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laws of war, entirely subject to the disposal of Buonaparte. But the assassination in cold blood, of helpless women and children, who had congregated under his especial pledge, that they should be permitted free egress from the city, was a deed which deserves the abhorrence and deprecation of the latest posterity. The plea of expediency, (which is the excuse of all tyrants, and which could not, by any possibility, apply to the murder of at least one-half of the victims of Buonaparte's ferocity,) can never be admitted in extenuation of a butchery like this, even if there were just grounds for advancing it. It has been affirmed, however, that most of the garrison were destroyed three days after the fortress had been entered, and all opposition had ceased.

To proceed with our narrative. After the capture of Jaffa, the French army passed on to Acre, without encountering any material opposition. In the middle of March they arrived at a plateau, which overlooked the tower of Acre; so celebrated in the time of the Crusades, and now equally distinguished as being the first place in the career of Buonaparte, at which his genius received a decided rebuke. At the commencement of this famous siege, Buonaparte was for the first time opposed by a British officer, and encountered by British troops and sailors; and here he was completely foiled in an enterprize in which, had he succeeded, it is not improbable that he might have continued his victorious march to the shores of the Dardanelles. In an early part of the siege, the flotilla, containing the implements Buonaparte intended to have employed in the reduction of Acre, was captured. In this emergency he was obliged to use only field-pieces; and a breach apparently practicable, having been made in a tower in the line of attack, the French grenadiers attempted to storm it, but found themselves unexpectedly stopped by a deep ditch, which they were unable to scale, and where they were exposed not only to a galling and destructive fire from their enemies on the margin of the ditch, but to every species of missiles showered on them by the troops in the tower. In fine, the gallant conduct of our countrymen prevailed. The

attack was unsuccessful, and the operations were relaxed in consequence of the departure of Buonaparte from the camp, with a force amounting to 4000 men, to oppose an army of 30,000 men, badly armed, equipped, and disciplined, which the emissaries of Djezzar had raised in different parts of Syria. With this handful of troops, Buonaparte, discomfited, by a combination of masterly manœuvres, the motley host of his enemies, upon a line of nearly thirty miles on the side of Damascus, and upon the fords of the river Jordan. Having thus secured his flanks, he returned to the siege of Acre. It was peculiarly fortunate for Djezzar that Buonaparte was thus occupied, for during the interval of his operations against the mountain tribes, the English flotilla, under the command of Sir Sydney Smith, was blown off the coast; but on its return, formidable additions were made to the works of Acre. On the other hand, the French Admiral Perrée had arrived with three twenty-four, and six eighteen-pounders, and a supply of ammunition, which enabled Buonaparte to resume offensive operations with increased vigour. Breaches were repeatedly made in the outworks, which were attempted to be stormed by the French grenadiers, who behaved with unexampled gallantry. The defence was obstinate as the attack. The amphibious genius of Sir Sydney Smith, equally adapted to naval and military operations, was eminently displayed upon this occasion. After a severe struggle the French were driven off with great loss. Still, however, Buonaparte persevered, and on 7th May made a desperate assault upon a ruined tower, which he succeeded for a time in carrying. They were again repulsed, and after a severe struggle, finally compelled to retreat with a very considerable loss. Thus, Buonaparte had from this hour failed in the principal design of his expedition, the capture of Acre, and with it the conquest of Syria; and it only now remained for the French general to avail himself of a decent excuse for abandoning the siege altogether. The necessity of providing for the approaching attack upon Alexandria, and the disturbances which took place in some Egyptian provinces, owing to the rapacity of

the French soldiers, who were also collectors of the revenue, furnished Buonaparte with the pretext he stood in need of.

The retreat of the French army to Cairo was painful and humiliating to the haughty conqueror of Italy and Germany. Harassed continually on a march over burning sands, the sick accumulated in number, and in inveteracy of disease. It was during this retrogade movement that Buonaparte directed the invalids in the hospital at Jaffa, whose cases were deemed incurable, to be poisoned. It would lead us too far from the important subjects which will soon engage our attention, to enter minutely into an examination of the evidence on which the imputation of this flagitious act rests. It is sufficient to observe, that Napoleon did not deny giving the order to the physician to destroy the sick; but he insisted that it was executed, and designed only to be executed, in a very few instances; that the invalids could neither be removed nor cured; that to have left them alive would have been to have exposed them to the murderous fury of the Turks; and moreover, that regard for the safety of the French army induced him to issue the order. Ascribing in fairness all the weight that may be justly due to these considerations, viewed in the only light in which Buonaparte has been accustomed to regard his public actions, namely, that of political expediency, no argument is necessary to prove, what the spontaneous impulse of every man's heart must teach him, that the meditated assassination of those brave and unfortunate men, by the very commander who had benefited by their services, is a stain upon the character of the individual which not all the splendid achievements of the hero can obliterate. It was one of those deeds which can only be contemplated with horror and execration.

