19. Carriers of Goods Common Law. Whether consignee of interstate freight is or has become party to contract of transportation must be determined by general principles of common law. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., Mass., 119 N. E. 855. 20. Rates.-Where agent of interstate carrier, accepting goods under bill of lading requiring payment of freight by the owner or consignee, inadvertently charged a lower rate than that on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, the carrier could recover the amount of the deficit.-Western Ry. of Alabama v. Collins, Ala., 78 So. 833. op 21. Rates.-Where railroad company erates two lines between same point, and freight rate over one is less than rate over the other, it is ordinarily duty of carrier to ship by cheaper route; but duty is not absolute, carrier being bound to consider, not only shipper's interest, but its own, and that of public, and if, all things considered, it would be unreasonable to ship by cheaper route, carrier is not required to do so.-Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soluin, U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 550. 22. Rates. Where trunk line companies owned all of the stock and controlled a railway company whose entire mileage was part of their terminal facilities, they cannot, on the theory of its separate corporate entity, impose on shippers and industries reached by such company's line, charges in excess of their ordinary rates to the terminal point.-Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 553. 23. Res Judicata. Shipper aggrieved by loss of freight in transit may sue carrier in separate actions for amount claimed for loss and for penalty prescribed by Civ. Code 1912, § 2573, for failure to pay claim within 30 days, though trial of action for penalty must accompany or follow trial of that for claim.-SaulsBaker Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., S. C., 96 S. E. 118. 24. Carriers of Passengers-Alighting from Car-A railroad is answerable for negligence of Pullman porter in not placing step for a passenger to alight resulting in personal injury, though porter was not its employe, in absence of any showing that Pullman car was not under its management, as passenger may assume that whole train is under one management.Rogers v. Philadelphia R. Ry. Co., Pa., 103 Atl. 873. 25.Collision.-Where plaintiffs took passage on defendant suburban electric railway's car for continuous passage on the same car to a point in another state, knowing no other carrier than defendant, defendant was liable for collision damages, although fare was collected in six installments of nickel each, and collision occurred in fifth fare zone, over state line, on tracks belonging to another company on which defendant operated under operating agreement, and although defendant had no charter to operate outside state.-Simpson v. Southern Pennsylvania Traction Co., Pa., 103 Atl. 884. 26. Chattel Mortgages—Acceleration of Debt. -Where a mortgage provided that upon default in payment of interest, the entire debt should mature at option of mortgagee. failure to pay interest when due gave mortgagee right to declare entire amount due, and where mortgage was foreclosed upon default in payment thereof, the payment of the overdue interest before foreclosure did not make foreclosure premature. -Swan v. Jones, Ore., 173 Pac. 249. 27.- Statutory Construction.-Under Michigan statute (How. Ann. St. 1912, § 11407), as construed by Michigan courts, failure to file a chattel mortgage, where possession of property is not transferred, renders it void as to mortgagor's creditors subsequent to mortgage and before statute is complied with, and they may attack mortgage, though they acquire no lien during time statute was not complied with. -Goldberg v. Brule Timber Co., Minn., 168 N. W. 22. 28. Commerce-Employment of Children. Act Sept. 1, 1916, prohibiting transportation in interstate commerce of the products of mines of factories in which within 30 days prior to removal of children under 14 were employed, or children between 14 and 16 were employed more than 8 hours per day and 6 days a week is invalid, and cannot be sustained as a regulation of interstate commerce. — Hammer V. Dagenhart, U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 529. 29. Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law. -The owner of realty injured by the construction and operation of an elevated railroad was not deprived of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because benefits resulting from the increased travel were considered in determining whether the premises had been damaged, though other neighboring lands were similarly benefited. McCoy v. Union Elevated R. Co., U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 504. 30. Due Process of Law.