XLVII. CHAPTER Voted for it. Gerry proposed an election by the execu tives of the states; but this proposition obtained no votes. 1787 No change could be agreed upon; and the election by the national Legislature stood as a part of the plan. Sherman, Wilson, and others, were in favor of three years, with re-eligibility, as the term of office. Mason suggested seven years, and ineligibility afterward, as the best means of preventing intrigues between the Legislature and the executive, likely to result in the election of unqualified persons. This motion was carried; Connecticut, the two Carolinas, and Georgia against it; Massachusetts divided. Franklin was opposed to giving the executive any sal ary beyond his expenses, and, in general, to any high salaries, as adding the temptation of avarice to that of ambition, and tending to throw the administration of the government into the hands of the violent, bold, and selfish, to the exclusion of the wise, moderate, and disinterested. He read a speech to that effect, to which the Convention listened with marked attention; but his views were regarded as visionary and impracticable. The constitution of the judiciary next came up. Wilson proposed to give the appointment of the judges to the executive; but this was opposed by Rutledge and Franklin. Objecting to their choice by the Legislature as leading to intrigue and the selection of unfit persons, Madison suggested their appointment by the second branch of the Legislature, which prevailed unanimously. The Council of Revision, as proposed in Randolph's resolutions-borrowed from the Constitution of New York -was not agreed to. On Gerry's suggestion, a modified veto-imitated from the Constitution of Massachu. setts was substituted; a vote of three fourths in both branches being necessary to pass laws objected to by the XLVII. executive. Hamilton and Wilson wished to make this CHAPTER veto absolute; but against that the vote was unanimous. An attempt to secure for the national Legislature a 1787. veto upon all state laws-opposed by Randolph and Mason, supported by Wilson, Madison, and C. Pinckney— was voted for by the three largest states. A veto upon all state laws contrary to the Articles of Union, or to treaties with foreign powers, was conceded. The Virginia plan, as thus modified in committee, and, after a fortnight's debate, reported back to the House, pro- June 18 vided for a national Legislature, to consist of two branches, the members of the first branch to be chosen by the people for three years, those of the second branch to be elected by the state Legislatures for seven years; the members of both branches to be apportioned to the states according to the whole number of their free citizens, and three fifths of all others, now familiarly known as the Federal Ratio. This national Legislature was to possess all the legislative powers vested in Congress by the Articles of Confederation, with additional authority to legislate in all cases for which the states were incompetent, or in which legislation on their part would be "inconsistent with the harmony of the Union." It was to possess, besides, a negative upon all state laws contrary to the Articles of Union, or inconsistert with foreign treaties. Its members were to be paid out of the national treasury, and to be ineligible to any office, state or national, during the term of their membership, or for one year after. The national executive was to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the national Legislature for the term of seven years, and ineligible a second time; with power to carry into execution the national laws; to appoint to office in all cases not otherwise provided for; and en low CHAPTER ed with a veto on all laws returned with objections, and XLVII not subsequently sustained by a vote of three fourths in 1787. both branches of the Legislature. The national judiciary was to be composed of a Supreme Court, the judges to be appointed by the second branch of the Legislature, and to hold office during good behavior; and of such inferior tribunals as the national Legislature might see fit to establish. The points most strongly contested, passed by at first, had been taken up again after the others were settled. One of the last acts of the committee had been the determination not to give the states an equality in the second branch of the Legislature. That determination produced a great excitement; and Patterson, of New Jersey, so soon as the Committee of the Whole had re June 15 ported, brought forward a counter scheme, the "New Jersey plan," the project of the State Rights party. According to this scheme, the existing Continental Congress was to be preserved as the federal Legislature, with additional powers to levy duties on foreign importa tions; to impose stamp and postage taxes; to collect, by its own authority, requisitions not promptly met by the states; and to regulate trade with foreign nations. A plural federal executive was proposed, and a federal judiciary. Acts of Congress and foreign treaties were to be the supreme law. This counter project, and the Virginia plan, as just reported to the House, were referred to a new Committee of the Whole; and the entire question of a national gov. ernment or not had again to be gone over. The New Jersey plan was supported by Patterson, and by Lansing, of New York, principally on the ground of want of power in the Convention, and the impossibility of inducing the states to go the length of the other XLVII. scheme; to whom Wilson, Randolph, and Madison re- CHAPTER plied elaborately and at length. In the course of this debate, Hamilton avowed his dis- 1787 sent, not only from his New York colleagues, but from both the plans before the committee. He expressed doubts as to republican government at all, and his admiration of the English. Cocmitution, as the only true model. Wilson had argued, with great ability, that the English government could not be our model, as we had no similar materials. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails, and of the rights of primogeniture; the absence of any thing like a nobility; the equal distribution of property; the whole genius of the people, were opposed to it. Admitting, to a certain extent, the truth of all this, Hamilton still thought it both feasible and necessary to establish a national government so powerful and influential as to create an interest in its support extensive and strong enough to counterbalance the state governments, and so to reduce them to subordinate importance. Without concealing his theoretical preference for monarchy, he admitted that, in the existing state of public sentiment, it was necessary to adhere to republican forms; but, to give to those forms all the strength of which they were capable-a strength essential, in his opinion, to a fair trial of republican government-he would have the executive and senators appointed during good behavior. Hamilton closed an elaborate speech by offering a written sketch of such a system as he would propose, not for discussion in the committee, or with the idea that the public mind was yet prepared for it, but in order to give a more precise view of his opinions, and as explanatory of some amendments which he intended presently to offer. His scheme proposed an Assembly, to be elected by the CHAPTER people for three years; a Senate, to be chosen by elec XLVIL tors chosen by the people, to hold office during good be 1787. havior; and a governor, chosen also for good behavior, by a similar but more complicated process. The judiciary resembled that of the other plans. The governor was to have an absolute negative upon all laws, and the appointment of all officers, subject, however, to the approval of the Senate. The governors of the states were to be appointed by the general government, and were to have a negative upon all state laws. The power of declaring war and ratifying treaties was to be vested in the Senate. It is worthy of remark, that governments on Hamilton's plan, since established in several of the Spanish American republics, have failed entirely of that strength and stability which he was so anxious to secure. Having declared his views, Hamilton presently left the Convention on a six weeks' absence, the representation of New York remaining with his two colleagues, both of whom were wholly devoted to the State Rights party. The debate on the New Jersey plan was confined to the question of amending the old articles or framing a Jane 9. new system, and it speedily resulted in reporting back to the House the national plan, as agreed to by the former committee. Only New York, New Jersey, and Delaware voted in the negative. Owing to the absence of Martin, Maryland was divided; Connecticut voted this time with the larger states. The Connecticut delegates aspired, in fact, to act as mediators between the contending parties in the Convention-an office, as we shall presently see, which they had more than one opportunity to exercise. The report of the Committee of the Whole being now taken up, each article was separately considered anew, many alterations were suggested, and several were made |