mit the people to declaim with any great vehemence against an occasional act of trespass on its part.

Hence there was obviously no necessity for the general cry against the dangers which might attend too powerful a government and a "consolidation" of the Union. And yet these were still harped upon on every occasion, and not merely from impure personal motives, but in great part also from full and honest conviction. The more insufficient the powers of government were proved to be, the stronger was the opposition to any extension of them. The disinclination to trust congress with power at all in keeping with its duties, became at last so great that it began to show itself even in the debates in congress.1

These views, however, were not carried to an extreme during the war. The governmental machinery of the confederation was as clumsy and imperfect as it could well be. It not unfrequently seemed as if it would cease working altogether. But at every critical moment it received a new impulse. As long as the war had not yet been happily terminated, there stood out in bold relief a definite object which made the Union absolutely necessary; for even the most zealous visionary recognized that independence could be obtained only by united effort. But the moment all

1

Story, Comm., I., § 264.

"The necessary unanimity of action and op ion was preserved by the individual influence of the great men who appeared together in the different colonies." Trescot, The Diplomatic History of the Administra tion of Washington and Adams, p. 10. G. W. Greene is a decided advocate of the same view. See the Life of Nath. Greene, passim.

J. Jay wrote on the 27th of June, 1786, to Washington: "I am uneasy and apprehensive, more so than during the war. Then we had a fixed object, and though the means and time of obtaining it were often problematical, yet I did firmly believe that we should ultimately succeed, because I did firmly believe that justice was with us." Marshall, Life of Wash., II., p. 107. Trescot, 1. c., p. 9, says, and doubtless rightly: "For it must not be supposed that the treaty of peace secured the na tional life. Indeed, it would be more correct to say, that the most critical period of the country's history embraced the time between 1783 and

39

external pressure was removed,' the crazy structure began to fall to pieces with a rapidity which astonished even those who had had during the struggle the best opportunity to learn its weaknesses.

If the states were at first satisfied with simply ignoring the requisitions of congress, or of complying with them just as far as seemed good to them, they now began to scoff at its impotence and to boast of their neglect of duty.2

GROWTH OF CORRUPTION.

3

The demoralizing influences which every protracted war produces began now to manifest themselves to an alarming extent. Impure motives of every description governed the action of the legislatures, and this evil became gradually more frequent and less disguised. Even during the war the most distinguished men gradually left congress, because they found in their several states a field of action in which they could accomplish more, and one in most instances much more congenial to their tastes. Now they either sought to retire entirely to private life, or they were condemned to see their influence in the legislatures gradually wane. Less remarkable men, who knew little of the meaning of the real patriotism which had actuated the leaders of the Revolution, by degrees assumed command of the helm. Confidence in the virtue of the people and denunciation of the slightest attempts to strengthen the power of the confederacy were the masks behind which the most egotistic ends were concealed. But it was soon

the adoption of the constitution of 1788." See also Story, Comm., I., § 249.

1

Story, Comm., I., § 254.

2 Washington writes to Jay: "Requisitions are actually little better than a jest or a by-word throughout the land. If you tell the legisla tures they have violated the treaty of peace and invaded the prerogatives of the confederacy, they will laugh in your face." Marshall, Life of Wash., II., p. 108. Justice Story also says: "The requisitions of congress were openly derided."

3

Trescot, Dipl. Hist., p. 12.

considered scarcely worth while to make use of any mask, no matter how transparent. The acquisitions of the war were looked upon as so much booty, of which each state endeavored to secure the lion's share, without the least regard for the well-being or honor of the whole. In several instances, those who were willing to sell even the honor of their own state showed a bolder front and grew noisier in the hope of increasing their own personal share of the booty and of seeing it turned as soon as possible into jingling gold.1

Congress was destitute of even the necessary pecuniary means of meeting its most urgent obligations.2 The English forces were still in New York when congress was compelled, by a handful of mutinous recruits, to remove from Philadelphia to Princeton, because it was not able to keep the repeated promises it had made to the troops. It was due to Washington's influence alone that the whole army did not refuse to lay down their arms and dissolve, until justice was done them. The distress grew greater every year, and threatened daily to induce more serious complications. The foreign debt was maturing, and congress was unable to meet the interest upon it, to say nothing of the payment of the principal. All efforts to prevail on the states to guaranty the general government a secure and adequate source of income were without effect. They

