in that admiration the latest posterity will unite,) the force and power of the genius which had accomplished such prodigies, we must turn aside with horror from the cruelty with which he repulsed the solicitations that were made to him for the interment of the remains of the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick in the mausoleum of his ancestors; and with contempt from the abject littleness, the grovelling insolence of his conduct to the prostrate courtiers and ministers of the King of Prussia on his arrival at Berlin, which city he entered in triumph the latter end of October.

The occupation of the war did not prevent Napoleon from remembering his quarrel with this country. His troops took possession of Hamburgh, a neutral and independent city, and confiscated, wherever it could be found, British merchandize. It was then he published the famous Berlin decree, declaring the "British islands in a state of blockade." It was his first exploit, in a series of campaigns against our commerce and manufactures. The best practical commentary on this extraordinary and odious proceeding is, that in despite of this and other decrees, still more severe, British commerce continued to flourish, and even to increase to an extent and in a degree heretofore unknown. To secure his communication with France, and to gratify his inextinguishable animosity towards the partizans of England, he cashiered the Elector of Hesse Cassel, took military possession of his states, and compelled him to seek an asylum at Altona. Before he entered upon the Polish campaign, Napoleon declared to the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, that unless the Austrian army immediately evacuated Bohemia, he would consider their continuance in that country as a declaration of war. Intimidated by this threat, the Austrian Government complied, and their resolution was, no doubt, accelerated by the presence of an army of 40,000 chosen troops, which he had assembled in Dalmatia, in the weakest and most accessible part of the Austrian frontiers. An army, which had been assembled on the frontiers of Holland, now advanced to the Elbe, and took possession of Hanover. The commandant of the strong

fortress of Homeln followed the example of his brethren, and surrendered after a slight resistance. It is impossible to review these events without ascribing the capitulation of so many strong fortresses, with such disgraceful celerity, to a corrupt understanding with the officers who were intrusted with their defence. The example affords an awful lesson to all governments, that whenever they openly renounce every principle of good faith and sincerity in their public transactions, they must expect to be exactly imitated by their dependants on any occasion, when their personal interests may appear to them to require the sacrifice and ruin of their employers. All the provinces of Prussia, westward and northward of the Oder, were now subdued; and the King sent a confidential minister to negociate the terms of an armistice with Napoleon; but the terms prescribed, which amounted to a surrender of all the remaining fortresses of Prussia, including Dantzic, to the westward of the Vistula, were too severe for the King of Prussia, even in his depressed condition, to accede to; and on the 29th November he left Berlin for Posen, where he arrived on the 1st December.

It appears that a considerable Russian force had crossed the Vistula, and were advancing into Prussia, to oppose this army. Napoleon detached three corps to meet them; but the Russians, not conceiving themselves strong enough to maintain their position, retired, evacuating Warsaw, which was entered by the French army.

The propriety of Napoleon's perseverance in an enterprize, to effect which he had to contend against the extraordinary disadvantages of situation and climate, and with a people, too, inured to that severity of cold which was so destructive to the French army, may very reasonably be questioned.

The whole French army having crossed the Vistula, were joined by Napoleon, whose arrival in the camp, was as usual, the prelude to offensive operations. The force of the Russian army is not accurately known, but it was certainly inferior to that of the French.

Hostilities began by an attack, on the part of the French, at a village on the Narew, which a strong corps of Rus

sians had attempted to fortify; from this entrenchment they were driven, after an obstinate and bloody encounter, and the next day produced the battle of Golzovin. It appears that the Prussians sustained the brunt of this action, which was in fact rather a drawn battle than a victory. The advantage was claimed by both parties; but if we bring their pretensions to the test of geographical evidence, the only criterion by which to judge in a disputable case of this kind, the advantage will certainly be found to have remained with the French who, at the close of the action, were masters of the field, and claimed possession of the customary trophies of prisoners and artillery. Still the resistance of the enemy was most desperate. We should have premised, that at this period the Russian and Prussian armies were separated; one which had fought at Golzovin, was under the orders of Baxhofden, the other was commanded by Benningsen.

