would at once congratulate him on the success he had achieved and condemn the mode in which he had acted. We need not go into details of these Mahi Kanta troubles, which have no interest for us except so far as they illustrate Outram's predilection for modifying his orders to suit his own views, which were certainly always conceived in the higher interests of the State and of the people with whom he was concerned. His spirited conduct in the Mahi Kanta earned the commendation of the Court of Directors; but this also was qualified by a reminder that they were not "forgetful of the fact that on several occasions he had shown a disposition to act in a more peremptory manner, and to resort sooner to measures of military coercion, than the Bombay Government had approved." Outram was not the man to bear such a remark in silence, and he drew up a memorandum in vindication of his career, which the Bombay Government answered by soothing encomiums. He was too good an officer for government to lightly quarrel with, and his consciousness of his own powers enabled him to address the Secretariat in a tone which would have insured certain suspension in the case of any less qualified officer. But it is important to note that, even at this early period of his career, he had begun to indulge in those contests with Government which, more or less all his life through, retarded his advancement and interfered with the disposition of his superiors to employ him on service worthy of his abilities.

In the interval between his employment among the Bhils and his mission to the Mahi Kanta, Outram had married; and the union, in spite of many separations arising from his wife's ill health and his own absences on duty, was in every way calculated to promote his happiness. But sickness compelled Mrs. Outram and her infant son to return to England in 1837; and Outram himself had then purposed to take leave and follow her in 1840. But meantime the Afghan war had broken out, and Outram was among the first to send in his name as a volunteer.

Sir John Keane, commanding the Bombay column, appointed him an extra aide-de-camp; and Outram accepted the appointment, apparently more because it would give him admission into the campaign, when he would be able to find other opportunities of making himself useful, than that he cared much for a place in the general's household. Outram's peculiar talents soon found adequate employment in his new position. The position of the Talpur Ameers of Sind, lying across the line of communications of the Bombay column, rendered it necessary that an understanding should be come to with them. Outram and Lieutenant Eastwick were dispatched to Haiderabad to obtain the Ameer's acceptance of a draft treaty prepared by Col. Pottinger, the Resident; and this mission was the commencement of that intercourse with the Talpur families which subsequently ripened to a warm friendship, and which brought so

much trouble and worry upon Outram's after-career. On this occasion his mission was unsuccessful, and it required a demonstration from the north to make the Ameers listen to reason. Shortly after, Outram was sent on to Shikarpur, where the king, Shah Sujah-ulMulk, and Mr. MacNaghten the envoy then were, to arrange about the commissariat and transport for the advance of the Bombay column. The success with which Outram accomplished this mission marked him out as the most suitable officer for keeping up communication between Sir John Keane and the Envoy's headquarters; and into this work-involving, as it did, long and dangerous rides through wild passes and unfriendly tribes, perils from ambush and from mutinous escorts, fatigue, and scanty fare-Outram threw himself with all his heart. The employment carried with it the valued advantage that it took him to the scene of action whenever anything of importance was going on. On one occasion he was severely hurt by a fall from his horse; but instead of lying up until recovery, he traveled with the column in a palanquin. At the storming of Ghuzni-from the official accounts of which Outram's name was omitted, probably from the provincial jealousy which characterized the Bengal and Bombay armies so strongly in the first Afghan wars-Outram was present, and had distinguished himself by a gallant exploit on the eve of the battle with a small party of the Shah's contingent, capturing the holy banner of white and green, and routing a strong party of the Afghans. But his great.exploit in the Afghan campaign was his pursuit of Dost Mohammed, which, though it failed to capture the Ameer, was a feat of derring-do which the earlier Bayard might have been proud to number among his enterprises. On the fall of Ghuzni, Dost Mohammed made for Bamian, with the evident intention of falling back upon Balkh, then as now the natural refuge of every discomfited pretender to the Afghan throne. A flying force of 2,000 Afghans and 100 of our own cavalry, the whole under the cominand of Outram, were to endeavor to hunt down the flying Ameer; and a number of young officers, most of whom were destined to attain after-distinction in the service, volunteered to accompany him. There was Wheeler of the Bengal cavalry, Colin Troup, Christie, George Lawrence, Broadfoot, Keith Erskine, and others; and Bayard could not have wished for a braver following. The hopes founded on Afghan assistance were delusive. The cavalry supplied by the Shah were a badly-mounted rabble. The guide, an old melon seller, who had risen to high rank by changing sides in the Afghan troubles, was utterly untrustworthy. He wished to follow the trail of the Ameer, while Outram's desire was to make his way across the hills and intercept his flight. The native guide, however, contrived to lead them by such routes as would waste time and give the Ameer an opportunity of getting beyond the Paropamisus. At every halting-place the native forces were fall

