represented it. He had provided to meet some of the deficiency, but it was impossible to meet the whole of it in one year, even though the money were voted. Some time would be required for the gradual restoration of the fleet to a state of efficiency. Mr Childers afterwards tried to encourage us by declaring that whether it may have been carefully looked after or not, we have a navy by which we can hold our own against the three principal maritime powers, and that in six months we could sweep all their ships from off the seas. This is a cheering opinion as far as it goes, but it is not a sailor's opinion, and it in no wise tends to clear up the doubt as to whether all the ships which might and ought to have been maintained in seagoing and fighting condition have been so maintained. After a perusal of the whole of the debates on the subject, one can hardly doubt that the Radical Ministers, chained and bound by their promises and professions regarding economy, have persuaded themselves from time to time that necessary repairs and construction might be postponed, and the postponements have led to the unsatisfactory state of things which Mr Hunt deprecates. Indeed, as things have turned out, nothing could have been more unfortunate than the boast about decreased expenditure which the Radicals made in 1868, because circumstances have been dictating an increased expenditure in naval matters; and, although this has not been owing to any fault of the authorities at the Admiralty, they have been restrained from taking proper means to meet it by their former loud professions. Materials and labour have advanced full 25 per cent-a good reason for increasing certain provisions of the estimate 25 per cent; but Ministers who had made such a fuss about

their predecessors' estimates did not dare to propose the necessary increase of cost. Again, the ships of the present day, in proportion to the number of men they carry, are far more expensive in first cost than the ships of thirty years ago. But this is not all. It is found that the modern ironclads keep the seas but a short time before they require repairs, and that the repairs are so expensive that in a period of ten years or so they come to as much as half the original price of the ship. Where repairing is such a serious matter, it is no wonder if a Government which pledged itself to economy shirked these repairs whenever excuse could be found for doing so. Fortunately, the difficulties which we have just stated are not peculiar to Great Britain. Other countries must find them as great hindrances as we do. And then it appears that there is another constant source of disappointment and loss, which, though we cannot avoid it, must affect expenditure very seriously. We allude to the experimental character of the costly achievements of naval architecture. Formerly, after long experience in one almost constant style of building, we could set about framing a ship with the certainty that, if constructed with ordinary care, she would answer the purpose intended. But nothing of the kind can be predicted of the curiously formed things which we create nowadays. No doubt the cleverest artists design them with the most anxious endeavour that they should succeed; but they do not always succeed for all that. The debates of this year show how a ship, after having been built at immense cost to sweep the high seas, may not prove fit to send away from the coast. Indeed, there are reasons in plenty why the estimates of a great naval power must be heavy. But after all, although it is plain that

the most watchful of Ministers may, after a large expenditure, possibly have but little to show for it; yet there is no excuse at all in these days for the Minister who, to make show of saving, neglects our defence. When ships are boldly built, there is the risk that they may prove dreadfully expensive; but when their construction or repair is neglected, there is danger of ruin. In these circumstances, the advantage is apparent of being ruled by Ministers who, without self-contradiction or self-conviction, can speak out their minds as to the actual condition of our fleet, and as to the expense absolutely necessary in order to maintain an unquestionable naval supremacy. The transition period now current cannot but be an expensive period; but that consideration need not scare us, for without doubt the country will cheerfully supply the requisite funds, provided only that it finds open dealing and clear expositions from those who have the ordering of the navy. Men of all parties, including Sir W. V. Harcourt, have testified that we cannot spend our money to better purpose.

A curious remark which fell from Mr E. J. Reed in the course of the debate of April 30th passed without explanation from the speaker of it, or comment from any other member. Mentioning the Devastation, he said he believed she would be found the most valuable ship in theNavy,though naval officers might not be able to appreciate the ships that the Government had put into their hands. Who, then, are they who are to develop the merits of these ships, and use them for our advantage? Will Mr Reed move them and fight them? Will the Civil Lords lead on the ironclad column to break the enemy's line? Either naval officers must entirely appreciate the ships which they are to work, or the excellen

De

ces of those ships need not be. non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio, is entirely true of the merits of ships in the eyes of naval officers. Either we must educate our officers up to the point of comprehending the capabilities of the Devastation and other great experiments, or the capabilities might as well not exist. Or, may we view the matter in another way, and say that, as long as naval officers do not admit particular advantages and merits to reside in certain ships, we hardly feel justified in assuming those advantages and merits as proved by the testimony of Mr E. J. Reed?

