an enemy to half measures; and he dreaded the restoration of royal power, as an event which was not only to blast all his prospects of personal aggrandisement, but to defeat the intentions of his dearest friends, and perhaps expose them to the vengeance of the court. But it is manifest, at the same time, that from this moment, the fate of the King was sealed. No terms which could be proposed as the basis of a settlement, would have satisfied the two great parties, or protected the one against the power and suspicions of the other. Henceforth the sword alone was to determine whether England was any longer to hold a place among monarchies, or to undergo the experiment of a republican govern

ment.

In the ascendency of Cromwell as a successful soldier, was exemplified that result which at one period or another inevitably takes place in all revolutions. A man from among the people, without titles, lands, or privileges, and whose interests have become connected with the progress of the innovation, starts up to direct the course of events; and, without any regard to the original object of the quarrel, avails himself of the passions which have been thereby excited, leads on the multitude to accomplish his private purposes, and at length imposes upon their necks a heavier and more galling yoke than that which they have just shaken off. At this time, and instructed as we are by the page of history, every friend of liberty must regret that Cromwell was made an exception to the otherwise unlimited operation of the Self-denying Ordinance. It had been better for the Parliament to

have suffered a material risk as to the prosperous conclusion of the war, than to have employed so dangerous an instrument. But at the period of which we are treating, not one of them distrusted the principles or motives of the Lieutenant-General; and it would have appeared as little less than ruin to the incipient commonwealth, to lay aside the man who, above all others, was best fitted to render her cause victorious.

In short, were there any doubt that the Selfdenying Ordinance was meant to serve a particular purpose, it might be removed by the fact that Cromwell, after he had thereby turned out the aristocratical generals, contrived soon afterwards to have several of the chief officers of the army elected members of the House of Commons, who at once occupied their seats, and retained their commands. But the consideration which most strongly confirms this view, is founded on the remarkable circumstance already mentioned, that when the troops of the new model were supplied with an establishment of officers, the appointment of Lieutenant-General, or second in command, was not filled up; it was reserved for the hero of Marston-Moor.

VOL. I.

CHAPTER IV.

Containing an Outline of Public Affairs from the period of the Self-denying Ordinance, to the Surrender of his Majesty by the Scots to the English Parliament.

THE new form into which the army was cast, opened up for Cromwell a wide path to the accomplishment of all his purposes. In reducing the old regiments, pains were taken to select for the battalions of the new model such officers and soldiers as were most likely to comply with his views in the still greater innovations which he meditated. The rigid Presbyterians were dismissed, and their places filled by Independents; men whose fanatical humours could be more easily excited by the LieutenantGeneral, who, in this respect, was ever ready to supply the defects of military discipline by the more effectual aids of preaching and prayer.

But while the Parliament was engaged in these preparations for war, an attempt was made by commissioners from the King and from the two Houses at Westminster, to negotiate a peace. The meeting took place at Uxbridge, on the 30th of January, 1645, in compliance with the wishes of the moderate on both sides, who were

weary of hostilities, rather than from any expectation entertained by the leaders of either party that the treaty would be attended with a successful issue. The main points submitted to discussion were the Church, the Militia, and Ireland; and the period for deliberation was limited to twenty days. Twenty-six propositions, drawn up so as to give mutual satisfaction to the insurgents of England and Scotland, had been presented to the King at Oxford, on the month of November preceding; and these, put into the hands of the Parliamentary Commissioners at Uxbridge, were declared to be the only basis on which the people could treat with their sovereign.

As to religion, it is well known that the legislators of Westminster had, the year before, sanctioned a Presbyterian Directory of public worship, in place of the Liturgy, and had even agreed upon several points of ecclesiastical polity subversive of the established church: to these they required the King's consent, as well as to the acts for abolishing Episcopacy, and for constituting the Assembly of Divines. The royal commissioners were authorized to propose a modified form of Episcopal government, by which the bishops should be precluded from exercising any part of their wonted jurisdiction, without the concurrence of a certain number of presbyters to be chosen by the clergy of their dioceses. But no concession that did not imply a full establishment of the Presbyterian church, could be received by the other party, who, on this head, were deprived of all discretionary power. They were farther instructed

to insist that the Solemn League and Covenant should be rendered obligatory throughout the whole kingdom, and signed even by Charles himself. His Majesty's representatives replied, that he could not conscientiously give way to the proposed change in the religious worship of the nation, but that he would willingly grant every reasonable indulgence to those who might have scruples to join it; and consent, moreover, that L.100,000 towards the liquidation of the public debt, should be raised on the property of the church.

The second point, which respected the power of the sword, presented difficulties neither fewer nor less insuperable than the question of ecclesiastical constitution. The King proposed that the right of appointing officers to the army and navy should be confided for three years to twenty commissioners, ten of whom were to be nominated by himself, and the other ten by the Parliament; on condition that, at the end of the period just stated, the usual authority vested in the crown, should revert undiminished to him or to his heirs. To this the other party would not accede; on the contrary, they demanded that the power in question should be continued to the two Houses for seven years from the conclusion of this treaty, or for three years after the establishment of a firm and durable peace, and then to be permanently defined and disposed of by act of Parliament. As this proposition was obviously meant to deprive Charles, during his whole life, of the most efficient article of his prerogative, it is not surprising that his commissioners should have met it with a decided refusal.