is too palpable and too cogent to be replied to. I give you the illustration of Dr. Brown himself.

Light affects us in vision, or it does not affect us. If it does affect us, it does something-it is the cause of our visual sensations. If it does not affect us, then in this case it does nothing-it is no cause, and for aught we can see, exists for no purpose; nay, the legitimate conclusion would be, that we neither have, nor can have, any evidence of its existence, unless it be specifically revealed, and revealed alike to every individual; for nothing short of this would answer the purpose.

A slight consideration of this argument is sufficient to show, that to deny the efficiency of second causes, is virtually to shut matter out of the world; or, if it be allowed to exist, that it can exist for no conceivable end, unless it be to remind the Deity when to put forth his power, and do that which he certainly would do without any such memorial.

On this subject, the language of the author to whom we have just alluded, is peculiarly striking.*

"That which excites in us all the feelings ascribed to certain qualities of matter, is matter; and to suppose that there is nothing without us which excites these feelings, is to suppose that there is nothing without, as far we are capable of forming any conception of matter." Hence his opinion that the doctrine of "universal and spiritual efficiency, in the sequence of physical causes, is but an awkward and complicated modification of the system of Berkeley." For while it maintains that God does all, and matter does nothing, with strange inconsistency it professes to believe that matter exists, though no one can see for what end, nor have the least evidence of its being.

To show that second causes are truly efficient, I add

* Cause and Effect, page 62.

but a single consideration more, and that is the mere fact of their existence. They either exist, or do not exist. If they do not, our inquiry has no object; God alone exists, and he alone must have power. If they do exist, their existence must be something distinct and separate from God, though derived from him. This is equally true of matter and of mind. The question we put then, is, can we conceive anything to exist without power, property or quality, of some kind? For what is that which has neither? It is known by nothing, it is capable of nothing, and we have every reason to think is nothing.

The very existence, therefore, of a substance, supposes the existence of qualities or powers of some sort. But can these be supposed, and yet the substance to which they belong do nothing, and be capable of nothing? What are these qualities, when actively considered, but so many powers which are efficient in the production of change? If they produce no change, nor exert an influence to that end, we cannot know that they exist, or the substances of which they are predicated. But the point of our remark is, that their very existence involves in it the notion of some quality or power, inasmuch as it is inconceivable that they should exist without. "A substance without qualities," says the ingenious writer to whom we have several times referred, "if conceived to be an object of knowledge, seems to be a contradiction in terms; and the qualities of substances are only another name for their power of affecting other substances;" and, applying these remarks to material substances, he adds: "Whatever definition we may give of matter, must always be the enumeration of those properties or qualities which it exhibits; and if there were no powers, there would truly be nothing to define." It is scarcely necessary to say that the case is in no degree different with regard to mind.

We cannot better conclude this Lecture, than in the words of Mr. Locke.* "The infinite eternal God is certainly the cause of all things—the fountain of all being and power. But because all being was from him, can there be nothing but God himself? Or, because all power was originally in him, can there be nothing of it communicated to his creatures? This is to set very narrow bounds to the power of God, and by pretending to extend it, takes it away. For which, I beseech you, as we can comprehend, is the greatest power: to make a machine—a watch for example-that, when the watchman has withdrawn his hands, shall go and strike by the fit contrivance of the parts; or else requires that, whenever the hand by pointing to the hour minds him of it, he should strike twelve upon the bell?

"No machine of God's making can go of itself. Why? Because the creatures have no power, can neither move themselves nor anything else. How, then, comes about all that we see? Do they do nothing? Yes; they are occasional causes to God why he should produce certain thoughts and motions in them. The creatures cannot produce any idea or thought in man. How, then, comes he to perceive or to think? God, upon the occasion of some motion in the optic nerve, exhibits the color of a marigold or a rose to his mind. How came that motion in his optic nerve? On occasion of the motion of some particles of light striking on the retina, God producing it, and so on. And so, whatever a man thinks, God produces the thought, let it be infidelity, murmuring or blasphemy. The mind doth nothing; his mind is only the mirror that receives the ideas that God exhibits to it, and just as God exhibits.them. The man is altogether passive in the whole business of thinking. A man cannot move his arm or his tongue-he has no

* Search of Truth, pp. 110, 111, by Dr. Beazeley.

power-only upon the occasion, the man willing it-God moves it. The man wills, he doth something; or else God, upon the occasion of something he did before, produced the will and this action in him.

"This is the hypothesis that clears all doubts, and brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza, by resolving all, even the thoughts and will of men, into an irresistible and fatal necessity. For whether the original of it be from the continued motion of all doing matter, or from an omnipotent immaterial Being who, having begun matter and motion, continues it by the direction of occasions which he himself has also made; as to religion and morality, it is just the same thing.

"But we must know how everything is brought to pass, and thus we have resolved it without leaving any difficulty to perplex us. But perhaps it would better become us to acknowledge our ignorance, than to talk such things boldly of the Holy One of Israel, and condemn others for not daring to be as unmannerly as ourselves." [Locke's reply to Norris, a follower of Malebranche.]

LECTURE VIII.

ON SECOND CAUSES.

ARE SECOND CAUSES EFFICIENT?

THE doctrine maintained in the preceding Lectures was, that second causes, are causes per se, operating by their own inherent energy, and operating as truly in their humble spheres, as the Great First Cause in the mighty works which he performs. Nor do we suppose that this doctrine detracts, in any measure, from the Divine wisdom or power. On the contrary, we coincide with Mr. Locke, in thinking that the opposite doctrine takes away from the power of God, if not from his wisdom: since it denies to him the possibility of imparting to his creatures any agency whatsoever, and makes his government to consist, not in controlling agents, physical or moral, by a system of well adapted means, but in a succession of changes, or events produced by his immediate and sole efficiency. That is to say, he governs creatures which do nothing, and which from their very constitution can do nothing, and this without any means or instrumental causes; for instrumental causes there cannot be, where instruments have no power.

But God, it may be said, can give them power. Be it so; then they are no longer powerless; they will certainly do something, when brought into circumstances