of society, but whoever rose to honors by exercising those trades? for why? the prospect of getting a livelihood holds them tight to their work, without any other spur to assist it. But upon boys being first put out as apprentices the master finds it useful to encourage them by commendation, because they have then none other inducement to do their duty besides reward and punishment. We chide and applaud our children to make them careful of their money; but when they have gotten a competent habit of economy, then honor changes stations, standing as a fence on the other side, to secure them against covetousness. Hence too we may learn why the most considerate persons honor the intention rather than the deed, for though the usefulness of an action results from the performance, not the design, yet the use of commendation lies only in its operating upon the mind, nor does it at all influence the success any further than by doubling our diligence. Yet a proper estimate of external objects has its use too, as directing us which way to apply our endeavors out of several presenting: for if there were not a credit in having things neat and handsome about us, many men would satisfy themselves as well with grovelling always in the dirt; and if there were not a respect paid to eminence of station and fortune, even where we have no high opinion of the persons, we should invalidate those rules of good breeding which keep up decorum, and render conversation easy. Hence likewise we may see why honor generally runs counter to profit and pleasure, because the use of it lies in restraining them when they would carry us on to our detriment; and the more forcibly they tempt us, the greater is the merit of resisting them, because we then need a stronger weight to overbalance their influence. The same reason may account for honor resting upon comparison, because use frequently does so too: for as among many things proposed to his option, a prudent man will always choose the most useful, so he will prefer the most laudable, as carrying the presumption of being the most useful. Therefore the desire of surpassing others is always faulty, unless when some real benefit will result therefrom, or there be some good purpose in view, which cannot be attained without it. 10. The desire of honor, like all other desires, gives an immediate pleasure in the gratification, or when moving on successfully towards its object; and this may be reckoned among the uses of honor. But these pleasures are not to be valued according to their intenseness, for high delights of all kinds, though they ravish the mind while fresh and new, yet they pall the appetite, and render it tasteless of common enjoyments; nor can they keep their relish long, because our organs are too weak to support the violent exercise they put them upon. But there is a self-approbation, which, being of the gentle kind, throws the spirits into easy motions that do not exhaust nor fatigue, and soothes the mind with an uninterrupted complacence in the reflections she may cast back upon her general tenor of conduct. For as ease, health, and security, afford a degree of actual pleasure, though implying no more in themselves than a negation of pain, sickness, and danger, so there is a real satisfaction in keeping clear of everything for which others might justly censure us, or we might blame ourselves. This then the wise man will be most careful to attain, as adding more to the sum total of his happiness than the momentary transports of joy, upon excelling in any way whatever. Nevertheless, an ardent desire of doing or possessing something extraordinary has its value, but as we observed before concerning intense pleasures, not so much for its intrinsic worth, or for the gust found in the gratification, as for the good fruits it may produce, by stimulating our industry, furnishing us with employment, and putting us upon useful services we might otherwise have omitted. 11. If there be any meaning in the expression of things laudable in themselves, it must belong to those we find esteemed most universally, or by the best judges, or from which we cannot withhold our applause whenever we consider them in our own minds, though we know not why they so affect us: but our not seeing the benefits resulting therefrom, is no proof of their non-existence. By such tests it behoves us to try our sentiments every now and then, for as we catch a tincture from others by custom or example, without this caution we shall lie perpetually liable to be drawn aside by the glare of false honor from pursuing the true. But when we do employ the method of reference to use, we must carry the reference to all quarters whereto it can extend: for it is not enough to weigh the consequences of the present action, but we must consider what effect our departure from a rule may have upon ourselves at other times, how far it may influence other people to follow our example, when they have not the like reason for doing as we do, and in short all the circumstances that any ways relate to the case. Honor, says Mr. Addison, is a sacred tie, and its laws are never to be infringed, unless when more good than hurt will evidently result from dispensing with them: nor must the danger of weakening their authority be forgotten in the account; and if that be considered, there are some of those laws which perhaps a sufficient warrant can never be found for transgressing. 12. Situation and circumstance may cast a dishonor upon what appears perfectly innocent in itself: there are many things 1 need not name, that every man must do, and therefore will acquit himself in doing, yet every discreet man will choose to do in private, and conceal from the knowledge of others as much as possible. It is well known what irregularities the Cynics were led into by judging of things as laudable or blameable in themselves: for intrinsic qualities cannot be divested by the circumstances of time and place, from the subject whereto nature has united them. A stone will retain its hardness so long as it remains a stone, and air be yielding to the touch always and everywhere: therefore they made no scruple to commit the grossest indecencies in public, because their adversaries could not but admit the acts they performed were at some times allowable. But if they had judged by a proper reference to use, they must have seen the expedience of decency and decorum, that what becomes one man may not become another, and that the same actions, according as they do, or do not, tend to give offence, or to the breach of good manners, may become blameable or allowable. 