Pretty Jane, and a steamer more worthy of the colony, arrived all too soon to cut short our expeditions in search of wood pigeons and wild pigs, and our struggles at lawn tennis when the sun was dipping behind the mountains of Vanua Levu. She was filled up with cotton and copra from the Windward, with bales of fibre from Undu Point, and when she had taken in the Rambi bales, with some hundreds of bags of copra from Vuna Point, Taviuni, she sailed for Levuka, vid Savu-savu Bay, bearing us homeward to Ovalau, which, after all, can hold its own in loveliness with any island of the group.

My yarn is spun, and will have accomplished what I intended if it creates some greater interest in the colony, and enables the reader to perceive that we are not living among club-brandishing savages, but in a settled community, and that the little we have yet been able to achieve has been but the first feeble efforts of a young giant beginning to feel the limbs which he will soon use with greater and ever-increasing power and effect.

JOHN GORRIE.

THE IMPENDING CRISIS IN TURKEY.

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E are approaching a crisis in the affairs of the East the importance of which seems to be but feebly apprehended in Europe. The Great Powers have made certain formal demands upon Turkey, based upon the Treaty of Berlin. They have demanded, in the strongest terms known to diplomacy, the cession of certain territory to Montenegro, the rectification of the Greek frontier, the establishment of a reformed and autonomous government in Macedonia and Armenia. There is Lo question Low of the wisdom or the opportuneness of these demands. They have been made by united Europe, under the lead of England. Europe and Turkey stand face to face. No compromise is possible. One party or the other must retreat and submit. Any form of compromise would be a victory for Turkey, and would demonstrate her ability to resist and defy the power of Europe. No one can blame the Sultan for holding out to the last, for successful resistance would be a triumph such as no Sultan has won during the present century; and, in his eyes, there is far more at stake than appears in the diplomatic correspondence. With him it is a question of the revival or the destruction of the power and glory of the Caliphat. This is a fact which seems to be so little understood in Europe that the obstinacy of the Porte appears inexplicable; but it is a fact which ought to be fully apprehended in England, and probably it has already attracted the attention of the Ministry in its relations to India and Central Asia.

For many years the influence of the Sultan as Caliph of all Mussulmans has been on the wane. It was in its origin a usurpation on the part of the Ottoman Sultans, which was tolerated by the Mohammedan world because of the power and dignity of these sovereigns. They were, in fact, the leaders of the aggressive forces of Islam, and on this ground could claim to be the rightful heirs of the Caliphat. But of

late years the Ottomans have been giving way before the advancing power of Christendom, and since the days of Mahmoud II. the Sultans have been forced to interest themselves chiefly in the maintenance of their civil rights. In these neither the Mussulmans of India and Central Asia, nor the Arabs of Turkey, have any interest. For the Arabs, the Turkish Sultan is doubly a usurper. He represents a barbarian horde which has no right to rule over Arabs either in spiritual or temporal affairs. This spirit of hostility to Turks has been gathering strength in Syria, Arabia, and Egypt, for many years, and nothing has been wanting to secure their independence but the consent of Europe, or an able leader. All these countries are ripe for rebellion. The Mussulmans of India and Central Asia were not hostile to the Sultan, but simply indifferent. They had nothing to fear and nothing to hope from him. Under these circumstances the Sultan was becoming more and more a civil ruler, and there seemed to be no reason why the Turkish Government, under the influence of Europe, might not soon become a purely secular government.

But the present Sultan, as soon as he was firmly seated on his throne and had been saved from the Russians by English intervention, adopted a new policy, which was to some extent the result of his education, which had been chiefly religious, and to a still greater extent, perhaps, the result of his observation of the rapid decay of the Empire under European influence. He determined to strengthen his position by reviving the power of the Caliphat, and rousing the fanaticism of the Mohammedan world. This determination is the key to most of the events of the past year. It was this which led to the arrest and condemnation of Dr. Koelle's Khodja, Achmet, and his life was saved only by the vigorous intervention of Sir Henry Layard. It was this which prompted the extraordinary decisions of the Grand Council of Ulema at the time of the fall of Khaireddin Pacha, when it was formally announced that the Sultan reigned as the Caliph of the Mussulman world, that he was bound to sustain the Sheraat as the only law of the Empire, and that he could not delegate any part of his authority to any other person. It was this spirit of fanaticism, originating in the palace, which led to the murder of Colonel Commaroff by one of the Sultan's attendants, and which has thus far protected the murderer against all Europe. It is this spirit which has manifested itself in the murder of hundreds of Christians in and around Constantinople, for which no Mussulman has yet been punished. The treatment of the Armenians, which has led many calm and thoughtful men to believe that there is a deliberate intention of exterminating them, has resulted from this same determination to restore the Mohammedan power in Asia Minor. The peculiar character of the Albanian agitation was more the result of religious than of national propaganda, although it has now assumed a national character which, if the Sultan fails to intimidate Europe, will react against his authority. The events

which have transpired in Arabia, including especially the murder of the Sherif of Mecca, who was opposed to the Caliph of Constantinople, and the appointment of a trusty supporter of the Sultan in his place, have all related to this question.

