come to that yet." The next broadside killed the Dutch Admiral, by which means their squadron was thrown into confusion and obliged to quit the Henry. Three fireships were now sent to burn her, one of them grappled her starboard quarter, but the smoke was too thick to discern where the grappling irons had hooked, until the blaze burst out, when the boatswain resolutely jumped on board, disentangled the irons, and instantly recovered his own ship. Scarcely was this effected before another fireship boarded her on the larboard side; the sails and rigging taking fire, destruction seemed inevitable, and several of the crew threw themselves into the sea; upon which Sir John Harman drew his sword and threatened to kill any who should attempt to quit the ship. The exertions, at length, of the remaining crew extinguished the flames. Sir John Harman, although his leg was broken, continued on deck giving directions, and sunk another fireship which was bearing down upon him. In this crippled state he got into Harwich, and repaired the damages his ship had sustained in sufficient time to be at sea and share in the following actions. On the 2d, in the morning, the battle was renewed with encreased fury. Van Tromp rashly pushing in amidst the English ships had a narrow escape. De Ruyter, who came down to his assist ance, was in equal danger; these Admirals being reinforced by sixteen Dutch ships gave an instant turn to the battle; and the Duke of Albemarle became so hard pressed, that he found it necessary to retreat towards the English coast. The Dutch continued to pursue him until night, when a calm put an end to the conflict. In the morning the Duke of Albemarle finding that he had only with him twenty-eight ships fit for service, and the Dutch still in pursuit with a much superior force, ordered three of the ships most disabled to be burnt, and directed those which had not suffered so much to go ahead to look out, preserving the line himself with the rest to receive the pursuers. In the afternoon, when the Dutch fleet was almost within gunshot, a fleet was discovered to the southward, which the duke soon perceived to be the squadron under Prince Rupert crouding sail to join him. The English admiral instantly hauled to the wind, the more readily to effect the junction. Sir George Ayscue, in the Royal * Previous to the action, a council of war was held, wherein the Duke of Albemarle gave this opinion: "That if we had dreaded the numbers of our enemies, we should have fled yesterday; but though we are inferior to them in ships, we are in all things else superior. Force gives them courage. Let us, if we need it, borrow resolution from the thoughts of what we have formerly performed. Let the enemy feel, that though our fleet be divided, our spirit is entire. At the worst it will be more honourable to die bravely here on our own element, than to be made spectacles to the Dutch. To be overcome is the fortune of war, but to fly is the fashion of cowards. Let us teach the world, that Englishmen would rather be acquainted with death than with fear.” Prince, Prince, of one hundred guns, standing too near the shoals, ran upon the Galloper, where she was surrounded by the Dutch fleet and taken *. • On the 4th, about eight in the morning, the English squadron having joined, pursued and came up with the Dutch fleet. The at tack was now made and supported with greater violence and resolu tion than before. The action continued until seven in the evening, when a thick fog put an end to this dreadful and bloody contest, each retiring to its own coast claiming the honour of the victory. The loss sustained by the English in this long and well-fought battle is computed at sixteen men of war, ten of which were sunk, and six taken. Between five and six thousand men were killed and wounded. The English writers mention the Dutch to have lost fifteen men of war, twenty-one captains, and five thousand men ; their own authors confess nine ships to have been lost, and a prodigious slaughter. ", The pensioner, De Witte, said after this battle, "If the English are beaten, their defeat did them more honour than all their former victories; their own fleet could never have been brought on after the first days fight, and he believed none but theirs could; and all the Dutch had discovered was, that Englishmen might be killed and English ships burnt, but that English courage was invincible." The author gives the following account of the unfortunate Expedition to Quiberon : 1795. Sir John Borlase Warren received orders to hoist his broad pendant as Commodore, and appointed to command an expedition destined against the coast of France. About the middle of June he sailed from Yarmouth Roads, Isle of Wight, with a squadron of ships of war and fifty transports, having on board a body of 3000 emigrants, under the command of the Comtes D'Hervilly and De Puysaye. On the 21st