board. Omitting the letterhead portion, date, address and signatures, it reads: "Herewith find enclosed statement of money advanced for groceries and coal to one John Lyons, a pauper of your county. We have just ascertained through letters written by you enclosing money to Mr. Lyons for his support here, that he was a charge on Gunnison county, which letters we now have in our possession, and also learn that your county contributed towards sending him here. Kindly present this matter to your board at their next meeting and forward us check in payment of same." Section 4795, supra, provides that the notice shall contain a statement that said person has become chargeable as a pauper upon the county sending the notice; that it shall also include a request to the authorities of the county receiving it to remove said pauper forthwith and to pay the expenses accrued in taking care of him, her or them. The notice given does not state that the pauper had become chargeable upon Ouray county, or that he was in that county at the time of sending the notice, or that he would require assistance in the future; neither does it request that he be removed forthwith or at all therefrom. The notice enclosed a bill for $23.50. The judgment was for $221.45. There is no allegation in the complaint that the pauper, by reason of sickness, or disease, or by neglect of the commissioners of Gunnison county, or for any other sufficient reason could not have been removed from Ouray county, had such a request been made. Under such circumstances we are of opinion that the notice was insufficient to show a compliance with the statute.-30 Cyc. 1132, 1134; Town of Beacon Falls v. Town of Seymour, 46 Conn. 281; Town of Beacon Falls v. Town of Seymour, 44 Conn. 210; M'Kay v. Welch, 6 N. Y. Sup. 358; Middletown v. Berlin, 18 Conn. 189; Cooper v. Alexander, 33 Me. 453; Belfast v. Lee, 59 Me. 293; Washoe County v. Eureka County, 25 Nev. 356. The judgment is reversed. Reversed. Mr. JUSTICE MUSSER and Mr. JUSTICE GABBERT concur. 1. [No. 6750.] WATKINS ET AL. V. ADAMS. WITNESS-Competency of Party-In an action against the survivors of a partnership the plaintiff is not a competent witness to testify to a contract made, or conversation had, with the deceased partner, not in the presence of any of the survivors. 2. PARTNERSHIP-Death of Partner-Effect-The death of one partner dissolves the partnership. The administrator of the deceased partner has no authority to bind the surviving partner. Error to Teller County Court.-Hon. THORNTON H. THOMAS, Judge. Mr. FRED L. SHAW, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. JUSTICE BAILEY delivered the opinion of the court: The action is against surviving partners to recover for services said to have been rendered by plaintiff, under a contract of employment, made with the deceased member thereof. The only witness sworn was the plaintiff, who, to prove the contract and fix liability upon the partnership, was allowed to testify, over objection, to conversations between himself and the deceased partner. The contract and the terms thereof were established by these conversations alone. Objection to this testimony was made under section 7269, Revised Statutes, 1908, which is as follows: "Conversation of deceased partner-When admitted.— Sec. 4. That in any action, suit or proceeding, by or against any surviving partner or partners, joint contractor or contractors, no adverse party or person adversely interested in the event thereof, shall, by virtue of section one of this act, be rendered a competent witness to testify to any admission or conversation by any deceased partner or joint contractor, unless some one or more of the surviving partners or joint contractors were also present at the time of such admission or conversation." There is no attempt to show that these conversations were had in the presence of the surviving partners or either of them, or that either had knowledge of them; indeed, there is no such claim. Under the circumstances disclosed this evidence was, by the express terms of the statute, inadmissible. The purpose of the statute is wise and wholesome, to the end that a surviving co-partner may be protected from injury and wrong, which otherwise might easily be perpetrated. Since the alleged claim is supported by improper and incompetent testimony only, the judgment in favor of plaintiff was unwarranted. In discussing this statute in Savard v. Herbert, 1 Colo. App. at page 447, the court said: "Section 3643 (R. S. 1908, sec. 7269), clearly indicates, that where the suit is brought against any surviving partner or joint contractor, that the testimony relative to any admission or conversation by the deceased person or joint contractor shall not be admitted unless some one or more of the surviving partners or joint contractors were present at the time of the admission or conversation." The record further shows that a portion at least, but how much it does not disclose, of the judgment recovered was for services rendered after the death of Higbee, under an independent contract with Mrs. Higbee, as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Upon no theory could a liability for such service be legally fastened upon the partnership, which had been dissolved ipso facto by the death of Higbee. For the reasons stated the judgment must be reversed. It is so ordered and the cause remanded. Mr. JUSTICE MUSSER and Mr. JUSTICE WHITE concur. [No. 6614.] DENVER CITY TRAMWAY COMPANY V. LOMOVT. 