extreme case by a revolution. There is, there can be, no middle ground.

We fear that the feeling of many against the fugitive slave law will lead them to refuse their assent to these principles and arguments addressed to the reason. Let us take a case where our feelings will harmonize with the argument, and if conviction does not follow, it will at least be evident that the question is not one of feeling, but of constitutional law, and must be decided by the calm exercise of reason, and not by our prejudices in favor of our friends, or our sympathies with them.

Suppose, then, if such a supposition were possible, that Capt. Corrie had been convicted, in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, by a southern jury, of the crime of piracy, for having been engaged in the foreign slave trade, and that after his conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina had been applied to for a writ of habeas corpus, that the causes of Corrie's imprisonment might be enquired into, and he be set at liberty. Suppose that the State Court of South Carolina