-Where city, after telegraph lines located in its streets had been conveyed to defendant, recovered judgment against grantor company for license fees for use of streets, and defendant was in no way party. decision of state court that defendant was concluded by such judgment was erroneous, depriving it of its property without due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.-Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. City of Newport, Ky., U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 566. 31. Estoppel.-Contention that Acts 1898, C. 49 (Ky. St. § 4679c), authorizing condemnation by telegraph companies of easements over railroad rights of way, is invalid because of provision that no notice need be given any mortgagee, cannot be urged by railroad company, for one not injured cannot question constitutionality of law.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 385. 32. Income Tax.--The levy and assessment under Laws Wis. 1911, c. 658, of a general income tax upon the net income of a Wisconsin corporation derived from transactions in interstate commerce, is not such a direct burden on interstate commerce as to contravene the commerce clause of Const. art. 1, § 8.-United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, U. S. S C., 38 S. Ct. 499. tiff abandoned his contract to furnish labor and material in alteration of building for a certain sum, and owner accepted work and completed it at his own expense, plaintiff might recover for labor, etc., according to contract price in proportion that they bore to completed work, less damages from abandonment. Eckles v. Luce, Okla., 173 Pac. 219. 36. Police Power.-The court will not require performance nor award damages for breach of a contract to hold a baby show, where epidemic of infantile paralysis renders the show highly dangerous to public health, and therefore contrary to public policy. Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Ass'n, Conn., 103 Atl. 838. 178 CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL Corporations-Assessment Against Stock was issued 37. stock holders. Where corporate without subscription, the stockholders are liable to assessment, just as if they had been subscribers.-In re Phoenix Hardware Co., U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 410. 38.- -Foreclosure. In a suit to foreclose a corporate trust deed for default in interest, it is no defense that the trustee, acting with the corporation's directors, so manipulated the corporate affairs that the corporation was unable Co., to pay the interest.-Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Long-Distance Telephone Northwestern Ore., 173 Pac. 251. a 39. Injunction.-Statute granting charter to power company cannot be attacked in suit for injunction against purchase of land by another power company on ground that 30 days' notice required by Const. art. 2, § 12. has not been given.-Carolina Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., N. C., 95 S. E. 99. on Stock. In action against 40. Lien corporation to fix a lien on stock standing in the name of one who had put it up as collateral, the corporation claiming a prior lien, whether corporation was chargeable with a limited purpose for which the stockholder had been transinterest.ferred the stock by another was a matter in which complainant could have Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co. v. First Nat. Bank, Ala., 78 So. 797. no 41. Death-Federal Employers' Liability Act. -Federal Employers' Liability Act makes the widow sole beneficiary when there is no child, and only in the absence of both may parents be considered; so proof of pecuniary loss by mother on account of death of her son will not support a recovery, where the son left surviving widow, though he and she had been living apart.-New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 535. 42. Discovery-Books and Accounts.-Leave to examine defendant's books in order to ascertain the exact amount due plaintiff, that the complaint may be framed accordingly, will not be granted.-Zurich General Acc. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Union Ferry Co. of New York and Brooklyn, N. Y., 170 N. Y. S. 758. Alimony. -A defendant, ad43. Divorce cannot judged to pay alimony pendente lite, complain of no sufficient hearing thereon, where the court had jurisdiction, and he had notice his own and appeared with counsel in open court, and based largely upon the award testimony, covering 30 pages of the record.Westphal v. Westphal, Md., 103 Atl. 846. was 44. Electricity-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In an action against a telephone company for damages for the burning of plaintiff's property in which the company's wires were located, the rule of ipsa loquitur does not relieve plaintiff from the burden of showing negligence.