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"Christian, and therefore if the person who makes "it be a bad man, he will be more inexcufable than "if he had not been a Chriftian, and could not have "made that declaration.". That is not the matter in debate, Sir: The question to be decided is, whether a bad man, who by attending the Lord's Supper folemnly declares he is a Chriftian, and not only obliged but refolved to live like a Christian, be not more inexcufable than one (in other refpects equally bad) who had not made fuch a declaration; or whether fuch an one does not involve himself in greater guilt than he. would otherwise have been chargeable with. You proceed thus: "but if a man be in fact a Chriftian, "the obligation to a chriftian-like behaviour is much "the fame whether he declare his belief of chri"ftianity before the world or not."* That is to fay, His declaring himself a Chriftian in the most folemn manner poffible, so as to profefs his refolution to live and die as becomes a Christian, brings him under no ftronger obligation to a chriftian-like behaviour than a mere private opinion that chriftianity is a divine religion, and fuch a profeffion in a bad man is no aggravation of his guilt. If this be true, it will follow, that it is impoffible for a perfon by any profeffion of religion to bring himself under a ftronger obligation to an holy life, than the mere belief of chriftianity brings him under, or to expofe himself to greater guilt, or more aggravated punishment than he would incur by difobedience to the gospel alone, without any profeffion at all which appears to me as contrary to found reason, as I hope hereafter to fhew it is to the common language of scripture. In order to illuftrate and vindicate the paffage quoted above, you

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*This is not quite confiftent with p. 56, where you call upon us to ftrengthen this obligation by a public profeffion." Upon which (by the way) fo much stress is laid throughout the New Teftament, that those who do not make it are excluded from the Christian character. So that" being in fact a Christian, and not declaring it to the world," is a cafe not to be supposed. See Mat. x. 32. Rom. x. 9, &c.

add, "The one is only a more folemn thing than the "other, but precifely of the fame nature. They "differ only as a common affertion and an oath, "which are both, in a manner, of equal obligation sc upon an honeft man." I was greatly at a lofs for fome time to fee the force of your reasoning here, for want of knowing what are the two things between which you are making the comparison. Thofe immediately preceding are "a man's declaring his be "lief of chriftianity to the world, and his not declar"ing it." For you next add, "the one is only more "folemn than the other." The mere abfurdity of fuch a comparison induced me (after feveral times reading the paffage) to look back thro' the laft fentence of full ten lines, to the preceding; where I found what I suppose must be the things compared, viz. "The receiving the Lord's Supper-and ftanding 66 up in the face of the world and faying, I am a Chri"ftian." These you fay are the fame thing. To these I imagine you must refer when you fay, "The one "is only a more folemn thing than the other." But pray, Sir, does not the greater folemnity of any profeffion proportionably increase the obligation to act ac cording to it, and inhance the fin of violating it? The Lord's Supper you fay differs only from faying I am a Chriftian as an oath differs from a common affertion. But is there no difference between these two? You allow the one is more folemn than the other? It is univerfally esteemed fo, and therefore preferred for the greater fecurity. Is not the obligation to truth therefore, and the guilt of falfehood, greater in the former than in the latter? Suppofing then that receiving the Lord's Supper were the fame thing as ftanding up in the face of the world and faying, I am a Chriftian, fince, as yourself allow, this is a more folemn way of making fuch a declaration, there is "a greater hazard" in a perfon's making it this way, who is "of a dubious or indifferent character," than in his merely faying he is a Chriftian. I muft own I

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would not advise a person of a dubious or indifferent character (efpecially one whom I knew to be irreligious) to stand up in the face of the world and fay, I am a Chriftian; much lefs to attend the Lord's Supper, tho' I looked upon it as only faying the fame thing in a more folemn manner. Would it not be advifeable in fuch an one to defer declaring his christianity to the world, till his conduct should speak the fame language?