A very vigorous propaganda has been carried on at the same time in India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia against the English and Russian Governments, and with the object of bringing these Mohammedans once more under the influence of the Sultan. Every post that goes from Constantinople to India carries out numbers of incendiary documents, and there is a continual going and coming of emissaries. I have every reason to believe that the English and Russian Governments have full and complete information in regard to these efforts, and they probably realize the importance of them in relation to the pending contest with the Sultan.

We have now reached a point where the action of the European Powers is to determine whether this effort of the Sultan to revive the influence of the Caliphat is to succeed or fail. The Mohammedan world is hesitating. The Arabs would prefer to see the Caliphat transferred to Mecca. In India and Central Asia the people are in a state of expectant attention, if I may borrow this term from Dr. Carpenter. In Turkey certain classes have been reached by this fanatical revival, but the mass of the people are in doubt as to their true interests. Everything now depends upon the question whether the Caliph of Constantinople is strong enough to resist Europe. If he is forced to submit and yield to the demands which have been made upon him in regard to Montenegro, Greece, Macedonia, and Armenia, his influence in India, Central Asia, and Arabia will come to an end, and the Turks themselves will see the folly of attempting to revive the old spirit of Moslem intolerance. But if the Sultan can prove that he still has power to resist and humiliate England and Europe, he will accomplish his purpose and restore the prestige of the Caliphat. It is not easy to write calmly of the inevitable results of such a triumph. They will be written in blood only too soon, and it is but a poor consolation to reflect that they will in the end rouse Europe to assert its power, and put a summary end to the Caliph and Sultan together. There are Turks in Constantinople who see as clearly as any one in Europe that this plan of the Sultan, if successful, must result in general massacres, which will be inevitably followed by the destruction of the Turkish empire. The Christians in Asia Minor and Macedonia do not look so far as this. They have seen that the temporizing policy of Europe for the past two years has reduced them to a condition far worse than before the Russian war, and they see that now nothing can save them from destruction but the complete triumph of Europe in its present contest with the Sultan. It is this agony of fear which gives them courage to cry out so vigorously for help, at the risk of their lives. They naturally do not care to pay the price of extermination for the ultimate overthrow of the Sultan.

They simply feel that Europe, and especially England, is responsible for their present misery, and that their only hope in the future is in European intervention now. They feel that England ought never to have destroyed the Treaty of St. Stephanos unless she was prepared to protect the Christians of Turkey herself. They believe that a failure to protect them now will result in their extermination. They have good reason to fear. I do not wish even to appear to exaggerate the consequences of a failure to compel the Turks to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, as stated in the present demands of the Great Powers. I should prefer to understate them; but the experience of the last year leaves no doubt in my mind as to the nature of these consequences. For years past the Turks have been restrained by the fear of Europe. If this fear is once removed or seriously weakened, the fanaticism which has been so carefully cultivated during the past year must bear its natural fruit-in plunder, oppression, and massacre. The anarchy which now prevails must become tenfold worse, for the Sultan will not have the means, if he has the will, to preserve order. India and Afghanistan cannot fail to feel the influence; for fanaticism is contagious, and, once convinced of the essential weakness of England, the Mohammedans of India would not be slow to rise in rebellion.

In view of these consequences, it seems to me that England must compel the Sultan to submit to her demands, even if she has to enforce them alone. It is no desire to overthrow the Sultan which leads me to this conclusion, for I have always believed that it was for the interest of the people of Turkey, as well as for the peace of Europe, to maintain at Constantinople a reformed and secularized Sultan, not an irresponsible Caliph administering the Sheraat, but a civil ruler under the protection and guidance of Europe. The only hope of such a result lies in the firmness of England at the present time. If the Sultan persists in his resistance, as he probably will, I see no escape from the use of force. There are many ways in which this may be applied. A fleet might be sent to occupy Constantinople, and in the end this may be necessary; but it might be possible to impress the Sultan with the determination of Europe to secure the full execution of its demands without wounding his pride so deeply. It would be sufficient, in all probability, to seize some of the principal ports, as Salonica, Smyrna, and Beyrout, and hold them as a guaranty. A war between Greece and Turkey should, if possible, be avoided, in the interest of both countries and of the whole Balkan peninsula. This is not in any sense a question between Greece and Turkey. The two parties are Turkey on the one hand and Europe on the other, and the demands made in regard to the Greek frontier are of no more importance than the others in regard to Macedonia and Armenia. If Greece and Turkey are allowed to go to war, Servia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria will be inevitably drawn into the conflict, and such scenes of horror will follow as Europe has not seen for fifty years. The Armenians will have no refuge except in