the Galatea, which had been sent into Quiberon Bay, was chased by the French fleet, which was soon afterwards seen by the squadron. Commodore Warren immediately made the best disposition for the protection of the convoy, and hastened to join Lord Bridport, whom he had the good fortune to discern the next morning in pursuit of the enemy; the Robust, Thunderer, and Standard were ordered to join the fleet, but got up with it too late to have any share in the action. After being at sea sixteen days, Sir John Warren anchored with the fleet between Isle Dieu and that of Noirmoutier ; but as this was not considered by the French officers a proper situation to disembark, they proceeded for The capture of an English admiral caused great exultation among the Dutch; this has been assigned by some sea officers as a reason why the English do not wear the red flag at the main; but Sir George Ayscue was Admiral of the white. The distinguishing flag of the red squadron has ever been the union or flag of the lord high admiral. Sir George Ayscue on his return to England was set aside.' Quibe ron Quiberon Bay, where they anchored on the 25th. On the 27th most of the emigrant troops were landed near the village of Carnac. At first about 200 Republicans shewed a disposition to oppose the dis-embarkation, but these were put to flight with some loss. The whole coast was soon alarmed; and the Republicans collecting in great force, (after several successful attacks,) compelled the Royalists to retreat into Fort Penthievre, and the Peninsula of Quiberon, which had surrendered to M. L'Hervilly on the 3d of July. The whole force which occupied the peninsula amounted to about 12,000. men. On the night of the 16th, M. D'Hervilly, at the head of about 5000 Royalists, made an attempt to carry by storm the Republicans' works and entrenched camp on the heights of St. Barbe, in which he was repulsed with considerable loss, and himself severely wounded. Desertion from the emigrant army became at this time seriously alarming; indeed little else could have been expected, when it is consi dered that numbers of the men were enlisted from the French prisons. By these deserters General Hoche was informed with the exact state of the fort and royal army. On the night of the 20th, which was extremely dark and tempestuous, many of the emigrant soldiers who were on guard deserted; and being acquainted with the parole and countersign, conducted a large body of the Republican troops unmolested into the fort. The instant the alarm was given, the garrison was thrown into the greatest scene of confusion; several of the emigrant soldiers grounded their arms, and shouted Vive la Republique; others abandoned or massacred their officers; the few who remained faithful fought with great desperation, and did not surrender till after a bloody and dreadful conflict. The Emigrants, Chouans, and English in the fort were about 10,000; most of whom were either killed or taken prisoners; among the number were the young Comte de Sombreuil, the Bishop of Dol, and several other emigrants of distinction, who were, contrary to the terms of capitulation agreed on by General Le Moine, conducted by his orders to Nantz, where they were tried by a military tribunal, and sentenced to suffer death.' Then follows the letter of the gallant but ill fated Comte. de Sombreuil to Sir J. Warren, which many of our readers will doubtless remember; after which Captain S. proceeds: The morning after this dreadful affair, the boats of the squadron with great difficulty brought off about 2000 or 3000 troops and Royalists, inhabitants, under cover of the frigates. Whilst Sir John Warren was carrying on his operations against the enemy in Quiberon, he detached Captain Joseph Ellison, in the Standard, to the great road of Belleisle, to summon the governor to surrender up the island.' Sir John Warren next proceeded to the islands of Hedic and Houat, of which he took possession without opposition. Having refreshed the troops, and left a sufficient number for their defence, with some ships of war to cover the retreat of the troops if necessary, he sailed to the attack of the island of Noirmoutier; but he here also found found the Republicans so well prepared, that he was obliged to retire, after destroying two or three armed vessels, and then took possession of Isle Dieu, about five leagues to the southward of Noirmoutier. • Soon after the Commodore's arrival at this place, he was joined by the Jason frigate, Captain Stirling, having on board the Comte D'Artois, Duc de Bourbon, and some other French noblemen. A fleet of transports also joined the squadron, with 4000 British troops on board, under the command of Major General Doyle, who were landed on the island with a great quantity of military stores, cloathing, &c. They remained here till the close of the year, when finding it utterly impracticable to attempt any