abroad without a home; but he, however poor and unknown to fame, who has a father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters; who sees his own sorrows and happiness multiplied in the sorrows and happiness of those around him; and who is strong in the advocacy and support of the common and public good; not only because it involves his own personal interest, but the interest and happiness of all those, who are linked arm in arm with himself by the beauty and sacredness of domestic ties.

§. 174. Of the moral character of the domestic affections and of the benevolent affections generally.

One of the most interesting inquiries in connection with the domestic affections and the benevolent affections generally, and one too on which there has been a great diversity of opinion, is, whether these affections possess a moral character, and what that character is. The more common opinion seems to have been, that all affections, which are truly benevolent, are necessarily,and from the mere fact of their being benevolent, morally good or virtuous. Nor is it perhaps. surprising, that this opinion should be so often entertained. Certainly, as compared with the other active principles, coming under the general head of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, they hold the highest rank; and we frequently apply epithets to them, which indicate our belief of their comparative preeminence. We speak of them, not only as innocent and useful, but as interesting, amiable, and lovely; and from time to time apply other epithets, which equally show the favorable place which they occupy in our regard. All this we allow; but still they are not necessarily, and in consequence of their own nature simply, morally good.

The correct view on this subject we apprehend to be this; (the same that has been taken of other principles, that are analogous in their nature and operation.) So far as the benevolent affections are constitutional or instinctive in their action, they are indifferent as to their moral character, being neither morally good or evil. So far as they have a voluntary action, they will be either the one or the other, according to the circumstances of the case. When, for instance, the mother hears the sudden and unexpected scream of her

child in another room, and impetuously rushes to its relief, we allow the action to be naturally good and exceedingly interesting and lovely; but we do not feel at liberty to predicate virtue of it, and to pronounce it morally good, because it is obviously constitutional or instinctive. If the act done under such circumstances be necessarily virtuous, then it clearly follows, that virtue may be predicated of sheep, cows, and other brute animals, who exhibit under like circumstances the same instinctive attachment to their offspring. So far, therefore, as the benevolent affections are instinctive in their operation, they are to be regarded, however interesting and amiable they may appear, as neither morally good nor evil.

§. 175. Of the moral character of the voluntary exercises of the benevolent affections.

ous.

But so far as the benevolent affections are voluntary, in other words, so far as they exist in view of motives voluntarily and deliberately brought before the mind, they may be, according to the nature of the voluntary effort, either virtuous or vicious. Take, as an illustration, another instance of the operations of the maternal affection. The basis of this affection is unquestionably pure instinct. But it has, in addition to this, a voluntary operation; and this accessory operation, it is to be presumed, is in the majority of cases virtuNevertheless, whenever this amiable and ennobling affection becomes inordinately strong, when under its influence the mother leaves the child to vicious courses against the remonstrances of the sentiment of duty, its exercise evidently becomes vicious.On the other hand, if the mother, perhaps in consequence of the improper conduct of the child or a perplexing inability to meet its numerous wants or for some other reason, finds its affection falling below the standard which is requisite in order to fulfil the intentions of nature, and in this state of things restores and invigorates its exercise by a careful and serious consideration of all the responsibilities involved in the maternal relation, it is equally clear, that its exercise at once assumes the opposite character not merely of amiableness, but of virtue.

§. 176. Of the connection between benevolence and rectitude. We may add to what has now been remarked, that the

highest and most ennobling form of benevolence exists in connection with strict justice. Perfect justice is, by the constitution of things, indissolubly conjoined with the general and the highest good. All forms and degrees of benevolence, which are at variance, whether more or less, with perfect rectitude, although they are aiming at good or happiness, are nevertheless seeking something less than the greatest possible happiness. Even benevolence, therefore, is, and ought to be subjected to some regulating power. Whenever we distinctly perceive, that its present indulgence, in any given cases, will tend, whatever may be its immediate bearing, to ultimate unhappiness and misery, we are sacredly bound by the higher considerations of duty to repress it. And there is as much virtue in repressing its action at such times, as there would be at other times in stimulating it.