-Paine v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 477. - - An Condemnation. 45. Eminent Domain electric company which is a riparian proprietor reason have power of emidoes not for that power can only be nent domain, since such acquired by legislative grant.-Carolina Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., N. C., 96 S. E. 99. 46.- -Easement.-As Acts 1898, c. 49 (Ky. St. § 4679c), authorizing telegraph companies to condemn easements over railroad rights of way, allows judgment only for so much of land as may be necessary, some measure or degree of necessity must exist before right of condemnation matures.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 385. Rights. Electrical company company being a partnership of which E. E. Y. was a member, and the writ was served only thereto busiin obedience on E. E. Y., and ness of the company was suspended, the plaintiff in such suit is estopped in an action for Yardamages for wrongful injunction from saying was not enjoined.-E. E. the company brough Turpentine Co. v. Taylor, Ala., 78 So. 812. 49. Exemptions-Benefit Society-Life Policy payable to wife of insured, but reserving in him power to change beneficiary without wife's consent, cannot be deemed for benefit of wife, so as to be exempt under Code Pub. Gen. Laws Md. 1904, art. 45, §§ 8, 9, exempting from liability for debts any policy on debtor's life, taken out or assigned by him for sole use of his wife. In re Jones, U. S. D. C., 249 Fed. 487. 50. Food-Intent.-Penal Law, § 435, subd. 4, as added by Laws 1915. c. 233. providing that one who, with intent to defraud, sells or exfor sale any meat falsely represented poses or as having been prepared to be "kosher," under orthodox Hebrew religious requirements, is valid, being misdemeanor, is guilty of a within the police powers.-People v. Atlas, N. Y., 170 N. Y. S. 834. 51. Frauds, Statute of-Promise to Pay Debt of Another.-Where officer of a corporation told dealer orally to furnish gasoline to the trucks of the corporation and charge it to him and he would pay it, and credit was given him personally, he was liable, although sale slips and bills were made out in the name of the corporation.-S. J. Cordner Co. v. Manevetz, Conn., 103 Atl. 842. 53. Habeas Corpus-Selective Draft Law. Where registrant under Selective Draft Law is certified into military service, decisions of examining boards as to his physical condition cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus; hence one so certified cannot, where he refused to undergo operation as directed by military authorities for cure of pre-existing trouble, obhabeas corpus.-De tain his discharge under Genaro v. Johnson. U. S. D. C., 249 Fed. 504. Community Property. 54. Homestead Where an undivided one-half of property is community property, and the other half wife's separate property, a wife's homestead declaration impressing her separate property as homestead has effect of impressing homestead characteristic on other half as a homestead selected by wife from community property, in the absence of selection by husband.-In re Bailard, Cal., 173 Pac. 170. Domicile.-A husWife and 55. Husband band's domicile is the domicile of the wife, misconand is unchangeable by her except with his consent, or for such acquiescence or duct on his part inimical to the union as justifies her in selecting another domicile.-Thompson v. Thompson, N. J., 103 Atl. 856. - 56. Injunction - Appeal and Error.-Where, pending appeal from order enjoining mortgage foreclosure sale under statutory proceedings in of question involved state court, settlement was effected, appellants cannot, appeal being any rights for damages or dismissed, assert costs on injunction bond.-Clark v. Fairbanks, U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 431. That the Benefit Society. 57. Insurance wife of member of a fraternal benefit associaraises tion, who was named as beneficiary, paid assessments out of her separate estate, no legal claim which would preclude a change of beneficiaries.-Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Behrend, U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 522. 58. Collateral Contract.-Where life policy providing for loans on security of policy creates a collateral contract only, and insurer's breach thereof does not repudiate contract of insurance, and when loan value of policy is exhausted, it is no breach to refuse loans until pre CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL payment of next due premium.-Harn v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., Okla., 173 Pac. 214. 59.- Evidence. In the absence creating estoppel, the statement of insured in of facts his proof of loss, as to the nature of his illness, is prima facie, but not conclusive, proof of the nature of the illness.-Union Mut. Aid Ass'n of Mobile v. Carroway, Ala., 78 So. 792. 