those States-the rest, at any rate, is garrisoning the frontiers, cr is held in reserve for field operations-tasks to which the chiefs should contribute; or is watching the armies of the chiefs themselves-a task which they should not impose by maintaining large forces unnecessary for internal purposes and difficult of control. Estimating the cost of the forces so engaged at seven millions and twelve millions respectively, the chiefs, whose aggregate revenue exceeds one-third of that of the Empire, contribute to the latter outlay only one-twentieth part! This is a state of things which cannot remain. The Feudatories themselves feel it to be so, and they desire to associate themselves in the military defence of the Empire. When war was imminent with Russia two years ago, and again when it broke out against Afghanistan, the chiefs vied with each other in offering their contingents, and in the latter case those of the Punjab chiefs were accepted and rendered good service. My proposal is, therefore, that the Feudatory Chiefs should be permitted to furnish standing contingents, holding, in part, or entirely, according to their strength, certain of the Imperial garrisons, at a distance from the States, and neutralized for mischief by combination with the British forces. By usage and precedent dating from the time of the Moghuls, the princes and chiefs of India are bound to render to the Suzerain military service in time of war. That, without training in time of peace, without modern equipment and modern organization, such service of their forces is worthless, is now patent to all. I propose, therefore, to define and limit this general obligation by fixing a certain extent of service to be rendered both in war and peace. The chiefs will thus take their due share in the burden of Imperial defence, their contingents will be rendered of real value for service in the field, the disorderly mobs of armed men in the various States will be reduced to a very large extent, thus releasing most of the Imperial troops that are now engaged in watching them. Under this proposal each State will supply a permanent contingent in some British garrison. These contingents will be under their own officers, with British officers attached thereto for instruction and guidance on the footing of those twice lent to the Persian army. The contingents will, of course, be incorporated in the district and division within which they are stationed. I published suggestions for their distribution, strength, and organization, in the "Proceedings of the United Service Institution of India." These show a strength of some 34,000 troops that would be added to our Native Army by these arrangements, which will entail a probable diminution of the turbulent levies within the Native States by some three times that number; also, that this arrangement will set free twenty-seven British regiments of Native infantry and nine regiments of Native cavalry from the garrisons taken up by the Native States' contingents, besides probably several British regi ments of Native cavalry and infantry, English and Native, from the garrisons in these States. Thus the strength of British troops rendered available will probably equal or exceed the number supplied by the Native States. It can hardly be necessary to refer to the idea of risk in such a measure. For many years after 1857 it was thought that there was danger in a Native army, and that it was a wise precaution to keep that army inefficient. It was not till 1873 that we commenced to give even M.L. rifles to our Native troops in the place of Brown Bess. It is to be hoped that we may not be as long in discovering the mistake of supposing the safety of the Empire to require that the Feudatories' armies should be kept inefficient. To do so is to waste the power which the chiefs are bound to use for the defence of the Empire, and which they are willing so to use. The last of my proposals is homogeneous with that just discussed. It seeks equally to diminish an imminent increase of military expenditure by the utilization of existing material. The details of the scheme have been published in the "Proceedings of the United Service Institution." The population of European descent in India, exclusive of the English army, is believed to comprise some 100,000 adult males, half of which number should certainly be capable of bearing arms. In 1857 the numbers of this class were, no doubt, much less; nevertheless, had every man capable of bearing arms possessed a rifle and a knowledge of its use-had the scattered units received an organization of even the simplest kind-the scenes of that fearful year would never have occurred, nay, the revolt itself would have been nipped in the bud. The history of those days is full of the feats performed wherever a few armed Englishmen drew together. Had Delhi possessed a volunteer or militia corps of even two hundred bayonets, the 3rd Light Cavalry would never have ridden slaughtering through the streets, nor the doubting garrison have been encouraged to join them by the helplessness of the English. Admitting the unlikelihood of the recurrence of such an outbreak, nevertheless we can understand that garrisons of regular European troops have now to be maintained in many places where the existence of bodies of local European troops would enable the Government to dispense with the regulars in case of their services being required elsewhere. The measure proposed is threefold :— First. To raise at the Presidency towns, and other principal centres, local infantry regiments and garrison companies of artillery, from the class of poor Eurasians to whom admission is denied to the ranks of the regular English regiments. This is a class generally steeped in poverty through the absence of any opening whereby to earn a respectable livelihood. In 1857 some regiments of them were raised and acquitted themselves well, but the experiment was