its administration about with judicial routine that must be observed, it would seem that the function when so exercised, necessarily, loses its legislative nature and becomes judicial. The judicial duties may readily be segregated as including all matters which, under the act, require a formal hearing. The administrative duties may then be segregated as including all other duties. All cases on formal petition filed pursuant to Section 13; valuation cases on protests pursuant to paragraph (i) of Section 19-a; all hearings pursuant to orders for investigation entered by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) of Section 15; all suspension cases, and all other matters in which formal hearings are required under the act or directed by the Commission to be had under the act, would fall within the sole jurisdiction of the judicial divisions. While the administration of the securities provisions of Section 20-a; the granting of loans from the revolving fund under Section 203 of the Transportation Act; the completion of the tentative valuations under Section 19-a; the administration of all of the administrative bureaus of the Commission, such as statistics, accounts, tariffs, safety appliances, inquiry, law, correspondence; the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity under Section 1, where no hearing is asked; the suspension of tariffs carrying increased rates; the administration of the car service provisions, which can be executed without a hearing, are some of the things that would fall within the exclusive province of the administration division. It is doubtful whether the Commission could, under this section as at present worded, itself make this separation of its judicial from its administrative duties and assign all of its administrative duties to a single division and designate three of its members to serve permanently on such division and do nothing else. Each Commissioner, under his present appointment, is charged with a public responsibility, not only to decide cases, but to administer the act. If such a responsibility is to be discharged, it would seem that every Commissioner should participate in forming the administrative policy and its execution. In such a situation, it would seem that, even if an amendment were in fact not required, yet the amendment should be made nevertheless by Congress to relieve the Commission from the necessity of proceeding on uncertain authority in a matter where the individual responsibility of each Commissioner is in question. If this section were amended directing the Commission to make this segregation, it would be a different matter. There could be no longer any personal responsibility for administrative policy on any member not serving on the administration division, and likewise no responsibility for deciding cases on any Commissioner assigned permanently to administration. Any amendment, it would seem, should go further and direct the President to designate which of the present members of the Commission should serve on the administration division throughout the remaining portions of their terms. When these designations were made, this would have the effect of publicly placing the sole responsibility for administration on the three so designated, and likewise the responsibility for deciding cases on the remaining members. In certain instances where there might otherwise be an overlapping of duties, it will be possible, if the matter is made the subject of an amendment, for Congress to determine, in the first place, where the particular duty shall be segregated. For example, the Commission is authorized to institute an investigation of rates or practices on its own motion. In any segregation shall this duty, which is administrative in nature, be confined to the administration division as its sole prerogative? Certainly the working up of the government's side of any investigation is administrative, while the hearing of the government's side and the side of interested parties and preparing a report pronouncing judgment are strictly judicial. But where should the authority to instigate the investigation be vested? That could best be decided by Congress in amending the act. The Judicial Divisions would necessarily retain under their administration the bureau of dockets; the bureau of formal cases; the bureau of indices; and the library. The function of each of these bureaus is essentially a part of the judicial functioning of the Commission. The bureau of formal cases is, of course, the one through which the examiners and attorneys who hear cases function. There has been much written and said about having a sort of a Director-General of Railroads in the President's cabinet. Such a cabinet officer would exercise just about the same duties as the administrative duties that are now imposed on the Commission. If these administrative duties were segregated and made a separate executive department presided over by a cabinet officer, the functioning of the judicial authority necessarily left with the Commission would be greatly hampered unless duplicate records were kept by it. Tariffs, statistics and other records must be referred to by the Judicial Divisions in deciding their cases. If these administrative duties are segregated and assigned to an administration division, that division and the Judicial Divisions will all be housed in the same building, have the same secretary, pay their expenses out of the same appropriation, have the same disbursing clerk, use the same records, and co-operate to the same extent that the several divisions now do. The chief objection to consolidating these administrative duties into an executive department with a cabinet officer at the head has been that it would "put the railroads into politics." Any administration by the Administration Division of three Commissioners would be non-partisan, just as the Judicial Divisions now are. And practically the same efficiency could be secured. Three can reach a decision in conference much quicker than nine or eleven. The particular three would consume none of their time hearing arguments in the cases. None of the commissioners on the Judicial Divisions would ever be bothered with administrative policy. The Administration Division and three Judicial Divisions can do just four times as much work as the whole commission acting as a unit. This is plain mathematics. But when the efficiency to be obtained by specialization between administration and judicial function is also considered, the possibilities seem to urge the amendment suggested. If adopted, it would seem that, since the divisions must be composed of at least three members each, the personnel of the Commission should be increased from eleven to twelve members so that there could be one Administration Division and three Judicial Divisions. SECTION 18 See Appendix, Page 127, for text of both Section 18 was not changed except to have its two paragraphs numbered. This section is the one empowering the Commission to