"Public faith and public force were equally out of the question, for as it respected either authority or resources, the corporation of a college or a missionary society were greater potentates than congress. Our federal government had not merely fallen into imbecility and of course into contempt, but the oligarchical factions in the large states had actually made great advances in the usurpation of its powers. The king of New York levied imposts on Jersey and Connecticut; and the nobles of Virginia bore with impatience their tributary dependence on Baltimore and Philadelphia." Fisher Ames, Works, II., p. 370.

2 "The government of a great nation had barely revenue enough to buy stationery for its clerks or to pay the salary of the doorkeeper." Fisher Ames, 1. c.

AGITATION FOR REPUDIATION.

41

held fast to the policy of requisitions and even considered it a favor when they paid the least attention to such as were made upon them.' The evidences of indebtedness of the home loan sank, in consequence, to about one-tenth of their nominal value.2

The pecuniary condition of the individual states was still worse, for here there was not only no possibility of payment, but the disposition to pay became weaker every day. And even when existing legislatures could be reproached with nothing on this score, it was so uncertain what might be expected from future ones that the state scrip could be negotiated only at an oppressive premium. And this became continually worse, for the number of those who aimed at liquidating their debts by a dishonorable exercise of the legislative power constantly increased,3 and in many of the states it became more uncertain every day whether they would not find a majority in the legislature.

"Public confidence was shaken to such an extent in consequence, that even private individuals of undoubted credit were obliged to pay a discount of from thirty to fifty per

'Hamilton remarked in February, 1787, in the New York legislature, that in the preceding five years New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia had contributed nothing; Connecticut and Delaware about a third of their levy; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland about one-half; Viginia, three-fifths; Pennsylvania, almost her entire quota; and New York more than her quota. But it was New York's headstrong opposition that defeated the effort made to give congress, for twenty-five years, the right to levy a tax of five per cent, on all spirituous liquors and some other articles, and to increase the tax on all other imported goods. Marshall says in relation to this: "New York had given her final veto to the impost system, and in doing so had virtually decreed the dissolution of the existing government." Life of Wash., II., p. 123.

"It should not be forgotten, however, that congress had, some years before, fixed the relation of the continental paper money to specie at 40:1. See an interesting account of the depreciation of the continental money in 1779 and 1780 in Kapp's Leben Kalb's, pp. 169, 170. 'Life of J. Adams, II., p. 131.

cent. on their notes." Business was completely prostrated. “There was no market, especially for real estate, and sales for cash could be made, when at all, only at a great sacrifice." A sullen resignation began to take possession of the public mind. People despaired of bringing about a better state of things through economy and labor. Wild fancies in the garb of radical reform theories, tending to the overthrow of all law and order, gradually usurped the place of the sober business habits which at all other periods have distinguished the American people.

Under such circumstances, it can excite no surprise that the exclusive and particularistic tendencies of the time began to assume a coarser form of development When the confidence of man in man was undermined, and the sense of justice of whole classes of society so dimmed that they openly sought to escape their own embarrassments by the violent ruin of their neighbors, it could not be expected that the policy of the states in their relation with one another should be guided by healthy politico-economical ideas, by great unselfishness, or by high moral principle. Each state had the exclusive right to regulate its commerce, and each state, most ungenerously and most selfishly, availed itself, to the utmost limit, of this right. In the regulation of commerce, regard was had only to self interest, and a policy was frequently followed, the aim of which was to obtain an advantage directly opposed to the welfare of the neighboring states. This gave occasion to continual vexations and petty jealousies. The number and magnitude of real and imagined grievances grew on every side, so that the mutual prejudices of the states shot deeper roots and their animosity became yet more embittered, while as a consequence the ruin of their commerce was completed.

The reaction which this internal dissension had on the relations of the Union to the European powers was very perceptible. The political emancipation of the United