abandoned. If not equal as material to the English soldiery, neither are they so costly, so difficult to obtain, or so unfitted for the climate. Here is a recruiting field, unworked, which can supply some 6,000 or 7,000 men, who, with many of the qualities of the English soldier, will cost very much less. The Eurasian, to begin with, is one of ourselves, there are none of the dangers of the foreign mercenary about him. He will not, like the English soldier, cost £100 before he does a day's service for the Indian Empire; he will not, like that soldier, require to be cared for as a rare and costly exotic; there will be no home remittances, at a loss of 17 per cent. in exchange, on account of his depôts, of his necessaries, of his relatives. Moreover, the corps being local, with fixed headquarters, the men could live with their families on less actual pay and advantages than are requisite for the English soldier in India. Second. To develop the Volunteer organization, embracing at present only some 4,000 members, by various small concessions tending to diminish the cost of that service to individuals; by recasting the organization itself, so as to render the body more efficient and useful; and, finally, by the pressure of the measure which forms the third head of the proposal. Third. To render service in a militia obligatory upon all members of the Anglo-Indian Civil population not included in the Local Corps or in the body of Volunteers. It is proposed that service in the Militia shall comprise two periods :— (1.) Eighteen years, from the age of eighteen to that of thirty-six years, in the Active Force. (2.) Twelve years, from the age of thirty-six years to that of fortyeight years, in the Reserve Force. The Active Force to be embodied for exercise (after each member has passed in drill and musketry, for which he is allowed two years, on pain, in case of failure, of being attached to a regular regiment as recruit) for only ten days yearly; and to be liable for garrison service within British India during a war. The Reserve Force to attend one yearly muster, and to be liable to embodiment only on occasions of imminent danger to the State. It is proposed that this force should comprise only two arms, infantry and garrison artillery; that each corps should have a paid staff officer of the regular army; that the poorer members may claim pay, equivalent to £5 per annum for privates and £10 per annum for non-commissioned officers, and a bonus equivalent to £8 6s. on passing in drill and musketry, and travelling expenses when called out for yearly exercise; that arms, ammunition, and uniform should be supplied free, and necessary expenses of each corps paid, by the Government; and that, during embodiment, accommodation and rations should be provided free of expense. These are the main features of a proposal the details of which have been carefully worked out, and have been approved by a considerable number of persons of the classes affected, to whom the scheme was submitted for criticism. There is no question that the Anglo-Indian community is ripe for the acceptance of some such measure, and that it will furnish, partly in new Militia corps and batteries and their reserves, and partly in a great development of the number and strength of the Volunteer corps, some thirty thousand men, at the cost of about one-third of the same number of Native troops. The local Eurasian corps, as before said, should amount to at least six thousand men besides the above, at a cost of about half the same number of English troops. These three bodies, the Local Corps, Volunteers, and Militia, when once fairly organized, not only as units but as a Territorial armywhich should be a matter of five or six years at the most-would set free almost the entire strength of regular English troops for service in the field on the frontiers of Hindoostan, and would even render available a considerable portion of them for temporary detachment to Europe in case of war. H. GREY. ON THE SOURCES OF GERMAN DISCONTENT. NOT ""the OT long ago, a keen-sighted, painstaking Frenchman, one of those excellent officials who do so much for France, and of whom France has so little to say, published a work upon "The Material Strength of Germany," to be followed by a second upon "The Moral Strength of Germany." In it M. Legoyt emphatically puts his countrymen on their guard against construing too literally the current phrases about "the canker which is eating into the core of Germany," disunion which is paralyzing her members," "the alarming fact that her military power is out of all proportion to her wealth," &c. He who would take the nosce hostem to heart, must arrive at a directly opposite conclusion. In M. Legoyt's eyes, Germany's military organization cannot be sufficiently admired, not only on account of its efficiency, but also for its cheapness, the care taken of, and the comparatively small sacrifice demanded from, the individual soldier. He sees German commerce and German manufactures flourishing, notwithstanding a temporary depression. Agriculture seems steadily improving, the population of the ancient "human reservoir" rapidly increasing despite emigration, and he is convinced that any relative deficiency of capital is amply supplied by the spirit and habits of association of the German people. Everything shows that he is likely to pronounce the administration, the public school system, and the dispensation of justice in Germany to be in no less enviable a condition than the army, and that he will hold them up to his fellow countrymen as examples equally worthy of imitation.* Thus an unbiassed foreigner. But what, we may ask, would he say could he enter into the feelings of the German, the dreams of whose youth are realized, who can remember the censorship and secret tribunals, * "Forces matérielles de l'Empire d'Allemagne, d'après les documents officiels." Par M. A. Legoyt. Paris, 1878. |