60. Release. Where insured thought he had practically recovered from injury, and so reported to company, which accepted report and settled according to claim in full, and insured signed a release to that effect, there could be no recovery for future consequences of injury. -General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Harris, Miss., 78 So. 778. of 61. Larceny-Consent of Owner.-Under Penal Law, § 1293a, providing that unauthorized use of automobile shall constitute crime larceny, a chauffeur who uses his employer's automobile without his consent, and contrary to instructions, is guilty of larceny, although car was being driven for purpose of testing it. Rose v. Balfe, N. Y., 119 N. E. 842. 62. Malicious Prosecution Punitive ages. That no legal ground existed for suing Damout an attachment, that no amount was then due, that plaintiff was not about to fraudulently dispose of its goods, that it was and maliciously sued wrongfully able out and without probcause therefor, were whereon to base an assessment of the vindictive sufficient grounds damages.-Bell v. Seals Piano & Organ Co., Ala., 78 So. 806. 63. Mandamus-Remedy.-As an order transferring to the equity side of the District Court a count in a complaint seeking damages for breach of a contract to bequeath a sum certain may be regarded as a denial of the court's jurisdiction over the cause of action, mandamus is a proper remedy to require the court to proceed and give plaintiff her right to a trial at common law.-In re Simons, U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 497. 64. Master and Servant-Assumption of Risk. -A servant, acting and orders of the master and by the master under special directions assured of safety, does not, as matter of law, assume the risk of going on a scaffold, though having doubts and misgivings as to the danger. -Wolfe v. Griner, Ind., 119 N. E. 839. 65. Course of Employment.-An employe, working in a trunk factory, directed by his employer to go to another factory across the street to letter a trunk, who received fatal injuries from slipping on returning, was killed by an accident arising snow and ice while out of his employment, and not from an ordinary street risk.-Redner v. H. C. Faber & Son Co., N. Y., 119 N. E. 842, 223 N. Y. 379. of 66. Evidence. In action against owner automobile for death caused while driven by chauffeur, evidence of ownerby automobile ship of the car and of the fact of employment of the chauffeur by such owner is prima facie evidence of owner's responsibility for accident. -Rose v. Balfe, N. Y., 119 N. E. 842. 67. Hours of Service Act. Where graph operator employed by defendant, who teleperformed duties for and was subject to orders of second railroad company, which through accounting between two companies made contributions to his salary, was required by second company to remain on duty longer than allowed by Hours of Service act, defendant for penalty prescribed.-United States v. Denver is liable & R. G. R. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 464. 68.- -Implied Authority. automobile directed chauffeur to put the maWhere of chine in dead storage under instructions not to use it without permission, chauffeur no implied authority to has without owner's knowledge or consent take car orders, and out for purpose of testing it, and, such being unauthorized, owner use accident resulting therefrom.-Rose v. Balfe, N. not liable for Y., 119 N. E. 842. violate is owner 69.- Independent Contractor. A foreman, authorized to hire employes, who receives payment by the day and an allowance for every employe hired, and acts under the immediate supervision of a superior, is not an independent 179 v. Harvey Hubbell, Inc., contractor.--Nichols Conn., 103 Atl. 835. 70. -Negligence. -Where gently failed to furnish a sufficient number of a railway neglimen to lift discarded rails being removed from track to a scrap pile, and the men lifting one end of a rail, being unable weight to handle the rail, dropped their end because of its and injured one of the men end, the railway is liable.-Perez v. Union Pac. at the opposite R. Co., Utah, 173 Pac. 236. 71.- -Negligence.-It was negligence on part of master mechanic in attempt to repair gas still to discharge highly inflammable liquid in way to come in contact with furnace fires and to spread to vicinity of open trap, surface of which carried oil and inflammable material.Hallawell v. Union Oil Co. of California, Cal., 173 Pac. 177. 72. Safe Appliances.-Where an employe is injured by steel flying from a defective steel maul while attempting to straighten a cant hook by placing it on it with an axe, both axe and maul being imthe maul and striking properly used for such purpose, the employer is not negligent in not having cant hook properly repaired, where it had no knowledge that it had been bent.-Ten Mile Lumber Co. v. Garner, Miss., 78 So. 776. 