BARON AMBERT ON AUSTERLITZ.*

BY CAPTAIN CHESNEY.

Our stock of military literature has been very greatly enriched during the last two years, the American and Danish struggles having naturally served as subjects to the majority of writers on modern wars, while those of the era preceding the use of rifled arms, are treated by many as of secondary importance. The work before us forms a very striking exception. Baron Ambert has, indeed, in a sort of appendix, taken much pains to consider the modifications, which improved arms and transport will inevitably introduce into future campaigns and battles. The main subjects, however, of his volume (the first only of an intended series) are two great contests selected from the wars of Frederick and Napoleon for elaborate study, and for the practical application of their details to the use of such camps as that of Chalons. The author avowedly designs to fill a gap now supposed to exist between stategy proper, and those lesser tactics which approach to actual drill. He would illustrate the value of a proper combination and use of the three great arms, by thoroughly analysing his chosen examples, and deducing from them for the guidance of the subordinate commanders of each branch, a method of employing it to be practised in peace, and made readily available in war. It is an article of faith with Baron Ambert, that similar study and practice were required before the Grand Army formed at Boulogne, was fitted for the terrible stroke which layed in the dust that already tottering fabric, the German Empire. His national predilections, high professional knowledge, and official position under the French Ministry of War, give especial completeness and value to his description of Austerlitz, in itself one of the most important and picturesque of modern battles.

Not that any merely tactical description of his victory could have satisfied Napoleon himself, who has declared the far-reaching nature of the combinations by which he prepared for the great event in the following terms, "La bataille d'Austerlitz elle-même n'est que le résultat du plan de campagne de la Moravie. Dans un art aussi difficile que celui de la guerre, c'est souvent dans le système de campagne qu'on conçoit le système d'une bataille."

From these words it may be gathered that Napoleon completely divided in his own mind the Austerlitz episode, with the movements preceding it, from that earlier portion of the campaign of 1805 which brought him in triumph to Vienna without a general action. Yet the very first part of this it was which, more * Etudes Tactiques, par le Général Baron Ambert. 1re Série. Zorndorf et Austerlitz, Paris, 1865.

U. S. MAG. No. 449, APRIL, 1866.

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strikingly than any later success, illustrated the superiority of the strategist, and the advantage he reaped from the new organisation and increased marching powers of the French. Mack, most unfortunate of all his opponents, fell a dupe to a show of movements in front; and like other weak theorists, arguing from insufficient premises, remained beyond reach of reinforcements promised him, facing an imaginary foe; whilst the swift columns of the invading army swept round his unguarded flank, seized his communications at a blow, and cut him off from supply or aid. French historians speak in glowing terms of this first essay of the new machine and its grand and bloodless results, but dwell little on the dangerous check which their corps suffered from a few days' rain on the way as they neared their destined stations around Ulm. Read by the light of later events, there might have been discerned a presage of the dangers and disasters to which the Napoleonic mode of war would hereafter expose its author. But the weather cleared in time to save the columns from disbandment or mutiny: supplies were picked up by the strenuous efforts of the chiefs; and the movement went gaily on. driven in, surrounded, Mack lost his judgment first, and then his resolution; and his surrender with 33,000 men followed, Napoleon having gained in ten days what it cost Grant, with the aid of a devoted fleet, just as many weeks to accomplish at Vicksburg.*

Cut off,

The capitulation of Ulm laid open the valley of the Danube, and Napoleon lost no time in pressing back the remnant of the Austrians and entering Vienna. His Marengo campaign had been almost eclipsed by the new achievement, gained without the risk of a hard-fought battle. But the real struggle of the year was yet before him. The Russians, victorious over renowned French generals in the bloody Italian fields of 1799, had fallen back indeed on the news of Mack's disaster, but only to meet their reserves and gather for a more deadly blow on the presumptuous invader who approached their border. Their infantry had gained the highest reputation in the wars of Suwaroff. The Austrian cavalry which had joined them was the most numerous and best-trained of Europe. Their commander, Kutusoff, was noted for his patriotic spirit, and had the prestige of experience and success. The contest between these allies and the army of Napoleon was to be one where readiness, courage, and superior tactics would all be required. For Napoleon brought the lesser numbers into that campaign of Moravia which, as we have already shown in his own words, was from the first designed to culminate in the battle of

* Certain American writers provoke this contrast by ill-judged attempts to make a parallel of these essentially different cases. Pemberton, it must be said, was scarcely wiser than Mack, but showed infinitely more courage and tenacity. On the other hand, Grant's operations were much hampered by the dread of even seeming to incur that failure which would have repeated the discredit brought on him by the indecisive battle at Shiloh.

the 2nd December-the morning of the 'Sun of Austerlitz'-the true birthday of the new house of Cæsars.