1st,

Two debates in the House of Commons, on our future policy in West Africa, have brought to light very convincingly the degree to which we stand entangled in that region. Three points of information appear to have been principally made clear by the discussion. that the Black War might have been avoided. 2d, That we cannot go forward-i.e., we cannot assume more decided territorial control and maintain peace among the tribes by our overruling power 3d, That we cannot go backward-i.e., recede from our position on the Gold Coast, and leave the native races and the white traders to themselves.

The war, it would seem, grew out of the transfer to us of the Elmina territory. There is every reason to believe that in respect to that transfer we used tolerably sharp practice, making the transaction as insulting as possible to the King of Ashanti, without perhaps doing him much substantial wrong. But then, with savage natures, it is harder to put up with a slight than with a damage. All our soft sawder had been sent to America, and we could not command a few grains to reduce the swelling in Koffi's back; but we had some shot and shell, for

which we could find no use in civilised lands, and we sent that to soothe the monarch's wounded honour, and made Elmina too hot to hold him. After that feat, there was no receding till Gladstone's Black War had been accomplished. Peradventure, our Government thought, at the time of that unlucky Elmina business, that we could carry things with a high hand. If so, they made a grand mistake, which is not to be wondered at when "the deplorably scanty information" to which Mr Gladstone confessed is remembered. An it had been known that Koffi was valiant and so cunning of fence, Mr Gladstone would probably have seen him in greater heat than that of the Gold Coast ere he shelled him out of Elmina. That is the only possible explanation of prompt hostility on the part of the Gladstone Government. They expected that there would be no resistance, and that they might enjoy a cheap triumph. But they were altogether wrong, and we have had to pay for their error. They deserve every taunting word that has been spoken at them for the inconsistency which made a word and a blow their practice on the Gold Coast, while no amount of provocation from powerful nations could elicit from them the slightest sign of emotion. Their mischief in Africa cannot now be remedied; neither, we hope, will it be forgotten.

We cannot, it seems, turn the quasi protectorate which we exercise on the Gold Coast into an active, vigilant, practical control, by which we might effect much good, because of the slavery, and the trade in slaves, which are there so prevalent. No such practices can be allowed to exist where the rule of Great Britain is recognised. This obstacle is not due to the scruples of the past or the present Government, but to

an unconquerable prepossession in the mind of the British people. Such firmly cherished principles are not uncommon among us. They are the extreme manifestations of charitable and highly honourable feelings; but the effect of them is, that we leave undone a large amount of possible good because we are unable to do all the good that is conceivable. Nobody at all seems to doubt that by establishing a firm power in Western Africa, we might at once produce enormous improvement, and start some of the tribes in the path of civilisation. We don't do this, because there is not the slightest hope of these tribes being in any way induced to give up slavery, which to them is the most natural and indispensable thing in the world. They and we see it in entirely different lights; we occupy no common ground in regard to it: it would require years, perhaps centuries, of intercourse with civilised people to make the savages comprehend why slavery is odious and wicked, or to make them feel at all as we do in regard to it. Because of this difference of lights,because we have no hope of summarily putting an end to slavery, with all its hideous accompaniments, -we decide to stand aloof, and to refrain from doing the good that is in our power from giving the first blow, probably, to this very institution of slavery. Surely the reputation of Great Britain in regard to slavery is pretty well established by this time. She can afford to yield to a temporary necessity, without incurring the suspicion that she is growing careless about principles which she has disseminated at so much labour and cost; she is not obliged to abandon the substance for the shadow.

It must be remembered that our recent experience on the Gold Coast shows the protected tribes to be

sunk so low, that there is not a chance of persuading them to make an effort, warlike or peaceful, for their own or others' advantage. Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff have made us understand how inducements, which to a people with the slightest elevation of character or energy would have been irresistible, were utterly ineffectual with these debased natures. Compulsion is not a desirable means of putting life into a people, but in this case it seems to be the only means. Thus the question presents itself: Shall we for a time allow resort to the only means which promise success? or shall we, from a high-flown adherence to the letter of a maxim (of a generous maxim, without doubt), allow these poor creatures to continue in their fearfully degraded state of sloth, ignorance, and ferocity?

