Bicameralism

Предна корица
This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments.
 

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Съдържание

Introduction to Part I
13
The institutions of bicameralism
44
2A Institutional features of the navette nonfinancial
56
2B Institutional features of the navette financial
64
Introduction to Part II
73
The core and the uncovered set of bicameral legislatures
80
unicameral legislature
86
A model of intercameral bargaining
98
A model of conference committees and their proposals
110
Introduction to Part III
125
The process of intercameral bargaining
145
Conference committees
176
Implications
209
Conclusions
229
Index
243
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