The retreat of the French army was signalized by acts of unrelenting vengeance. It appears that during the siege of Acre, the convoy and couriers were intercepted on their way to and from Cairo. Wherever these outrages (perhaps acts of just retaliation,) had taken place, pillage and conflagration spoke the wrath of Buonaparte.

In the mean time Desaix had pursued his march into Upper Egypt until his arrival at Cosseir, a port in the Red Sea, where he found a British armament; the apprehension of an attack from which constrained him to act on the defensive. Buonaparte did not long remain at Cairo. He received information that the indefatigable Murad Bey was advancing with a corps of Mamelukes towards Suez; that the movement was combined with the march of a body of Arabs; and that every thing portended an immediate invasion from Europe. With his usual energy he immediately proceeded to Rahmaniech, chasing Murad in his retreat. On his arrival at Alexandria, the French general learned that a force of 15,000 Turks had landed at Aboukir; that they had begun to entrench themselves, and that the fort had already surrendered. Summoning from every part of Egypt the whole of his remaining disposable force, Buonaparte proceeded to Aboukir, and after a short reconnoissance, decided upon attacking the enemy. The forces of the Pacha were drawn up in two lines, the second of which occupied a very strong position. The first line was attacked and routed after a short but spirited conflict. The second, whose point d'appui was the fortress of Aboukir, made a brave and even desperate defence. The second line of the Turkish army having gained, as was imagined, a considerable advantage over the French, was so imprudent as to quit the intrenchments and precipitate itself upon the enemy. The eagle eye of Buonaparte discerned this capital error, by which he immediately profited. While the Turks were opposed in front, a division of the French army penetrated by a short circuit into their rear, and attacked the intrenchments, which were speedily carried. A charge of cavalry completed their defeat. Broken and dispirited, unable either to fight or fly, those who escaped the bayonets of the infantry and the sabres of the cavalry, rushed into the sea, where the greater part of them perished within sight of their comrades on board the Turkish squadron; who were too distant to lend them any succour. Mustapha Pacha, the Turkish general, with 2000 men, the tents, baggage, and 20 pieces of cannon, were

taken: 2000 men were killed, besides those who were drowned. A very few days only elapsed, when the fort of Aboukir surrendered. Thus the French army was left without any enemy in the field except the predatory hordes of Arabs and a few Mamelukes; but notwithstanding the brilliant victory of Aboukir, the penetration of Buonaparte soon discovered that the expedition had in reality failed. His army was decreasing daily by the combined influence of the sword and the diseases peculiar to the climate. The destruction of the French fleet exposed them to successive invasions. Their very triumphs threatened and almost insured their final destruction; for no reinforcements could be expected from France, nor any recruits raised in the country, upon whom it was possible to depend. Revolving these considerations, Buonaparte meditated two important measures; his own return to France, and the evacuation of Egypt by the French army. In the former of these resolutions he was determined by the intelligence he received of the reverses of the republican armies in Europe, as well as by the golden hope that he might seize the helm of the vessel of the state, already in danger of foundering from the folly, ignorance, and profligacy of its pilots.

We cannot afford space in this memoir to detail the great events which occurred in Europe during the absence of Buonaparte: we shall merely notice, that the Directory having entirely crushed the liberties of the Republic, now only a phantom, spread their troops over Switzerland, the Roman States, and Naples, with the sole view of finding employment for the soldiers, and enriching themselves. Their domestic administration was oppressive, yet weak, corrupt, and desperately wicked, without the grandeur of energetic vice. Thus the government of the Republic became odious and contemptible to the last degree.

Having directed two frigates to be secretly prepared in the roads of Alexandria, Buonaparte embarked with Berthier, Marmont, Murat, and other of his generals, 23d of August, 1799. The command of his army had been previously consigned to Kleber. The usual good fortune of

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