ing off; and when they came within a day's march of the Dost," as Sir Francis Goldsmid designates the Ameer, he had barely fifty Afghans to support him, and his supplies were exhausted.

"But Hajji Khan urged a halt, on the plea that the force at their disposal was insufficient to cope with the enemy. Outram insisted on moving, and managed in the course of the afternoon to get together some 750 Afghans of all sorts, whom he induced to accompany his own particular party. Through accident or design the guides went astray, and in the darkness of the night the way was lost 'amid interminable ravines, where no trace of a footstep existed; so that Yort was not reached until next morning, when Dost Mohammed was reported to be at Kharzár, sixteen miles distant on the highroad leading from Cabul to Bamian. No inducement could get the Afghans to advance another stage until the morning of the following day, August 7th; and in the interim their leader attempted by every available means, and including even threats, to dissuade Outram from proceeding any further, strongly representing the scarcity of provisions for his men, and the numerical superiority of those whom he sought to encounter. He was unable, however, to carry his point; for he pleaded to one who went onward in spite of every obstacle. When the pursuers arrived at Kharzár they ascertained that the Ameer had gone to Kalu, whither, leaving behind teir Afghan adviser, they pressed on the same afternoon, over the Hajji Guk (or Khak), a pass 12,000 feet above the ocean, whence they saw the snow 1,500 feet below them. At Kalu they were again doomed to disappointment. Dost Mohammed had left some hours previously, and it was supposed that he had already surmounted the Kalu Pass, the highest of the Hindu Kush. Here Outram and his comrades were compelled to remain the night, encamped at the foot of Kuh-iBaba, the Father Mountain,' monarch of that mighty range, and 22,000 feet high; they had been nine hours in the saddle, and horses and men were knocked up. The next day they were overtaken by Captains Taylor and Trevor, with 30 troopers and about 300 Afghans-which reinforcement, though it seems to have inspired Hajji Khan with courage to rejoin his headquarters, did not a whit diminish his ardor in endeavoring to persuade the British commandant to delay the pursuit. He tried, by entreaty, menace, and withholding guides, to keep back this dauntless soldier, even when mounting his horse and in the act of departure, but in vain; before nightfall Outram had crossed the steep Shutargardan (camelneck), a pass some thousands of feet higher than the Hajji-Guk, and after dark he halted at a deserted village at the foot of the Ghat, on the banks of a stream which flows into the Oxus. Briefly, after six days' hard riding and roughing he reached Bamian, to miss again the object of his search, and to certify that with such a guide and in such a country it would be madness to continue the chase."

Fruitless as this expedition was, it was one of the most gallant achievements in the whole of the first Afghan war; and the fact that an officer of Outram's standing should have been chosen to lead it showed that his native aptitude for such enterprises had already been recognized by the military authorities and by the Envoy,' the latter of whom, in spite of differences of opinion as to the policy which they were engaged in carrying out, was anxious to procure Outram's transfer to the political department. He was, however, next sent to reduce the Ghilzai country-a duty which he performed with characteristic energy and success, capturing their leaders and dismantling or blowing up their forts. He took part in General Wiltshire's capture of Kelat, where he so specially distinguished himself as to be selected to carry the dispatch to the Bombay Government-a hazardous duty, as the general desired

him to return to India by the direct route to Sonmiani Bundar, and report upon its practicability for the passage of troops. Disguised as an Afghan, accompanied by one servant and guided by two Syuds, Outram made his way by Nal to Sonmiani, a distance of 355 miles, in eight days, supporting the character of a Pir or holy man on the road with much skill; and he astonished his brother-in-law, General Farquaharson, by bursting into his quarters at Kurrachee in Afghan costume, armed with sword and shield. He learned afterward that the Chief of Wadd had been made acquainted with his journey, and had followed him hot-foot down through the passes to Sonmiani, with a view to intercept and slay him.

