late, the representations which they give are continually untrue; and the apprehensions which they excite are regularly erroneous. There may be, there often is, no intentional deception in their thoughts. Still, they continually deceive, and that of choice, that they may enjoy the pleasure found in the indulgence of an eager imagination.

6. In flattery and censure.

Flattery is the ascription of good qualities to others which they do not possess, or in greater degrees than they possess them. Sometimes this ascription is the result of the mere warmth of affection; and is then, though not wholly undeserving of censure, undoubtedly less criminal than in other cases. No warmth of affection, and no worth in the object of it, will however justify us in speaking that which is not true. Usually, it is dictated by sinister views, and intended to be the means of accomplishing unworthy purposes. In this case the author of it is a palpable, though a very pleasing, liar. The purpose which he has in view is a sinful one; and the means which he adopts to compass it are always sinful and contemptible. Accordingly, mankind have proverbially declared the flatterer to be an odious and despicable wretch.

Censure is often just and vindicable, often a duty, and not unfrequently a proof of superior worth. This, however, invariably supposes that the censure is deserved; that it is demanded by the nature of the case; and that it is administered solely to promote the good of the censured, and not to gratify the pride or ill nature of the censurer. But as the word is used above, it is intended to denote a false denial of good qualities, or á false ascription of bad ones, adopted to gratify our own unworthy feelings, and to wound those of another. Falsehood of this nature is too well understood, and too generally detested, to need any comment.

7. In alleging, to support a doctrine, or a cause, arguments which in our own view are unsound; or alleging those, which have some degree of soundness and weight, as having more weight than we believe; or alleging them with more confidence than we really experience in our minds.

Veracity, as it respects arguments, demands that we allege such as in our view are really sound; that we attribute to them exactly the weight which we believe them to possess; and that we advance them with expressions of no more confidence in

them than we actually feel. No reason can be alleged why we may wilfully deceive in our arguments, any more than in our declarations; or why sophistry is less guilty than what is appropriately called lying. The conduct in both cases is the same; viz. a wilful deception. The design is the same. The mischiefs also are as great in the former case, and often greater, than in the latter. Nor can any reason be alleged to prove the guilt less.

Of the same nature is the concealment of such arguments as we possess, when the support of truth and justice demands them, or the overthrow of falsehood and injustice.

8. In promise-breaking.

A promise is an engagement to do, or abstain from, some thing, either absolutely or conditionally. When this engagement is made to God, it is termed a vow; when to our fellow-men, a promise. The laws of morality, which regulate both, are in substance the same. When a promise is made absolutely, or when the conditions on which it is made are performed, we are bound to fulfil it exactly, according to its tenour. Nor can we be released from this obligation, unless the performance is either impossible, or unlawful; or unless by the consent of him to whom the promise is made. In every other case, the violation of the promise is a lie; at least as criminal, base, and detestable as any other.

Our obligations to veracity are greatly enhanced by an oath; one of the most solemn and affecting transactions in which man is ever concerned. In this transaction, God, our Creator, Judge, and Rewarder; God, who requireth truth in the inward parts;' God, who seeth not as man seeth, but who looketh on the heart;' is invoked as an awful witness of the manner in which we speak. If we speak truth, we declare our hope of his mercy; if we speak falsely, we imprecate his vengeance. What rational being, hitherto ignorant of the perjuries which deform this guilty world, could believe that any man, thus situated, would fail to speak truth with the deepest solicitude, and the most perfect exactness! Yet perjury is in the list of human crimes, and forms no inconsiderable part of that dreadful catalogue.

The guilt of every species of lying, when perpetrated under the solemnities of an oath, is enhanced by these considera

tions: The sin in almost all cases is more deliberately committed. The person to whom an oath is administered has every opportunity which he can wish, for summoning up to the view of his mind every motive to the performance of his duty, and every inducement to abstain from falsehood. These inducements also are the strongest conceivable. God in a peculiar manner is present to his thoughts: the 'God of truth,' who has declared, that all liars shall have their part in the Jake, which burneth with fire and brimstone.' His soul is put at hazard on his utterance of truth or falsehood. If he speaks falsehood, he voluntarily consigns himself to perdition. If he is guilty of perjury, he is ruined also for this world. The stain is too deep ever to be wiped away. At the same time, he does what is in his power to cut up confidence by the roots. 'An oath for confirmation,' says St. Paul, is to men the end of all controversy,' Heb. vi. 16. If the confidence reposed in an oath could be reposed no more, human disputes must either be unsettled, or terminated by the strength of the arm and to this end he who perjures himself does all in his power to conduct them.