73. Workmen's Compensation Act.-Under Workmen's Compensation Law, § 15, subd. 3, that claimant has sustained a compound fracture of the leg between knee does not create a presumption that he has the ankle and the lost the use of his foot, section 21 after all not applying, and the burden of establishing such loss being on claimant.-Modra v. Little, N. Y., 119 N. E. 853, 223 N. Y. 452. 74. -Workmen's Compensation Act.-In view of Const. art. 20, § 21, empowering Legislature to provide for settlement of workmen's compensation disputes, anything in this Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature has power to limit review of awards of compensation, and to make them conclusive, as provided in Workmen's Compensation Act, $$ 27, 73, 84, 85.-Thaxter v. Finn, Cal., 173 Pac. 163. 75.-Workmen's Compensation Act. Workmen's Compensation Act, art. 2, §§ 10, 12, Under as to compensation for work, an employe who lost one eye before entotal incapacity. for tering employment, and thereafter, through accidental injury, lost the sight of his remaining was entitled incapacity for work."-In re J. & P. Coats (R. to compensation for "total I.), Inc., R. I., 103 Atl. 833. eye, 76. Mechanics' Liens-Bond by Contractor.not recover thereon for expenses of conveyancing and title insurance, etc.-Spiese v. Shee, Bond to protect owner against loss by filing mechanics' lien against building to be erected or loss from contractor's failure to complete building was a where construction was not begun, owner could contract of indemnity, and, Pa.. 103 Atl. 871. 77. -Material Men.-Tubing at the end of which was attached a knife, used solely as an appliance in perforating the casing of a well, which the contractor retained unimpaired save wear and tear, was not, but rental and transportation of tools used were, supplies" within St. 1897, p. 201, relating to "materials contractor's bonds on Sherman v. American Surety Co. of New York, public improvements.Cal., 173 Pac. 161. or 78. Mortgages-Burden of Proof.-In suit to foreclose mortgage, on issue whether two defendants intended to assume payment of mortgage debts referred to, or by connivance of others, such defendants have were led to do so burden of proof, but, on issue whether by subsequent conduct they waived right to set defense, so as to estop them, other parties have burden.--Krentzlin v. Barron, S. C., 96 S. E. 115. 79. up -Estoppel.-One who accepts a deed subject to a mortgage, and deducts amount secured thereby from with his privies, estopped from denying validpurchase price, is, together ity of incumbrance.-Moore v. Orchard Co., Limited, Idaho, 173 Pac. 117, Boise Land & 80. Evidence.-In suit by representatives of deceased assignee of land contract which had been assigned as security, in which plaintiffs sought strict foreclosure against assignor, and assignor pleaded payment of the secured indebtedness and reimbursement of moneys paid by assignee under the land contract, notes described in land contract, which had been paid by assignee to vendor named in land contract, offered in evidence by assignor to show his were admissible, reimbursement of assignee, as against objection they were incompetent unto testimony as der Laws 1913, c. 371, as transactions with deceased person.-Stone Leavitt, S. D., 168 N. W. 28. to V. 81.- -Foreclosure.-One to whom a land contract payable in installments has been assigned to secure an indebtedness cannot, after making the payments called for by the land contract, strict foreclosure against the assignor, have his right being that of a mortgagee merely and enforceable only by ordinary foreclosure. -Stone v. Leavitt, S. D., 168 N. W. 28. 82. Municipal Corporations-Assessment for Taxation.-A railroad right of way cannot be assessed on the basis either of general or special enhancement of its market value, but only for actual benefit to such land for the public uses for which it was acquired, and such assessment may rest upon increased facility of use for railroad purposes.-Erie R. Co. v. City of Passaic, N. J., 103 Atl. 855. 83. Negligence-Attractive Nuisance.-Where a minor, who was injured by the explosion of dynamite caps, left upon the grounds of a city detention hospital, through the negligence of the city employes, the city was not liable on of attractive nuisance.-Frost any theory City of Topeka, Kan., 173 Pac. 293. V. 84. Pedestrian.-A pedestrian who crosses a crowded street at 5 o'clock in the afternoon when traffic is heavy, looking straight ahead without glancing to either side, and is struck by an automobile of which he is oblivious until moment of collision, is negligent.-Mayer v. Anderson, Cal., 173 Pac. 174. and Surgeon - Negligence. 85. Physician Physician attending child suffering from scarlet fever is liable for damage resulting from his as to condition of failure to keep informed child and progress of disease, where he made effort to inform himself thereof.