maintaining with Grattan that the repeal of the Declaratory law had fully established the legislative independence of Ireland, they frankly consented to allay the doubts that had arisen by a Renunciation Act meeting fully the demands of Flood. It declared that the right claimed by the people of Ireland to be bound only by laws enacted by his Majesty and the Parliament of that Kingdom in all cases whatever, and to have all actions and suits at law or in equity, which may be instituted in the Kingdom, decided by his Majesty's Courts therein finally and without appeal from thence, shall be, and it is hereby declared to be established and ascertained for ever, and shall at no time hereafter be questioned or questionable.' It would be impossible to make a fuller or more honourable disclaimer of power, and it was made, not at a time of great national danger, but at the very period when the re-establishment of peace had restored the full power of England.

The British Government could not have met more fully the demands of Ireland, nor could the guarantees of the independence of the Irish Parliament appear on paper more complete. Yet on both sides of the Channel wise men perceived that the Constitution that was being established contained within it serious elements of danger or decay. A Parliament in which the overwhelming majority of the seats were nomination boroughs under the control of the Treasury or of a few private individuals was not really representative, and, although it had clearly shown that on certain questions it had a will of its own and could faithfully reflect the wishes of the nation, yet it was certain in normal times to relapse into a condition of systematic dependence. If a real reform of Parliament changed the system; especially if the great mass of the unrepresented Catholics were introduced into the Constitution, or if seditious or anti-English elements obtained predominant, or even

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considerable, influence in Parliament, the conditions of Irish parliamentary life would fundamentally change, and the difficulty of making the machine work in harmony with the British Government would be enormously increased.

But, apart from these considerations, the Constitution of 1782 was not likely to prove workable. One of the most important functions of a Parliament is to supervise and control the Executive. In England the Executive is virtually the child of Parliament, as the ministers can only be selected among the men who are pleasing to it, and who have become pleasing to it by a long career in English politics, and a vote of censure by the House of Commons can at any time displace them. But the Irish Executive was appointed by the English Government, and depended for its continuance on the votes of the English Parliament, and a Government which had the full confidence of the Irish House of Commons might at any time be overthrown by an English party vote on some purely English question. The Lord Lieutenant was appointed in England, and received his instructions from English ministers; his Chief Secretary was the leader of the Irish House of Commons, and both of them were usually perfect strangers to Ireland till they received their offices and were placed at the head of Irish affairs. The two countries were so closely connected that it was impossible for Ireland to escape English party tendencies, and some of the Irish boroughowners were English noblemen with English political influence. It was quite possible that opposite parties might at the same time predominate in the two countries, but it remained with the English ministers to appoint the men who administered affairs and distributed patronage in Ireland, and it was only by the extreme measure of refusing supplies that the Irish Parliament could in any degree control them. If the royal veto were exercised in Ireland

it could only be on the advice of the British ministers, and while the Irish Parliament had obtained the most complete control over the resources of Ireland, the Irish Government depended on and fluctuated with English party changes.

In foreign policy the dangers were still greater. If the Sovereign made war, it must be on the advice of his British ministers, but Ireland was at once bound by the declaration, while in the long course of discussion and negotiation that preceded the declaration she had no part. These things were carried on by diplomatists appointed by a British Government, and by debates and votes in a British Parliament, and it was more than probable that the question at issue would be one in which Ireland had no interest. She had, however, one power which would have great efficacy, but which would be of the greatest danger to the Empire. If she disapproved of a war or of an alliance she might refuse to vote supplies. She might withdraw her forces from the field, make a tacit arrangement of neutrality with the enemy, refuse to take any part in the prosecution of the war, or in the general defence of the Empire. It is true that this had never happened, that with a loyal Parliament it was not likely to happen, and that in every struggle in which England had been hitherto engaged the Irish Parliament supported her to the full extent of its power. But in the forecasts of the future this danger could not be omitted, and it might be brought about not merely by positive sedition in Ireland, but even by a strong party spirit running on questions of foreign policy in opposite directions in the two islands. The fifteen thousand men supported by the Irish Parliament formed a very admirable contribution on the part of Ireland to the defence of the Empire, but there was a party led by Flood, who maintained that a large military retrenchment was imperatively

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needed in order to bring the finances of the country into a proper condition.

This.

The difficulties relating to commerce were also very serious. In the period of the servitude of the Irish Parliament England had exercised her power with the object of securing for herself an absolute monopoly in the chief branches of the manufactures and commerce, and Irish competition had been deliberately crushed. system had now been given up. Trade with England could only be carried on with the concurrence of the British Parliament, but in her trade with foreign powers Ireland was absolutely free. She had been granted free trade with the English colonies of Africa and America on the sole condition of establishing the same duties and regulations as those to which the English trade was subject, and she had full power of encouraging her own manufactures and commerce either by bounties or by protective laws. Under such circumstances it was quite possible that Irish commerce might come into direct collision with that of England; that Ireland might come into closer commercial relations with another power and might even learn to look upon England as her most formidable rival. As we have already seen, there was a party which contended that in the situation of Ireland strong protective legislation was a necessity if she was to maintain any manufacturing prosperity in face of the vast capital and the old establishments of England, and such a policy would inevitably lead to political estrangement.

On the other hand, Ireland had no power of protecting her own commerce. She had no diplomacy, and if there were negotiations to be carried on, or disputes to be settled with a foreign power, she could only act through British diplomats. She had no fleet to enforce her demands, nor did she make any regular contribution to the British navy which protected her commerce. Yelverton, it is true, had endeavoured to

induce the Irish Parliament to establish a fleet of its own, but the measure was looked on with disfavour by the English ministers, who much preferred that it should on critical occasions make some grant to the British fleet. They would, indeed, gladly have seen the provision repealed which prevented 12,000 of the 15,000 soldiers raised in Ireland from being removed from the country without the consent of the Irish Parliament.

These considerations seem sufficient to show that without some supplementary legislation the Constitution of 1782 was not likely to prove permanent. The difficulties were perhaps somewhat exaggerated by English statesmen, but they were certainly real, and they might easily become fatal if Irish national feelings were ever alienated from England. As long as the Irish Parliament consisted of men who were heartily loyal to the Empire, it was not likely that the connection would ever break down on mere questions of machinery. At the same time, the chief governors of Ireland at the period when the independence of the Irish Legislature was declared were exceedingly desponding. The Duke of Portland, who was Viceroy when the legislative independence of Ireland was declared, said in a confidential despatch that unless some closer tie of connection was established between the two countries than now existed, it was very doubtful whether it would not be good policy for England to abandon Ireland altogether. Temple, who succeeded Portland, predicted that the concession which had been made would sooner or later close for ever the accounts between the two kingdoms. Rutland, who succeeded Temple, foretold that without a legislative union Ireland would not remain twenty years connected with Great Britain.

In the opinion of English statesmen a superintending power and supremacy of Great Britain in all matters of