The immediate reward of Outram's Afghan services was the political agency of Lower Sind, in succession to Colonel Pottinger, although the appointment was shorn of the title of Resident, by which the latter officer had been distinguished. Outram had scruples about this change, but Sind presented a field for a man of action which he could not fail to appreciate. Afghanistan was far from settled, and Sind must be the basis of all operations in the southern part of the country as well as in Beloochistan. The condition of the Talpur Ameers was then growing more and more critical; and though Outram was by no means well calculated to practice the diplomacy which the Government of India was disposed to exercise in their case, he was yet alive to the prospects of distinction which the situation in Sind presented. He was never a "political" in the successful sense of the term. He drew a somewhat fanciful dis tinction between his obligations in civil and military employ, which was a prolific source of embarrassment to him in the former capacity. He entertained the idea that while the soldier ought to yield unquestioning obedience to the orders of his superiors, the political officer might be permitted the greater latitude of accominodating the policy of Government to the dictates of his own conscience. Such feelings were to Outram's credit as a man, but they naturally detracted from his utility as an agent of Government, and laid the foundation of the painful controversy regarding the annexation of Sind in which he subsequently became involved, and which for many years cast a heavy cloud over his life. We cannot now go into the details of this unprofitable discussion. Of the necessity for annexing Sind we do not entertain a doubt, and the prosperity which British rule has brought to that province must more than condone the irregularity of the steps which Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier took against the Ameers. Outram seems to have exaggerated in his own mind the obligations which he conceived himself to be under to the Talpur dynasty. He was present at the death of Nur Muhammad Khan, and had solemnly accepted the guardianship of his children; and he seems to have considered that this pledge affected his personal honor as well as his political capacity. At the same time Outram, in the exercise of his political

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agency, displayed an independence of the Supreme Government which naturally drew down upon him Lord Ellenborough's displeasure. That nobleman was unpopular with all branches of the service; he was constantly finding his orders thwarted by the personal views of the officers who ought to have carried them out; and we cannot wonder at his feeling that so prominent a case as that of Outram required to be made an example, in spite of the hard work and brilliant services which the Governor-General readily acknowledged. The political agent took the extreme step of maintaining Lieutenant Hammersley in his post at Quetta, on the plea of urgent requirements," after that officer had been remanded to his regiment, in consequence of the displeasure of his Supreme Government; and though the motives which actuated Outram were generous to Quixotry, he himself, was conscious of the risk which he was incurring. "See this correspondence about Hammersley,” he writes to the Secretary of the Bombay Government, "which, I take, will end in his lordship sending me to my regiment." With an officer who thus takes his own way with his eyes open, we cannot sympathize very much when his worst anticipations are realized. The first punishment that befell him was the appointment of General Nott to the chief political as well as military power in Lower Afghanistan, Sind, and Beloochistan, which interposed that officer between himself and the Supreme Government. Outram felt the slight, but it was characteristic of his generous nature that he was resolutely resolved that his sore feelings on this point should not be allowed to affect his zeal in co-operating with his new superior. But Outram threw too much personal feeling into the affairs amid which he was moving to be a desirable assistant in a course of policy so tortuous as that which Lord Ellenborough was forced by circumstances to follow. He was friendly to the Sind Ameers, and he obstinately shut his eyes to their hostile disposition, which was obvious to Lord Ellenborough's Government. He had a great liking for the young Khan of Kelat, whom he had personally been the means of bringing into the British alliance; and he restored to him the territory of Shawl almost on his own responsibility, and certainly with a precipitation that could not but be displeasing, and might well have been embarrassing, to the Supreme Government. On the whole, we cannot say that Lord Ellenborough was altogether to blame because, on the arrival of Sir Charles Napier to assume the chief military and political power in Sind, he took the opportunity of sending Major Outram back for a season to his regiment. The comparison between the reputations of Outram and Lord Ellenborough has naturally made their dissensions reflect to the disadvantage of the latter; but a dispassionate review of Outram's proceedings in the Sind agency will convince any impartial judge that he took more upon him than his subordinate position warranted; and that unless the Governor-General was prepared to have his