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At the same time, it is ever to be remembered, that God himself has been pleased on various occasions to confirm his own word by an oath. In this manner he has testified to us, that in his view an oath adds a peculiar sanction to that which has been said even by himself. Universally, he who utters a falsehood under this solemn obligation to speak truth, sins against all the motives which can be conceived to influence him to the performance of his duty.

The causes of lying, the second thing proposed in the scheme of this Discourse, are, generally, all the temptations which men feel to this unhappy practice. Men utter falsehood extensively for the acquisition of wealth, honour, power, and pleasure; to advance the purposes of party; to ensure success in a controversy; to gain a favourite point; to mortify a rival, or an enemy; and for innumerable other purposes. In the discourse which I delivered on the subject of frauds practised on our fellow-men, numerous specimens of this nature were either alluded to, or expressly mentioned. Similar specimens, perhaps equally numerous, are attendant upon the eager pursuit of all those worldly gratifications which men

ardently covet. I know of no case in which lying more abounds, than that of vehement party contention. Universally, men, embarked in unworthy designs, as I shall have occasion to mention more particularly hereafter, find falsehood exceedingly convenient, if not indispensable to their Depraved as mankind are, a bad cause cannot be carried on with success, without the aid either of falsehood, or the sword.

success.

All these are immediate causes of lying. Those to which I have originally referred, are more remote. They are such as subvert the original tendency to speak truth, which we regularly find in the earliest ages of life. The influence of these causes is peculiarly exerted upon the minds of such as are young; and they are led into habits of lying, before they are capable of understanding either their guilt, or their danger. These causes are principally the following:

1. Children are often taught to lie by example.

Few persons of adult years are perhaps sufficiently sensible how soon children begin to understand the nature of those things which they see and hear, especially the nature of human conduct. From this, as well as from other causes, it frequently happens, that many things are done and said before very young children, which would not be said or done, if it were well understood that the children would clearly comprehend, and regularly copy them. By this misapprehension the members of many a family, and unhappily the parents also, are often induced to make their children witnesses of palpable falsehoods, when, bad as themselves are, they would not corrupt their children in this manner, were they aware that their conduct would thus become the means of corruption. Often these falsehoods are uttered in earnest; often they are uttered in jest. In both cases their influence is alike pernicious.

The power of all example is great, especially of evil example; but perhaps in no case greater than in that of falsehood. Here the falsehood is brought home to the child with an influence wholly peculiar. It is uttered by those whom he loves; by those whom he venerates; by those of whom he has never formed a disadvantageous suspicion. It is calmly and coolly told to others in his presence, without a doubt expressed of its rectitude; and is at times accompanied by a direct explanation

of the advantages which are hoped from it. At other times, it is uttered in the zeal of dispute, and the warmth of passion. At other times, a multitude of falsehoods are combined together in a marvellous story, and, in many families, such stories form no small part of the domestic conversation. At other times still, and in instances innumerable, the private history of persons and families in the neighbourhood furnishes an almost endless tissue of interwoven truth and falsehood, and constitutes the chief entertainment of the house. Families, composed of sprightly members,, make also innumerable assertions in jest, which are untrue; which the child who hears them perceives to be untrue; and for the falsehood of which he does not perceive the sport to yield any justification.

All these even very young children will usually discern to be falsehoods. No person can wonder that they should be induced to adopt this conduct, when he remembers that it is set before them continually, in so many modes, by those who are so much the objects of affection and reverence. That children derive this turpitude, in very many instances, originally and chiefly from such an example, they themselves abundantly prove. The reason which they almost always give, and first give, for the commission of this crime, is, that others have done the same thing.

In multiplied instances, falsehoods are directly told to children, particularly very young children, to persuade them to acquiesce cheerfully in things which are disagreeable. Children, like older persons, have many wishes, the gratification of which is in their view important to their happiness; but which others know to be fraught with danger and mischief. To persuade them quietly to give up such, gratifications, parents, and others, frequently adopt the easy and convenient method of deceiving them. Thus parents, who wish to go abroad, and to persuade their young children to remain at home, often declare, that they are going out to return immediately; while the children clearly discern that the declaration is false. When parents also, or others, are abroad, whose absence is very painful to children; servants, and others, to quiet them, declare often that the parents are returning, are in sight, or will return within a very short time. To persuade them to take medicines, the children are assured, that they are sweet and pleasant; when, in truth, they are bitter and