cians would call a metonomy; I do not tell you this in my Gospel, because, notwithstanding any prejudices to the contrary, I think you must know it by instinct. kar d Aoyos nv rpos roy @sor, ' and the word was with God;' that is, not with him really or personally, but how do you think ? why, in the way of retirement or private communion, as might be the case with you, or me, or any other man. Do not fancy he was really with God, though I say so; there is something implied under the preposition rpos, which I do not stop to explain to you, because I conclude, that you, and every convert that comes after you, however unacquainted with the Greek language, women and children, will easily comprehend what I mean by instinct.

kat o n o Aoyos, And the word was God. Do not mistake me; I mean, God was the Word ; though contrary to grammar, depend upon it this is my particular meaning; or if you do not like this, mind that Oeos has, in this place, no article before it, therefore, at the utmost, it can only imply that the Word was a God,-perhaps you will think Jupiter or Mercury: not so, but yet A God, one, in short, of the Jewish Elohim; but take special care you do not account it one of the Elohim spoken of in Deut. vi. 4, for, of course, it is impossible I should mean any such thing; though, indeed, I know that you have been brought up to believe that the Word of God was the appearing Jehovah, and therefore might reasonably be accounted one of the Elohim, which God himself has told us, constitutes ONE Jehovah; but had I meant to describe him to be Jehovah, I should, you may be sure, have put the definitive article before Oos, and called him @sos, a distinction which in no manner belongs to him. Though, indeed, I well know that St. Matthew has blundered so greatly as to deceive you in this particular, when he tells you that the Messiah was to be GOD WITH US, that is, in our language, Emmanuel, in the blundering Greek of St. Matthew, Med hawr o Otos. This may not strike you at first sight; but depend upon it, he never meant Jehovah, he only meant a God in some way or other as I do; do not, therefore, on any account, attend to his insertion of the article, mind only my omission of it.

"I dare not proceed, though I am sorry to say, ideas still more strange crowd in upon my mind; but ridicule is no test

of truth one way or the other; and I should scorn to use it, especially upon such a topic, otherwise than to shew, by some such brief specimen, how nearly it borders upon an actual absurdity, to suppose that a Jewish Evangelist could, in those days, have so expressed himself, subject to the interpretation which Unitarians now put upon his words.

* [I should willingly have transcribed, as remarkably applicable to the above note, the remarks of the learned Witsius, (Misc. Sacr. tom. ii. pp. 591, 592,) on the Socinian mode of interpreting Scripture, but that it is now to be found at length in a work of greater notoriety than my own, the celebrated Discourses and Dissertations of my learned friend Dr. Magee, (now Dean of Cork,) on Sacrifice and Atonement, so often eited in these pages. See his third edition, vol. i. 189."]

See the Note, p. 100, in Dr. Nares' "Remarks on the Improved Version."

No. V.

ON THE WORD " ΛΥΤΡΟΝ.”

"THEY (the Unitarians) tell us also, in their note on Matt. xx. 28, that Christ's death as Avтpov avti πoλλwv, a ransom for many, was NOT the suffering of a substitute. We might suppose from this that such a meaning could not be expressed by the term ransom, since they are so exceedingly careful to do away every impression of that nature; why then, let me ask, do they so industriously select the very term ransom for the rendering of avraλλayμa, Mark viii. 37, setting aside the received text, and the primate's rendering' in exchange for?' When it suits their purpose, it seems, ransom more strongly expresses the substitution of one thing for another than even the terms in exchange for;' when it does not, we may none of us venture to give it any such meaning. I am obliged to

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speak in this manner of their bold and unjustifiable adulterations of the WORD OF GOD! Only a few pages further they again render Avтроν aνтɩ τоλλwν a ransom for many, Mark x. 45, and send us back to their note on Matt. xx. 28, to prove that our Saviour's life given as a ransom, can in no manner imply the sufferings of a substitute; I do not deny that arraλλayua may be rendered ransom,' or that λurpov may sometimes express deliverance generally; but I contend, that if our Saviour gave his life as a ransom according to the Evangelist, and died in our stead, avтɩ поλλwv, for, or instead of, many, which the Greek expresses', both Aurpov in the original, and ransom in the received version, are to be taken in their literal and proper sense; and the pretended correction of the text is an open falsification of it. Ye were not redeemed,' (or ransomed, ελurpwoŋTE,) says St. Peter,' with corruptible things, as silver and gold, (the price paid, that is, consisted not in actual money, or things bought with money,) but with the precious blood of Christ;' this was the price paid, this was the literal and positive price wherewith ' ye were bought;' as another Apostle expresses it, 1 Cor. vi. 20. We still are pressed with notes and expositions, to induce us to think of nothing but seals and ratifications, but we must abide by what is written, and persist in acknowledging a ransom, a price, and a purchased redemption; nor though they should insist ever so upon our doing otherwise, shall I cease to regard the ransom of his blood-shedding as the suffering of a substitute, while I have the positive testimony both of St. Paul and St. Peter to the fact, that Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for us,' Gal. iii. 13; that he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust,' 1 Pet. iii. 18; that he died for our sins',' 1 Cor. xv. 3;

2 “What the Evangelist expresses by λυτρον αντι πολλων, St. Paul terms αντι AUTρоV ÚTEρ πаvтwv. 1 Tim. ii. 6. Upon which see Outram de Sacrificiis, Lib. ii. c. vi. §. 4. p. 337."

a" 1 Pet. i. 18, 19."

b"Died for our sins;' 1 Cor. xv. 3, ¿πɛρ тwν àμaprшwv nμwv. We are bidden to take notice that the true reading of' Gal. i. 4, is περɩ тwv a. n. and not væερ, that the expression is very general, q. d. in relation to our sins. Of course væreρ, if it differs materially from Tep, must be allowed its full force in the passage cited above from the first Epistle to the Corinthians. Whitby considers them as equivalent.