1. EVIDENCE-Discrediting Witness-Contradictory Statements— A mere expression of the opinion or feeling of a witness is admissible to discredit him, if it tends to manifest that in his testimony he was guilty of a fabrication. In an action against a street railway company for an injury to a child, attributed to the negligence of the motorman in the operation of a train, one who was an eye-witness gave testimony strongly tending to exonerate the motorman. On cross-examination he testified that he had never had any conversation with the attorney or claim agent of defendant as to what testimony he would give; that when put upon the stand no one connected with the defense had any idea of what he would say. He denied that when he picked up the child he had exclaimed that "the motorman ought to be lynched." Held, proper to admit testimony that the witness did make the exclamation imputed to him, expressly limiting it to its effect upon the credibility of the witness, and not as bearing upon or having any relevancy to the responsibility of the defendant. 2. -Laying Foundation.-When it is sought to discredit a witness by evidence of statements which conflict with his testimony, the foundation must be laid by interrogating him as to whether he made the supposed statement; and his attention must be directed to the particular time and place thereof. But it is sufficient if the rule is reasonably complied with. If it appears that by the course of the interrogation the witness could not have been misled, this suffices. Appeal from Denver District Court.-Hon. HARRY C. RIDDLE, Judge. Mr. CHARLES J. HUGHES, JR., Mr. GERALD HUGHES and Mr. HOWARD S. ROBERTSON, for appellant. Mr. R. D. REES and Mr. A. M. STEVENSON, for appellee. Action for personal injuries; judgment was for the plaintiff; the defendant appeals. The appellee (a minor about eight years of age) while attempting to cross the appellant's street car tracks at the intersection of what is known as West Cable Place and Dale Court in the city of Denver, was struck by an eastbound car, knocked under the fender or guardrail, and partially run over, from which she received serious and permanent injuries, including the loss of one foot except the heel. The car was stopped somewhere near the east side of Dale Court; it had to be backed up a little in order to remove the child. This street (termed West Cable Place) upon which the car was running, is quite narrow, approximately twenty-one feet in width. The appellant operates two street car tracks upon it, which practically consume the entire street. There is a tight board fence about six feet in height upon the south side of this street between Dale Court and the street west. It starts near the corner of the street west, extending east along the south side of this street to the corner of Dale Court, thence extends south along the west side of Dale Court about thirtyfive feet, where it connects with a two-story building which extends south to the next street. This fence on the south side of West Cable Place is within about four feet four inches from the first rail of the street car track used by the cars coming from the west, making the body of the car come within about two feet of the fence. There is a rise in the grade on West Cable Place from Dale Court extending two or three blocks west, making quite an incline for the cars to come down. From the east side of Dale Court there is a slight rise to the east. Dale Court is approximately eighty feet in width between the lots lines. From the above general statements it follows that a person of ordinary heighth going north upon the west side of Dale Court could not see a car coming from the west until he reached the corner of the fence at West Cable Place, which would then make him within about two feet of where the outside of the car would pass. This is about the point where the child was struck. There is evidence, that the appellee and two other children were going north upon the west side of Dale Court; that one of them had crossed the tracks; that the little girl who was injured came second upon the track, when she was hit by the car; that the car was running at a high rate of |