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But I muft diffent from you when you fay "the one is the fame as the other," and must here again beg leave to remind you, that you yourself have, in another part of your book, pointed out an effential difference, where you tell us that attending the Lord's Supper is not merely declaring that a perfon is a Chriftian, but that "he is refolved to live and die as becomes à Chriftian." Now this declaration no one can with propriety make but a perfon who is fo refolv ed. If therefore any one makes it who is not fo refolved, he is (as I have before fhewed) guilty of a folemn falfehood, he eats and drinks unworthily. Will you fay then that a man of an indifferent character runs no greater hazard in attending this inftitution, than he would in making a mere fimple declaration that he believed the gofpel? Thefe two things differ from each other, not as an oath differs from a common affertion, but as a perfon's declaring his belief of any truth, and his taking an oath that he will act fuitably to fuch a conviction. In confirmation of your opinion you further fay, Befides, coming in a conftant way to a place of Chriftian worship is, in fact, a publick declaration of a man's christianity, and therefore lays him under the fame "obligation." This I muft beg leave to deny, fince attending publick worship is no where in fcripture fpoken of as a proof of a man's chriftianity; nor does it in its own nature imply a declaration of it, (much lefs of his refolution to live like a chriftian) fince it is easy to conceive how an unbeliever may commend.

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ably attend a place of Chriftian worship in order tojudge concerning the Chriftian faith, or even to unite in those parts of the fervice which are agreeable to the religion of nature. And it is well known that many congregations among the Diffenters are become fo rational and complaifant, and their publick worship conducted upon fuch very catholic principles, that a fober Deist might with propriety attend upon it, and would meet with much lefs difguft than one of your old-fashioned Chriftians. But would not fuch a perfon make a diftinction between the ordinary parts of publick worship and the Lord's Supper, which he would confider as the diftinguifhing badge of Chriftianity, which, if he had any confcience at all, he would refuse to wear; and would not he think himfelf injured by having his attendance on publick worfhip conftrued as proof of his being a Chriftian? Since this is a duty dictated by the light of nature, and therefore widely differs from receiving the Lord's Supper, which is peculiar to chriftianity. And we believe that the attendance upon it not only neceffarily implies a perfon's being a Chriftian, but is divinely appointed as a publick teftimony of it, which publick worship is not. Your conclufion, therefore, that they are equally hazardous, is falfe, and a man of a dubious or indifferent character has (contrary to your inference) more reason to be afraid of coming to the Lord's Supper, than of attending publick worship.

If it fhould here be faid, as it often has been, "that "tho' a man of fuch a character cannot fo well an"fwer the end of this ordinance as a truly good man, "yet he ought not for that reafon to abfent himself "from this part of publick worship any more than "from publick prayer or praife, or hearing the word of "God, neither of which a man of a bad or dubious cha"racter can so properly attend upon as a good man,"I anfwer, the Lord's Supper feems to me to differ from all

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other institutions, and indeed one would naturally fuppofe in theory that the divine wisdom in appointing it would require it fhould have fome end peculiar to itfelf. If the above representation of it be juft, its difference from other religious fervices is very obviAnd particularly if that be true which I have been endeavouring to prove, that an unholy perfon by attending it profeffes a falfehood, and thereby aggravates his guilt, the inference is very natural that luch an one ought to refrain from attending this rite till his character correfponds with the nature of it.

If it should be urged, "That those who are not as yet truly pious may lawfully come to the Lord's Supper as a means to make them fo, and ought to "be encouraged to do it with this view; fince it has "this tendency, and has had this effect;" I answer, this would be acting contrary to an established and well-known fcripture-maxim, which forbids us to ⚫ do evil that good may come.' This were to invent an use of this ordinance for which we have no warrant, in the room of that which divine wisdom has appointed, and which indeed refults from its very nature. It is, as you have allowed, a profeffion of fomething that we are already, and therefore not a means of fomething else. The inftitution is not defigned to beget holy difpofitions which had no being before, it requires the exercife of them, and therefore fuppofes the being of them already. Those who attend it without them (according to the foregoing reafoning) attend it unworthily, and therefore in the degree in which they do fo, eat and drink judgment to themfelves by declaring what is not true. It is not therefore to be expected that their receiving fhould be the means of their converfion. Indeed wicked men cannot be supposed to attend upon it with this view, nor can the Almighty be expected to render an ordinance inftrumental in promoting an end to which he has not appointed it as a means. That the actual receiving

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