Neither the movements ensuing in Moravia, which the great conqueror himself (as we have seen) so closely connected with his victory, nor those larger combinations by which Mack's ruin was compassed lie within the exact scope of our author's task. He passes them rapidly by in order to devote himself the more completely to the special work he has undertaken of throwing a clearer light on the tactical achievements of the great day itself.

A book which in its preface (p. 16) claims to be to tactics what the works of Jomini are to strategy, and those of Thiers to history, seems to challenge critical remark. We may therefore state at once that we wholly differ from the gallant author in his assumption that the principles on which the imperial armies were handled in the shock of battle remained long unknown. His notion (p. 21) that Moreau and Jomini in 1813 bore to the enemy ideas and methods hitherto ignored is as perfect a misconception as the assertion which follows-that the generals of Austerlitz disappeared taking their secret with them-is incorrect. The latter is plainly contradicted by a comparison of names in the list of commanders of corps and divisions of the two dates. Of the former it is sufficient to say that Blucher, the boldest and most successful of Napoleon's opponents in Germany, not only held no communication with the Frenchmen who had come over to the allies, but evinced, as did his staff, a great impatience of their advice being taken on the general strategy of the war. He had enough to do in forming his mass of patriot recruits into an army in the one form which Scharnhorst had skilfully devised without thinking of new drill or change of tactics. The world has too long listened to this story of the French defeats in 1813 being due to French advice. That it gains credence anywhere proves the great need there is that the history of that time should be cleared of the fictions added to it by skilful pens in the interest of Napoleon. A single perusal of the work of Müffling, Blucher's Quartermaster-General, or of that of any other competent author on the German side, would settle its falsehood at once in any mind less prejudiced than of an imperialist advocate explaining disaster

away.

Whilst we cannot admit those theories of Baron Ambert (in which he but follows an ignoble herd of partizan writers), we feel it difficult to speak too highly of the pains-taking care with which the details of his work have been wrought out. A better account of Austerlitz, viewed as a military study, is hardly to be desired. Whether this elaborate description and its accompanying comments can be practically used in camps of instruction for improvement, must be at least a question of interest for the few fortunate soldiers who have the task of controlling these armies of peace. To the general student who learns that one purpose of

the work is to contrast with Napoleon's tactics those of Frederic, it is a disappointment to find that this first series gives as companion piece to Austerlitz, the bloody and indecisive victory of the great Prussian over Fermor at Zorndorf. To select this battle, Frederic admittedly owned his advantage to the genius of his general of cavalry, and where the stubborn tenacity of unwieldy Russian battalions deprived him of any claim to victory beyond that furnished by their slow retreat and to leave untold the brilliant stories of Rosbach, Leuthen, Torgau, seems neither fair to the hero of the Seven Years' War, nor sound treatment of the work undertaken. Zorndorf can never be a study of interest, except as illustrating, in an earlier stage, the constant tendency of Russian troops to cleave together in masses, and their undaunted bearing under defeat-qualities so fully displayed in later years on the not less bloody fields of Eylau, Borodino, and Inkerman. We leave this part of the subject to return to our illustra tion of Napoleon's tactics as perfected in 1805, and confess that no better guide can here be taken than that furnished by Baron Ambert.

His work, in the general considerations which conclude it, brings prominently forward Napoleon's own explanations of the two great principles of his mode of engaging, and their advantages. From the Mémoires is drawn the following paragraph on the increased use of artillery thrown into masses:

"La mêlée une fois établie, celui qui a l'adresse de faire arriver subitement et à l'insu de l'ennemi sur les points les plus importants une masse inopinée d'artillerie est sûr de l'emporter. Voilà quel est le grand secret et la grande tactique."

And St. Cyr has thus recorded his master's account of employ ment of reserves:

"Ce n'est qu'à la fin de la journée, quand je m'aperçois que l'ennemi fatigué a mis en jeu la plus grande partie de ses moyens, que je ramasse ce que j'ai en réserve pour lancer sur le champ de bataille une forte masse d'infanterie, de cavalerie et d'artillerie. L'ennemi n'ayant pas prévu, je fais un événement; par ce moyen j'ai presque toujours obtenu la victoire."

As these passages were well known, it has been generally taken for granted that, beyond these special means of victory, Napoleon's army had no great tactical advantage over those it overthrew. This notion Baron Ambert successfully controverts by showing in detail, step by step, how much more supple, more easily handled, more fit for mutual support, were the corps d'armée and its divisions acting in échelon than the rigid unwieldy line of the school of Frederic, or the disconnected columns into which necessity broke it when in motion. Our space forbids us to trace with the gallant author the elaborate perfection of method which he asserts to have been imported from the Camp of Boulogne to the hills of Austerlitz. But without doing this, or agreeing with him that the