rent suitable offices and hire employes and fix their compensation. Witnesses summoned before the Commission are paid under this section the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States. Under the second paragraph all expenses of the Commission are allowable and will be paid on presentation of itemized vouchers approved by the chairman of the Commission. The section still contains a provision that each Commissioner should receive a salary of $7,500, payable in the same manner as judges of the courts of the United States, and that a secretary shall be appointed who shall receive $3,500. Under section 24 the salary of a Commissioner is made $12,000, and that of the secretary $7,500. It would seem that these salary provisions should therefore be eliminated from this section. This can be done only by amendment. SECTION 19 See Appendix, Page 127, for text of both Section 19 has not been changed. This section provides that the principal office shall be located in Washington, but that the Commission may hold special sessions in any part of the United States, and that it may, by one or more Commissioners, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its duties, in any part of the United States into any matter or question of fact pertaining to the business of any common carrier subject to the act. SECTION 19-A See Appendix, Page 128, for text of both Section 19-a is the valuation section and has suffered no change, except that its twelve paragraphs have been lettered from "a" to "1." As the Commission's physical valuation nears completion, its importance becomes even more significant than its contemplated usefulness when this almost superhuman task was first undertaken. Congress enacted this valuation legislation in 1913 because of a desire, judging from its debates, to have a basis of value on which reasonable freight and passenger rates could be more scientifically arrived at. There was some opposition to the legislation on the ground of its uselessness for such a purpose as compared to the great cost of obtaining this information. The identity of this opposition was never disclosed, but it was always supposed to emanate from sources largely interested financially in railroad securities. If so, these interests have recently become converted to the idea to such an extent that they have attempted to anticipate the results of the physical valuation, as was attempted to be shown in the discussion of Section 15-a. When it is generally understood that the Commission is directed to report separately, with respect to each railroad, the original cost to date, the cost of reproduction new, and the cost of reproduction new less depreciation, of all its common carrier property, and then, in addition, to report separately other values and elements of value and, again, further to report separately the original cost of lands, right-of-way, and terminals, ascertained at the time of dedication to common carrier purposes, and the present value of same, and all of these values further separated as to the different states or territories in which this particular railroad operates, it will be appreciated how real and tangible a thing this valuation is to be. Provision is also made for keeping the valuation up to date. When the value in each state is determined, it will be a simple mathematical calculation scientifically to relate intrastate rates to interstate rates, and likewise the revenue qualities of the general level of rates in any great rate section can be scientifically tested with relation to the rate level in other territories. Important as this work was from a rate-making point of view, when it was started, its importance has been greatly increased because of its necessity as furnishing a basis for calculations involving matters other than the making of rates. The agitation from some quarters for some sort of profit-sharing plan under which the employes and security holders of the railroads shall share any profits which the investment of labor, on the one hand, plus the investment of capital on the other, earns, requires, if ever adopted, that at the outset some definite value be fixed representing the capital investment. Just how far this valuation of railroad property in any state will be final evidence of value for taxing purposes by state authority may develop into an interesting question. It is not an exaggeration to say that the valuation of the railroads will affect, and must continue to affect, through all time to come, every man, woman and child in the country. It is a most important governmental task. As it is nearing completion everyone is eager to know the final result, but it is essential to the public interest that accuracy should not be sacrificed for speed in response to this eagerness. Ample provision is made under the section for a full hearing on the results of the valuation of any railroad. The information which the Commission is directed to report, it must first publish in the form of a tentative report, of which the railroad involved, the governor of any state in which the railroad is situated, the Attorney-General of the United States, and such others as the Commission may prescribe, must have written notice setting forth the valuation arrived at for each class of property as per the divisions as indicated. Thirty days are then allowable to such parties within which they may file a protest. If no protest is filed, the tentative figures become final. If there is a protest the matter is set for a hearing. The Commission may revise the tentative valuation in any respect warranted on such hearing. The final valuation must be published and becomes prima facie evidence of the valuation of the property. Paragraph (j) provides for the amendment of any final valuation based on subsequently furnished evidence introduced in a court proceeding where the final valuation of the Commission is put in evidence. Nothing in the act provides for a review by the courts of any final valuation fixed by the Commission. The act, however, contains no provision making the valuation fixed by the Commission final, from which it would seem that the final valuation might be reviewable in the courts to the same extent that a rate case is reviewable. Since the final valuation is in the form of an order, the proper procedure to obtain a review in the courts would seem to be by injunction restraining the Commission from publishing its final valuation order. The final valuation does not become effective until it is published by the Commission as such. SECTION 20 See Appendix, Page 133, for text of both the former and present Acts. The first four paragraphs of Section 20 have suffered no change other than being numbered. These paragraphs provide for the filing by carriers of the annual statistical reports. Paragraph (5) has been amended in certain particulars. This paragraph provides that the Commission may prescribe the form of any and all accounts, records and memoranda to be kept by carriers, including data |