Means ought to be found of getting over this difficulty; but we are not at all confident that they will, for our people are most arbitrary on many points. Yet they have, after a long time, found out how to let our flag float over populations with whose religions we have no sympathy, and whose practices are abominations to us; and we have found that, by being simply tolerant at the first, we have, after a time, been able to infuse our sentiments among the subject populations. The practice of Suttee in India has almost, if not entirely, been eradicated in this way. But if we had declined to exert British authority where Suttee was practised, it might have been prevalent to this day. Our prudery much resembles the caution of the man who intended never to go into the water till he could swim!

There are obvious reasons why we cannot, immediately after this war, withdraw wholly from the theatre of it. We cannot desert the tribes whom we have raised to

the position of allies, taught to lean on us, and rendered obnoxious to the wrath of Koffi. The retreating English would be followed by the groans of the Fantees, Wassahs, and so on. And, of course, we are not going to depart, as Lord Carnarvon has explained. We cannot ascertain from his lordship's speech that the character of the Protectorate will differ much from what it was before; and we regret that this is the case. We would have preferred the consolidation, and, if necessary, extension, of our government, and the establishment of a firm rule; but probably the nation. would not consent to this, so there was no use in proposing it.

Two or three changes in the machinery of government intended to be carried out at this unpleasant station seem likely to be beneficial, and we are glad to see that we are to have once more a Gold Coast corps. We had one before, which afterwards had its name changed, and became a West India Regiment. Then came Mr Cardwell and abolished the corps; immediately after which he went to war on the Gold Coast. While we had a Gold Coast corps, we had no war on the Gold Coast; while we had a war on the Gold Coast, we had no Gold Coast corps; the War Minister had reduced it just by the time it was wanted. Looking at this fact, the Black War may be seen to be directly traceable to the promises of economy by which partly the Liberal Government attained to power in 1868.

movements has set in, and when we are watching in uncertainty the important effects of other and sufficiently hazardous experiments, it was silly as well as wicked to attempt to hurry forward more leaps in the dark. We think we should have preferred to give a stern and peremptory opposition to the attempt, but we must suppose that Ministers knew what they were about when they met the Bill as they did. No doubt the Prime Minister, with admirable temper, counselled the House of Commons as to the mode of dealing with the question. The right hon. gentleman did not let it appear that he is in principle opposed to this measure; and he certainly did not refuse to acknowledge the weight of the arguments which in the abstract can be adduced in support of it. His reasoning, on the coutrary, went to prove that an abstract view of the subject is at the present time absolutely useless, because the proposed change cannot be put in practice except in connection with other and more startling changes to which we do not at all see our way. Mr Forster, with (for him) singular recklessness, argued that the right course would be to concede the franchise, and then, if it must be so, to adjust any involvements or anomalies that might arise out of it, treating these presumed consequences of it more as excuses for postponing the desired legislation than as bona fide obstacles. But the Premier did not allow the House to remain long under the influence of this exhortation. He demonstrated with the greatest clearness that the collateral changes, which must accompany the change proposed, could in no wise be left for aftertreatment as mere appendages and simple adjustments, but that they are entitled to quite as patient consideration as the measure which is

The

to render them necessary. complete reallotment of the representation which he showed to be involved in the new franchise was, though he treated it humorously, enough to raise some little feeling of caution in even the most Radical mind. The disfranchisement of a large proportion of the existing constituencies, and the creation of new constituencies, the working of which it is impossible to conceive beforehand, are designs which may well excite apprehension. Grant that they cannot be altogether put aside, and that they must sooner or later occupy the attention of Government and of Parliament"; still they are not ripe for consideration at the present time. Even if opinion were more matured concerning them than it is, it would be most inexpedient to force them before the Legislature until we have more experience of the situation in which other, and not inconsiderable, reforms have already landed us. We are by no means clear as to the operation of the last Reform Act or the Ballot Act; but surely we ought to understand the nature and effects of those changes which have been legalised before we pass on to more sweeping and more dangerous innovations. Fortunately, there was not the least appearance of the wisdom of the Government having to contend with popular impatience in recommending the postponment of these momentous questions. seemed rather as if the abhorrence of revolutionary movement were more vivid in the people themselves than the conviction of its imprudence can be in Ministerial minds. We have been gorged with reforms and projects of reforms until we are absolutely nauseated. We find in the reforms of the late Government disappointment and dissatisfaction so great, that if the present Government were weak enough to start the

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