One of the most benevolent men, of whom history gives us any account, was Bartholomew Las Casas, bishop of Chiapa. In 1502 he accompanied Ovando to Hispaniola, who had been commissioned and sent out as the Spanish governor to that island. He there witnessed, with all the pain of a naturally benevolent heart, the cruel treatment, which was there experienced by the native inhabitants; the deprivation of their personal rights, the seizure of their lands, their severe toil, and inexorable punishment. He was deeply affected; and from that time devoted the whole of his subsequent life, a period of more than sixty years, to exertions in their behalf. Under the impulse of a most unquestionable benevolence, this good man recommended to cardinal Ximenes, who was at that time at the head of Spanish affairs, the introduction of Negro slaves into the West India Islands, as one of the best methods of relief to the native inhabitants.

We introduce this statement for the purpose of illustrating our subject. The measures of Las Casas, which tended to introduce enslaved Africans into the Spanish islands, were the results, beyond all question, of a holy and exalted benevolence. But if he could have foreseen the treatment of the Negroes, still more dreadful than that to which the native inhabitants were subjected; if he could have beheld in anticipation the desolations which have spread over Africa in consequence of the Slave Trade; it would have been his du

ty, whatever good might have immediately resulted to the Indians in whose behalf he was so deeply interested, to have checked and controlled his benevolent feelings, and to have endured the present rather than have been accessory to the future evil. The indulgence of his benevolence to the native inhabitants, under such circumstances and in such a form, (however amiable and interesting benevolence, in itself considered, undoubtedly is in all cases whatever,) would have been a violation of duty, and consequently a sin. So false and pernicious is that system, which ascribes to benevolence, in its own nature and independently of its relations to the law of rectitude, the character of virtue.

§. 177. Of humanity or the love of the human race.

Another of the implanted affections is HUMANITY or the love of the human race.On this subject there are only three suppositions to be made, viz, that man is by nature indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-man, or that he naturally regards him with feelings of hostility, or that he has a degree of interest in his welfare and loves him. That man is by nature entirely indifferent to the welfare of his fellow beings, is a proposition, which will not be likely to meet with many supporters; still less the proposition, although some have been found to advocate it, that he is by nature and instinctively the enemy of man. But, in endeavoring to support the third proposition, that he has naturally a degree of interest in and a desire for the welfare of the members of the human race generally, expressed by the terms HUMANITY or PHILANTHROPY, we wish it to be understood that we do not, as a general thing, claim for the exercise of this affection any marked intensity. It is too evident, that it possesses but little strength, compared with what it should; and that it falls far short of the Scriptural requisition, which exacts the same love for our neighbor as for ourselves. The fact undoubtedly is, that the principle is impeded in its action and diminished in its results by the inordinate exercise of the principle of SELF-LOVE, which is constantly recalling our attention within the restricted circle of our personal interests. But the affection of HUMANITY, although thus restricted in its action,

and depressed far below the standard which its great Author justly claims for it, has nevertheless an existence.

This is shown, in the first place, from the great interest, which is always taken, and by all classes of persons, in any thing which relates to human nature, to man considered as a human being, irrespective in a great degree of his country and of the period of his existence. There are numerous other subjects of inquiry; and we undoubtedly feel a considerable degree of interest in whatever reaches us from different quarters of the earth in respect to their structure, climate, and resources. But it is chiefly when man is mentioned, that the heart grows warm. We listen to the story of his situation and fortunes, even for the first time, as of one in whom flows the same fountain of life. When we touch a string here, we find a vibration in every human heart. It was for this reason, that a Roman audience, composed of people from different countries and of different names, and brought up under the influence of different associations and customs, expressed their unanimous and enthusiastic admiration, on hearing the memorable verse of Terence,

Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto.

They felt, that the expressions conveyed a great truth of nature, which it was honorable to recognize; and which it was a violation of the sentiments of their own hearts to deny. The mere aspect of man, the mere sound of the human voice, unaided by a multitude of associations which often enhance their effect, awakens emotions of regard and interest. And seldom can we find a person so immersed in his own selfishness as boldly and openly to avow, that the pursuit of his personal interests, with whatever good reasons it may in itself seem to be justified, is a valid and honorable excuse for annulling the claims of humanity, and sundering the tie of universal brotherhood.

§. 178. Further proofs in support of the doctrine of an innate humanity

or love for the human race.

In the second place, the testimony of individuals, who have been so situated as to put the natural sentiments of mankind in this respect to a fair trial, is favorable to the doctrine of the natural existence of humane or philanthropic