'died for the ungodly,' and was delivered for our offences,' Rom. v. 6. iv. 25." Nares.

(The reader is also referred to the Introductory Remarks.)

No. VI.

ON THE HOLY GHOST AND TRINITY.

"THE eternal existence of God, his nature, and many of his attributes, are incomprehensible to man. The Scriptures

See his Examen Var. Lect. Millii, and in his notes on Rom. viii. 3, he shows that πɛρi aμaρтiwν, according to the language of the Old Testament, signifies a sin-offering. See also Magee on Atonement, vol. i. p. 234-243, third edit. and his 29th note, p. 245, in which the arguments which the Socinians draw from the Scripture use of the prepositions avтi, vπep, dia, and repi, are briefly, but very sufficiently answered. See also Outram de Sacrificiis, lib. ii. cap. vi. §. 2. p. 345."

"The consistency of the foreknowledge of God with the free-will of man, in the sense in which the prescience of God has been understood, is one of those things which has generally been considered inexplicable. The prescience of the Deity, however, may be put in a light, which, consistently, as it seems, with all due reverence to God and the perfection of his attributes, appears to remove the difficulty; whether it may be admitted, must be left for consideration. We are informed, that God spares when we deserve punishment, and in his wrath thinketh upon mercy. He is also said to give us a greater or less measure of his assistance. When he forgives a sincere penitent, he relaxes in the exercise of his justice, for in his sight no man living can be justified. From these and various other expressions in Scripture, it appears, that in the purposes of God, the suspension or limitation of the exercise of one attribute, may be necessary for admitting the exercise of another. If God see it proper to punish a man for his faults, he cannot exert his mercy to counteract that punishment. In merely physical matters there may be no limitations of his power; the systems of bodies in unbounded space, may, without any interference, be extended at the will of the Deity; but in the exertion of his moral attributes, acting as it were together for the greatest good, limitations or suspensions may be necessary to produce the best effect. When we say God can do every thing which is possible, he limits that possibility by what is fit and right to be done. Now it implies no imperfection in the power of God, that man should be a free agent, since, if he be, God made him so. In fact, if man be not free, he is not an agent, but a mere instrument, and consequently no more accountable for his actions than a sword is for kill

represent God as One; they also speak of Three Persons, by whose co-operation the government of the moral world is

ing a man, or a falling stone for crushing him to death. But it is said, that, if God foresee, he must influence, because that which he foresees must be certain in the event, which it could not be, if the event were altogether under the direction of another being endued with free agency; thus free agency and foreknowledge are thought to be incompatible. Here we may apply what has been premised, that, if God should think proper to make man a free agent, he may suspend or limit the exercise of his faculty of prescience, supposing in this case such to be necessary; for we here go upon that supposition. We are assured from Scripture of the prescience of God; every prophecy which we have seen fulfilled is a proof of this. In the rise and fall of nations, in public blessings and calamities, and whatever may respect the general state of human affairs, and occasionally what may in these cases respect individuals, all these and other matters, in which the general welfare is concerned, are undoubtedly foreseen and under the direction of God; but individually as matters simply between God and man, as what may regard his eternal state, man is undoubtedly a free agent, and it does not appear to be derogatory to God, if he here be pleased not to exert his attribute of prescience, this appearing to be a case similar to that of suspending the exertion of some of his attributes to make room for the exercise of others, in circumstances where the dispensation of God may require it. But during this suspension or limitation, granted to take place, God still sees how man acts, and he remains equally at the disposal of God, as if he were then under his direction. Thus man is never out of the hands of his Maker, being always subject to his control, and at the same time continues a free agent, and therefore a proper subject of reward and punishment. To constitute free agency, whatever may be necessary can argue no imperfection in the admission, since, to accomplish an end, the necessary means must be employed. Here necessity removes the difficulty in respect to what might otherwise be considered as operating against the perfection of God's attributes. If on certain occasions God see proper not to exercise his justice or his mercy, we still consider these attributes in him as perfect; why, then, not say the same of his prescience? To do every thing which is proper in the accomplishing of those purposes which God may think fit to execute, constitutes perfection. With God, every thing which is proper is every thing which is possible. When we say all the attributes of God are perfect, we mean that he can and that he does always exert them for the best possible ends. Speaking of God, possibility is always in subordination to propriety, to what is fit that God should do. God can do no evil, but we do not thence say that his power is under any control. Admitting, then, what is here advanced, the free agency of man appears to be consistent with the prescience of God. On this subject, however, we must speak with great reverence and caution; for after all our attempts to solve what has been considered as an inconsistency, there may be no contradiction, • Man seeth not as God seeth.' In our attempts to reconcile apparent inconsistencies, we may be fighting with a phantom of our own raising. It takes away, however, the force of a difficulty as an objection, if we can show how it may be solved. That freedom of will is necessary to render man an accountable being, is evident from hence, that a being who acts only as he is acted upon, is a mere machine; for to oblige a being to act, transfers the action and all its consequences to him who imposes the obligation. To adore, to praise, to give thanks, and render all such services to God as can be acceptable to him, and be the ground of reward to the agent, necessa rily imply freedom of will in him who offers them up."