13. Much ado has been made of late days about certain moral senses, which nature is supposed to have furnished us with, for the discernment of things laudable or blameable, becoming or ridiculous, as she has with the bodily senses for the discernment of sensible objects; and this notion seems introduced to supply the place of innate ideas, since their total overthrow by Mr. Locke. If we allege that nature is more uniform in her gifts than we find these moral senses to be, which judge very variously of the same object in different persons, we are silenced with the old pretence, that all who do not see as we do, must labor under some disorder in their vision, by having contracted films before their eyes from error and prejudice. But how shall the moral sense be proved born with us, when we see no appearance of it before we arrive at some use of our understanding, and there are whole nations who seem utterly destitute of it? Our five senses we receive perfect at first, they rather decay and grow duller than improve by time: the child and the savage can see, and hear, and taste, and smell, and feel, as well as the most refined and civilized. Let us then look upon this supposed sixth sense as an acquired faculty, generated in us by the operation of those materials thrown in by the other five, together with the combinations formed of them, and other ideas resulting from them in our reflection. We ordinarily imbibe our sentiments by custom or sympathy from the company we consort with, or from persons whose judgments we revere: therefore the exposing of children, the extirpating of enemies, assassinating for affronts, persecuting for heresy, do not strike with horror in countries where commonly practised, or taught by the leaders. But as all custom must have a beginning, and all judgment some foundation to build upon, let us try to discover what might first bring into credit those objects which the moral sense, when supposed clearest will recommend: and this will appear upon examination to be nothing else besides their expedience and eminent serviceableness to promote the happiness of mankind. The objects that seem most strongly to affect the moral sense are integrity of justice and restraint of brutal appetites, which we have already seen deriving their value from expedience: and it is remarkable that the mind discerns the beauty of them abroad before she can discover it at home. For as the eye sees not itself, unless by reflection in a glass, so neither can we know our own internal features, unless by beholding the counterparts of them in other persons therefore if you perceive the moral sense in anybody a little dull, it is common to clear it up, by asking him how he would approve the like behavior in another towards himself. Which shows that actions have not an intrinsic turpitude necessarily touching the sense, when contemplating them naked, but we must place them in other subjects, where their tendency to bring trouble and inconvenience upon ourselves casts a turpitude upon them: having frequently seen them in this position, we learn to reflect that what appears foul and ugly without doors would do the same within, if we stood at the proper point of view; we then practise the art of removing ourselves to a distance from ourselves, through which channel we derive that skill of discernment called the moral sense. Nevertheless, I am not for depreciating these moral senses; on the contrary, I wish their notices were more carefully regarded in the world than they are: for their being acquired is no diminution of their value, unless we will despise all arts and sciences, acquisitions of learning, and whatever else we had not directly from the hand of nature; which would reduce us back again to the helpless and ignorant condition of our infancy. Men of the most shining characters and exemplary lives are found peculiarly attentive to them, nor will ever suffer themselves to be drawn into a disregard for them, by the impulses of passion, or temptations of profit. Yet being apt sometimes to gather films and foulnesses, it may not be amiss to examine them at the bar of reason by a jury of their peers; that is, by comparing them with one another, when we have leisure and opportunity to give them a fair hearing, and take full cognizance of the cause: for the presumption lies strongly in their favor, and the burden of the proof belongs to him that would impeach their character. For we may have had sub stantial grounds for our estimation of things, though we do not now retain them in mind, and the experience of others may have discovered an expedience that we never stood in a situation to discern therefore whatever appears shocking to our thought, or generally odious in the eyes of mankind, deserves to be rejected without very evident and invincible reasons to the contrary. CHAP. XXV. NECESSITY. By necessity I do not mean that impulse whereby bodies are made to move and strike upon one another, nor those laws, by which nature carries on her operation in a chain of causes and effects unavoidably depending upon each other, without choice or volition. For I consider it here as a motive driving the mind to one manner of action, when we have the contrary in our inclination and our power: and we hear the term often applied this way, how properly I shall not examine, choosing rather to regard every expression as proper, that obtains currency in the language of mankind. I have laid down that all our motives derive their efficacy from pleasure, other satisfactions flowing through the channel of translation, either immediately or remotely from that: but then it must be remembered, that under pleasure I comprehend the avoidance of pain, and it is the latter solely that gives rise to the class of motives at present under consideration. In all necessary actions, we have some uneasiness, or displeasure, or damage, in view, and some inclination drawing us another way which we should gratify if it were not for such obstacle; and as inclination generally stands for Will, we are said in such cases to act unwillingly or against their Wills, notwithstanding that we perform the acts by our volition, and therefore are no more necessary agents than when pursuing the thing most agreeable to our heart's desire. 2. Thus the motives of necessity have the very reverse for their objects to those of the three former classes, to wit, some pain or disquietude of mind, some detriment to our possessions, or blemish in our character, to which may be added the omission of something pleasant, profitable, or creditable, which we conceive in our power to attain; for whatever we desire strongly we feel an uneasiness in the thought of going without, which uneasiness many times lays us under a necessity of taking all measures to |