-Tadlock v. Lloyd, Cal., 173 Pac. 200. no 86. Principal and Agent - Evidence.-Where of manila department of plaintiff's manager paper business procured agency to sell product of bag company, which wished to avail itself of manager's experience and ability, such agency became part of plaintiff's business, which manager if considered an employe, could not filch away on severing his connection with firm.Lindsay v. Swift, Mass., 119 N. E. 787. for 87. Railroads — Negligence.-Backing switch engine without light or lookout, in the absence of wantonness, will not make railroad liable track to one negligently running velocipede car after to orders, and on dark, contrary trains going in opposite direction.-Crosman v. Southern Pac. Co., Nev., 173 Pac. 223. of Instruments Intent. 88. Reformation Code Civ. Proc. Philippine Islands, § 285, permitting to be introduced, in case of written contracts, evidence of terms of agreement other than contents of writing, where a mistake or imperfection of writing, or its failure to express true intent of parties, is put in issue by pleadings, warrants relief where the mutual mistake was one of law as to the legal interpretation of the contract.-Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. v. Government of Philippine Islands, U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 573. 89. Sales Contract. Where, through telegraphic correspondence, individual acting under oil in large bought linseed purported name quantities for future delivery, and seller, though diligent in making inquiry, acted under mistaken belief that buyer was corporation, there was no meeting of minds, and seller, having been dliigent, was entitled to rescind contract. -Fay v. Hill, U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 415. -As a shipowner 90. Negligence. · Seamenunder the maritime law is liable to a member of the crew injured at sea by reason of another member's negligence, regardless of their relation, Seamen's Act, § 20, declaring that seamen having command shall not be held fellow ser vants with those under their authority, does not, where a seaman was injured as a result of an alleged negligent order of the master, warrant recovery according to common-law rules of liability, the section disclosing no intention to impose such rules of liability on shipowners.Chelentis v. Luckenback S. S. Co., U. S. S. C., 38 S. Ct. 501. 91. Taxation Tax Title.-The relationship of husband and wife is so intimate and confidential that a husband cannot acquire a valid and independent tax title to his wife's real esa tax sale.tate by a purchase thereof at Croner v. Keefer, Kan., 173 Pac. 282. issued and 92. Time- Sunday. Summons made returnable on a Sunday or a legal holiday does not limit time in which defendant may the day stated, plead, as it is returnable on and effect of statute is to give to return upon next business day the same validity as if made V. Missouri on designated return day. -Harn State Life Ins. Co., Okla., 173 Pac. 214. Receivership. 93. Vendor and Purchaser Where purchaser rescinds and sues vendor for of improvements money paid and for value made, vendor by interposing counterclaim for rent, thus recognizing purchaser as tenant, assents to such rescission, and terminates contract. Woodard v. Williamette Valley Irrigated Land Co., Ore., 173 Pac. 262. 94. Warehousemen-Burden of Proof.-When plaintiff showed that automobile was in good condition, and that all parts and tools there when he delivered it to defendant warehouseman and many missing when returned, burden was on defendant to show want of negligence. -- Gilbert v. Hardimon, S. D., 168 N. W. 25. were 95. Waters and Water Courses-Diversion.Water Supply Act, requiring state comptroller's of names of corporations owing certificate money to state for diversion of water to be filed between January 1st and February 15th, is not mandatory, and omission to file it before latter date did not forfeit state's right to collect sums thereafter certified.-East Jersey Water Co. v. Board of Conservation & Development, N. J., 103 Atl. 853. 96. Incidental Injury. - Principle that no one may accumulate storm water on his land so as to throw it on his neighbor in concentrated form and force, to neighbor's injury, cannot be successfully invoked by one who contracts with his neighbor to do something from which inan incidental, if not jury results to him as Kirkland necessary, consequence of the act.Distributing Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., S. C., 96 S. E. 122. 885. 1 Where 97. Wills- - Contingent Remainder. testatrix left her entire residuary estate in trust for two unmarried sisters, or the survivor, and on the survivor's death directed that it vest in testatrix's heir at law, as specified in an item of the will, the legatees named in such item took vested, and not contingent, remainders.