: answers him, that he had nothing to do but to abstain from going to Rome but Sextus declares positively, that he could not renounce the hope of being a king, and accordingly to Rome he goes. After his departure, the high priest, Theodorus, asks Jupiter, why he did not give another will to Sextus? Jupiter sends Theodorus to Athens to consult Minerva; she shows to Theodorus the great palace of the Destinies, in which were placed all the pictures and representations of all possible worlds, from the worst model to the best. Theodorus beholds, in the latter, the crime which Sextus was doomed to commit; from which crime arose the liberty of Rome, and a mighty empire; an event so interesting to a great part of the human race. Theodorus was silenced. In 1720 Dr. John Clarke published his Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil, a work full of sound reasoning; but almost every argument on this most difficult of all subjects had been urged many years before any of the above-mentioned treatises appeared, namely 1678, by that truly great scholar and divine, Cudworth, in that inestimable treasury of learning and philosophy, his Intellectual System, to which so many authors have been indebted, without owning their obligations. I thought this little account of the writers who had preceded Pope, on the subject of this Essay, not improper to be subjoined in this place.Warton. ARGUMENT OF EPISTLE II. Of the Nature and State of Man, with respect to Himself, as an Individual. I. The business of Man not to pry into God, but to study himself. His Middle Nature; his Powers and Frailties, Ver. 1 to 19. The Limits of his Capacity, Ver. 19, &c. II. The two Principles of Man, Self-love, and Reason, both necessary, Ver. 53, &c. Self-love the stronger, and why, Ver. 67, &c. Their end the same, Ver. 81, &c. III. The PASSIONS, and their use, Ver. 93 to 130. The Predominant Passion, and its force, Ver. 132 to 160. Its Necessity, in directing Men to different purposes, Ver. 165, &c. Its providential use in fixing our principle, and ascertaining our Virtue, Ver. 177. IV. Virtue and Vice joined in our mixed Nature; the limits near, yet the things separate and evident: What is the Office of Reason, Ver. 202 to 216. V. How odious Vice in itself, and how we deceive ourselves in it, Ver. 217. VI. That, however, the Ends of Providence and general Good are answered in our Passions and imperfections, Ver. 238, &c. How usefully these are distributed to all Orders of Men, Ver. 241. How useful they are to Society, Ver. 251. And to Individuals, Ver. 263. In every state, and every age of life, Ver. 273, &c. EPISTLE II. I. KNOW then thyself, presume not God to scan; A Being darkly wise, and rudely great: COMMENTARY. Ver. 2. The proper study, &c.] The Poet having shown, in the first epistle, that the ways of God are too high for our comprehension, rightly draws this conclusion; and methodically makes it the subject of his Introduction to the second, which treats of the Nature of Man. But here presently the accusers of Providence would be apt to object, and say, "Admit that we ran into an excess, when we pretended to censure or penetrate the designs of Providence, a matter, perhaps, too high for us; yet have not you gone as far into the opposite extreme, while you only send us to the knowledge of OURSELVES? You must mock us when you talk of this as a study; for who can doubt but we are intimately acquainted with our own Nature? The proper conclusion, therefore, from your proof of our inability to comprehend the ways of God, is, that we should turn ourselves to the study of the frame of general NATURE." Thus, I say, would they be apt to object; for, of all Men, those who call themselves Freethinkers are most given up to Pride; especially to that kind which consists in a boasted knowledge of Man, the effects of which pride are so well exposed in the first Epistle. The Poet, therefore, to convince them that this study is less easy than they imagine, replies (from ver. 2 to 19) to the first part of the objection, by describing the dark and feeble state of the human understanding, with regard to the knowledge of ourselves. And further to strengthen this argument, he shows, in answer to the second part of the objection (from ver. 18 to 31), that the highest advances in natural knowledge may be easily acquired, and yet we, all the while, continue very ignorant of ourselves. For that neither the clearest science, which results from the Newtonian philosophy, nor the most sublime, which is taught by the Platonic, will at all assist us in this selfstudy; nay, what is more, that Religion itself, when grown fanatical and enthusiastic, will be equally useless; though pure and sober Religion will best instruct us in Man's Nature; that knowledge being necessary to Religion, whose subject is Man, considered in all its relations, and consequently, whose object is God. NOTES. Ver. 3. Plac'd on this isthmus, &c.] As the Poet hath given us this sublime description of Man for the very contrary purpose to what Sceptics are wont to employ such kind of paintings, namely, not to deter men from the search, but to excite them to the discovery of truth; he hath, with Ver. 2.] Ed. 1st. VARIATIONS. The only science of Mankind is Man.-Warburton. With too much knowledge for the Sceptic side, NOTES. 5 great judgment, represented Men as doubting and wavering between the right and wrong object; from which state it is allowable to hope he may be relieved by a careful and circumspect use of Reason. On the contrary, had he supposed Man so blind as to be busied in choosing, or doubtful in his choice, between two objects equally wrong, the case had appeared desperate, and all study of Man had been effectually discouraged. But M. 'Du Resnel, not seeing the reason and beauty of this conduct, hath run into the very absurdity, which I have here shown Mr. Pope so artfully avoided. Of which the learned reader may take the following proofs. The Poet says, "Man hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest.” Now he tells us it is Man's duty to act, not rest, as the Stoics thought; and, to this their principle, the latter word alludes, whose Virtue, as he says afterwards, is "fix'd as in a frost, Contracted all, retiring to the breast: But strength of mind is EXERCISE, not REST." Now hear the translator, who is not for mincing matters: "Seroit-il en naissant au travail condamné? Aux douceurs du répos seroit-il destiné ?" and these are both wrong, for Man is neither condemned to slavish Toil and Labour, nor yet indulged in the Luxury of Repose. The Poet says, "In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast." i. e. He doubts, as appears from the very next line, whether his soul be mortal or immortal; one of which is the truth, namely, its immortality, as the Poet himself teaches, when he speaks of the omnipresence of God: "Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal part." Ep. i. ver. 275. The translator, as we say, unconscious of the Poet's purpose, rambles as before: "Tantôt de son esprit admirant l'excellence, Il pense qu'il est Dieu, qu'il en a la puissance; Et tantôt gémissant des besoins de son corps, Il croit que de la brute, il n'a que les RESSORTS." Here his head, turned to a sceptical view, was running on the different extravagances of Plato in his Theology, and of Des Cartes in his Physiology. Sometimes, says he, Man believes himself a real God; and sometimes again, a mere machine: things quite out of the Poet's thought in this place. Again, the Poet, in a beautiful allusion to Scripture sentiments, breaks out into this just and moral reflection on Man's condition here, "Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err." The translator turns this fine and sober thought into the most outrageous scepticism: "Ce n'est que pour mourir, qu'il est né, qu'il respire; and so makes his author directly contradict himself, where he says of Man, that he hath "too much knowledge for the Sceptic side."-Warburton. |