On the 26th December another desperate battle was fought at Pultush: according to the French account, the Russians were defeated, and compelled to retire to a considerable distance. Benningsen, on the contrary, claims the honour of having repulsed Napoleon, and obliged him to retreat. The application of the same rule to which we have above adverted, namely, geographical evidence, would decide the controversy in favour of the French, which is rendered the more probable from their numerical superiority, the excellence of their artillery, and the transcendant talents of their commander. Still it was a very different contest from those of Austerlitz and Jena. The French army suffered dreadfully, not only by the long and furious resistance they encountered, but from the climate. Napoleon had ordered the corps under Marshal Soult to make a détour, and assail the Russians in flank: in the execution of this command, the troops waded to their knees in half-frozen mud, exposed to all the inclemency of a violent rain. Napoleon boasted that the Russians had lost from 25 to 30,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 75 pieces of cannon, and 1200 carts with the baggage. His own loss he estimated at 3000 men

in killed and wounded. It is probable that both statements are incorrect, and that Napoleon exaggerated the Russian losses as much as he diminished his own. Still one circumstance cannot be disputed, that the Russian army retired after the action to Ostralenha, about 90 miles from Warsaw, and 25 from Pultush. Napoleon, having made arrangements for placing his troops under cover, (for winter quarters, in the strict sense of the term, could not be procured,) returned to Warsaw, where he busied himself in diplomatic arrangements. But the Russians would not permit him to remain long in a state of repose. The Prince of Porto Corvo had been directed at the latter end of January to skirt the shore of the Baltic and proceed to Elbing, a sea port of East Prussia, where there was a considerable magazine belonging to the combined army.

This movement alarmed the confederates, as it not only menaced Koningsberg, where they had established their chief depôt, but threatened to turn their right wing. The whole Russian army, therefore, broke up from their cantonments, and advanced towards the Vistula. Bernadotte's corps, supported by Ney, was attacked at Motringen on the 24th January, 1807. It is probable that these corps were worsted, although Napoleon did not fail to claim the victory, particularly as the personal baggage of the Prince was captured by a detachment of Russians, who penetrated into the rear. Napoleon immediately digested his plan. The Prince of Porto Corvo had orders to retreat towards the line on the Vistula, allowing the Russians to pursue him in such a direction as to enable Napoleon, with the remainder of his army, to turn the left wing of the Russians, get into their rear, capture their magazines, and give them battle, under circumstances which would have cut off the possibility of a retreat. Had this scheme entirely succeeded, the war would probably have been terminated by the destruction or surrender of the Russian army; but General Benningsen was too experienced a commander to fall into such a snare. Assured that he had Napoleon in person to con

tend with, he concentrated his divisions. After a rapid march, by which he turned the left wing of the Russians, the first important offensive movement on the part of Napoleon, was to attack the town of Gadstadt, on 2d February, where the Russians had established a great magazine. The action here was long and sanguinary, and heroically contested on both sides; but the superiority of the French forces, aided by a powerful train of artillery, admirably served, compelled the Russians to abandon Gadstadt, which, with the depôts of Aterstein and Liebstadt, fell into the hands of the conquerors. On the 3d February, the French assailed the bridge of Bergfried, a position of great importance to the security of the Russian left wing. Here Benningsen had stationed the flower of his troops. The French got possession of the bridge, but the retreat of the Russians was so ably conducted, that no serious impression could be made in their rear by Marshal Ney: night alone put an end to the battle. On the 4th February, the French continued to advance; the Russians retired slowly, in perfect order, availing themselves of every advantageous position to turn upon their pursuers, and keep them in check. On one of these days, however, a detached Russian column, which had mistaken its road, was surrounded by the French army, and nearly destroyed. It should here be stated, that while these operations were going on between the main bodies of the two armies, a detached division of the French, under Savary, stationed near the confluence of the Berg and Narew, was attacked, and driven from its position by General Von Essen; but the action itself was not of sufficient magnitude to have any immediate influence on the great struggle. On the 7th February the Russian army had retreated upon Eylau, and that day was spent on both sides in making preparations for the great battle which was to ensue on the following day. The Russians occupied a formidable position, one part of which consisted of a rising ground, which commanded the principal debouché, by which the French army could proceed to the attack of the Russians. The pos