--In re Stocker's Estate, Pa., 103 Atl. -In an 98. Witnesses Cross-Examination. action for injuries received by plaintiff, a seras to vant, in an explosion, it was proper to exclude a question on his cross-examination whether his superior had told plaintiff that during superior's absence he would not be required Titusville Fruit & Farm to use explosives. Lands Co. v. Porter, U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 442. -Cross-Examination.-Where witness for prosecution gave no testimony on direct examination upon subject of his knowledge regarding grand jury proceedings, exclusion of crossexamination as to his knowledge whether property generally described in indictment produced before grand jury was proper, despite defendant's contention that there was a variin indictment and ance between description Feener V. United grand jury's knowledge. States, U. S. C. C. A., 249 Fed. 425. 100.- -Wife.-Where wife was called as witness by party adverse to husband, and there was no objection as to her competency to tesher testimony was tify without his consent, properly in evidence, and failure to object was as required by Comp. equivalent to consent, Laws 1913, § 7871.-Evenson v. Nelson, N. D., 168 N. W. 36. 99. was Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., SEPTEMBER 13, 1918. INJUNCTION AGAINST FORFEITURE TO PRESERVE STATUS QUO PENDING SUIT. In Evans v. Sup. Council, Royal Arcanum, 120 N. E. 93, decided by New York Court of Appeals, with dissenting opinion by one member of the court, it was held, that where plaintiff obtained an injunction against a fraternal benefit society to prevent his suspension for refusal to pay a periodical assessment, which had been increased, and gave bond approved by the court to pay at the end of the litigation whatsoever might be found to accrue up to the time of final judgment in the cause, he did not thereby preserve his status quo, where he wholly lost in the suit. The court said: "Under the by-laws he had, by his own act, in refusing to pay the legal assessments ceased to be a member and had terminated his relations with the society. The temporary injunction did not continue him a member. All that did, or pretended to do, was to enjoin the society 'from suspending' him as a member and from in any manner interfering with his rights and privileges' therein. The society did not suspend him, nor did it in any manner interfere with his rights and privileges. He suspended himself." The dissenting opinion said: "The opinion in this case makes the injunction order granted by the Supreme Court a useless forma lity and a nugatory process. I cannot agree that the injunction, which concededly restrained the officers from expelling Griffith Evans from the Royal Arcanum for the alleged non-payment of dues, was useless and a vain empty effort upon the part of the court to preserve his rights. The officers and the organization were strained, but a by-law or contract of the re member, it is said, was so passively effective as to nullify the injunction." Neither the majority nor the minority opinion cites any authority for its view, but to us it seems clear beyond the possibility of reasonable dispute that the view of the minority must be correct. Let us reduce the position of the majority to finality in reasoning, and it is perceived, that there is no possibility of successful resistance to a raise in rates, except by tender of an amount that is evidently due, and keeping that tender alive at every recurring period of further assessment. In the meantime the member is barred from obtaining the notices that go out to members or from enjoying any right to take part, as a member, in the ordinary management and control of the society's affairs. He becomes a sort of pariah in its ranks because he in good faith, presumably, is asserting alleged rights. But the principle the dissent invokes seems too familiar for scarcely any specific ruling to be instanced in its support. There are, however, one or two general principles which go to the very foundation of equity jurisdiction that may be cited. Thus it is said in High on Injunctions, 4th edition, § 5, that courts of equity in granting temporary injunctions "merely recognize that a sufficient case has been made out to warrant the preservation of the property or rights in issue in statu quo, until a hearing upon the merits, without expressing, and indeed, without having the means of forming a final opinion as to such rights." And further: "Since the object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, the court will not grant such an order where its effect would be to change a status." Ibid § 5-a. Long ago, Lord Brougham said that a court of equity confines itself "to stay a further injury-to keep things as they are |