further descent on the coast of France, they were re-embarked on board the transports and returned to England. Thus ended this unfortunate expedition, by which the nation is supposed to have lost near 40,000 stand of arms, with clothing for as many men; besides an immense quantity of stores, ammunition, &c. Six transports that arrived in the evening previous to the storming of Fort Penthievre, laden with provisions of every sort for the army, fell into the hands of the enemy.' In the more recent part of the history, we find only those details which the dispatches of the times contained: but the author has the merit of fully and faithfully setting forth their contents. Vols. IV. and V. are wholly occupied, as Appendices, with lists of squadrons and their commanders, accounts of ships lost, taken, &c. &c. These documents are useful though not readable parts of the work; and we doubt not that they are authentic in all important points, though we have observed a number of minute errors. ART. III. The Naval authentic Documents. PP. 320. 78. Boards. 'HE cui bono of this The ion since the Jo. History of the late War; compiled from work is not very evident to our appre events which it records are in the recollection of every one, and it cannot boast of imparting any information beyond that which the journals of the period com. municated. In his introduction, Mr. Rose says; if, in the work I have undertaken, I shall succeed in freeing the accounts of our naval operations from the inventions of the Jacobins, or the errors and exaggerations of the credulous, I shall conceive my efforts successfully directed, and my object attained.'Respecting the transcendency of our naval exploits, and the superior merit of our brave defenders, there has been but one opinion, and to have doubted here would have been to fly in the face of reason, and abjure the testimony of sense; so far, then, the labours of the author are superfluous. If we are to consider him as stigmatizing with the title of Jacobins all those who view with no fondness the affairs of Toulon, Cotsica, and Quiberon, the bullying conduct in the neutral ports of the Mediterranean, and the French colonial captures, we suspect that he will give an alarming bulk and respectability to the sect; and if we admire his boldness in undertaking to settle points of such difficulty, we have to lament that success has so little sanctioned his attempts. We subscribe, however, ex animo, to the following candid and sensible observations on the inefficient naval campaign of 1783, and the unjust censures on Admiral Earl Howe: Thus passed the Channel campaign of 1793. The people, who too often confound want of success with want of merit, were loud in their censures of the Admiral. The public prints and pamphlets of the day were filled with declamations on his inactivity, his name was seldom mentioned but with reproach, and the road of Torbay, to which he had so frequently returned baffled in his endeavour to meet the enemy, became the watch-word of calumny. If, in jud ging of land operations, it is right to make allowances for various accidents, which may frustrate the best planned enterprizes, much more ought we to do so with respect to naval expeditions, where difficulty of procuring intelligence, changes of wind, storms, calms and mists, render all attempts on an enemy extremely uncertain, often impede pursuit, or rob even victory of it's rewards. The opposition of the elements was in this instance the sole cause of the Admiral's failure, in attempting to bring the enemy to action; and the experience of his former life ought to have secured him from the suspicion of declining the contest. His courage was proverbial, and his talents as a commander had been proved in various situations; but in none more incontestibly than the relief of Gibraltar during the last war, when with a very inferior force he safely conducted an enormous fleet. of transports through a narrow strait defended by a powerful French and Spanish fleet. The events of the ensuing year proved the injustice of the obloquy, under which he laboured, and ought to be a warning, not to decide rashly on subjects, on which but partial information can be obtained, nor, because, we are removed from the sphere of them ourselves, to undervalue obstacles, which perhaps no human skill, or courage can overcome.' Treating of the Toulon business, the author says; Some, who conceive the war began on the strictest grounds of self defence, have considered Lord Hood's availing himself of the disaffection of the constitutional party in France, as an unjustifiable interference with the internal government of that country, and a duparture from the principles, on which our ministry professed to carry on the war: yet in this instance they differ from the opinions of a writer [Vattel] on the laws of nations, who has shewn himself REV. APRIL, 1803. A a most |