ployed on subjects apparently the most remote from sense, a close analysis of their operations will still shew their derivation from that humble source. Admitting this, we may easily understand why the laws of sense are the laws also to a certain extent of intellect; and why the easy exercise which is gratifying to the corporeal faculties, is in like manner gratifying to those of the mind. Whatever stimulates attention and attracts observation; whatever imparts new ideas, or excites a train of thought; whatever recalls former perceptions with distinctness to the memory, or opens a field in which imagination may range at large, must naturally be a source of pleasure, because it is action and excitement that constitute our very life; and if to live be grateful, these must necessarily be grateful in the same degree."—Vol. I. pp. 26—28.

It is by a developement, on the whole very judicious and successful, of this leading principle, so wonderfully fertile in the extent and variety of its applications, that our author pursues the analysis of the affections, and is enabled to dispense with all that multitude of original instincts, senses, and innate faculties, which make so conspicuous a figure in the theories of many eminent metaphysicians. If by these terms nothing more be meant than that the constitution of the human being is originally such that the circumstances in which he is placed necessarily tend to promote the growth of certain affections, and among others the sentiments with which he regards virtue either in himself or others, and that along with great diversities in the details, there is a remarkable general analogy in these sentiments;-if this be all that is meant, perhaps the difference which apparently prevails among philosophers on this subject may be one rather of expression than of real opinion. Many, however, appear to have carried their notion of original instincts to a much greater length than this, and hence at the same time that they admit the general influence of the associative principle, greatly underrate the extent and importance of its operations. "In what manner," says Mr. Stewart, "the association of ideas should manufacture out of the other principles of our constitution a new principle stronger than them all, it is difficult to conceive." Certainly this is a wonderful result, and one which we should scarcely have anticipated; but yet it is the undeniable fact, and that in cases which have never been made the subject of dispute. The love of money, which every one admits to be factitious, and to derive its origin from the perceived instrumentality of money to procure for us a great variety of other things originally agreeable, frequently supersedes those very desires which gave it birth. If this happens in one case, it may happen in another, it may happen in all; and thus it may be true that the pleasures and pains of sense, and desires originally referring only to bodily gratifications, furnish the materials out of which are gradually formed the most refined tastes, the most intellectual trains of thought and speculation, the most comprehensive, disinterested and spiritual affections. To the manner in which the investigation, proceeding upon this basis, is carried on by Mr. Jevons, we have little to object, and we fully assent to all his leading conclusions; but our limits will not admit of our entering into a detailed examination of it, and we shall therefore content ourselves with recommending it as a pleasing specimen of ingenious metaphysical analysis, applied to a subject of considerable practical value, conducted in such a manner as to be interesting and satisfactory to those who are less conversant with philosophical discussions, at the same time that it is founded upon the soundest principles of mental science.

The second and third chapters of the first book are devoted to an inquiry into the proper definition or criterion of virtue, and into the grounds of

moral obligation. It is to a want of sufficient attention to the distinction between these two very different questions, that the paradoxes and controversies which have disgusted many with this branch of ethical science, may, in a great measure, be ascribed. The question, "what is that common quality which belongs, or is supposed to belong, to whatever is called virtuous," has received various answers, most of which, when attentively examined, will be found ultimately to coincide; and all of them, when fairly applied, will be found to indicate the same or nearly the same objects. They differ, however, materially in distinctness, precision and facility of application. Conformity with the will of God, wherever that will can be clearly ascertained, must evidently supersede all others; and here the believer in revelation enjoys the unspeakable advantage of a guide in which he feels that he can repose implicit and unhesitating confidence. But to the moralist who confines himself to natural religion only, or even to the Christian, in those cases, if there be any such, to which the gospel rule does not immediately and precisely apply, the will of God cannot serve as a criterion of virtue. In such cases, we must learn what is virtuous by the application of some other test, and then its acknowledged conformity to the will of God will furnish the decisive motive or obligation to practise it. Such a test Mr. Jevons finds in the utility of virtue, or its tendency to promote the general happiness. The principal objection to this doctrine is the alleged difficulty of applying in practice the criterion recommended; a difficulty, however, which, though its existence must be admitted, has certainly been exaggerated beyound all truth or reason by several very eminent writers. The manner in which it has been misunderstood by some, and perverted or misapplied by others, has exposed this doctrine to no small portion of undeserved suspicion and prejudice; which have been occasionally increased by the unfortunate ambiguity of several terms frequently employed by its supporters, in a sense to which the bulk of mankind are less accustomed. It is justly observed by our author, that no other criterion can be considered as altogether free from the same objection, because no other in its detailed application by different persons has ever led them invariably to the same results.

The inquiry into the nature of moral obligation has been more perplexed by theoretical reasoners than any other in ethical science. The obscurity which sometimes appears to hang over that subject, perhaps arises in a great measure from the circumstance that the obligation has almost always been considered with relation to the beings on whom it is imposed, and not to the source or authority from which it emanates. The distinction between an inducement, as a matter of prudence, and an obligation, as a matter of duty, is obvious on the slightest reflection; but no intelligible account can be given of this distinction without an immediate reference to the idea of dependence on some superior being, who is enabled to connect the observance of his laws with the attainment of some object of essential importance to the agent. This object, in the case of moral obligation, can be no other than the greatest present or future happiness of the agent, connected with the practice of virtue by the declared will of God, or (what comes in fact to the same thing) by the course of nature or of providence.

The necessity of a reference to a future state in order to a perfectly satisfactory account of this subject is distinctly admitted by Mr. Jevons in the following passage:

"The sum, then, of our argument is this,-that no given course of conduct can be pronounced either conducive or adverse to the present happiness of an

individual, without some reference to the state of his dispositions or charaeter; that the comparison between virtue and vice, with respect to their influence upon happiness, must consist entirely in a comparison of dispositions, and their respective general tendencies;-and that the obligation to virtue, so far as regards the present life alone, can be established only to the extent of this plain truth, that a virtuous character affords, upon the whole, the best security from evil, the fairest prospect of happiness, and of such happiness as is incomparably the purest and most exquisite in kind. But to see virtue in its fullest importance, and to enforce it on the strongest grounds, it is undoubtedly necessary that we should extend our views to a future state. Without the expectation of a future state, there would be some ground, perhaps, for alleg ing, that moral principle, however useful in a certain degree, may yet be carried to an inconvenient extreme, and that a certain pliant and accommodating morality, which will bend to the temper of the times, and serve most effectually to secure respectability and wealth, is most advantageous to the individual. At any rate, in this case the improvement of character could never be reasonably stated or considered as the object of supreme importance in life, and consequently the moral principle could never attain its highest state of culture." Vol. I. pp. 175-177.

In the second book, entitled Practical Morality, are comprehended the detail and description of all the particular feelings, dispositions and modes of conduct which respectively constitute virtue and vice, together with such representations of their respective tendencies as may serve to recommend the one and dissuade from the other. These Mr. Jevons considers in the first place under the two general denominations of duties of action and duties of restraint; divisions which have a reference to all our passions and propensities taken collectively; since it may with propriety be said of each of them, that some things require to be done, and others to be forborne or avoided. We have afterwards a more minute detail of the rules of duty as they relate to each propensity or affection considered separately. These are treated of under the following heads; first, duties relating to the desire and pursuit of pleasure, of wealth, of honour, and of power. We have then a view of duties relating to the affections, meaning by that term the benevo→ lent affections exclusively, such as friendship, patriotism, gratitude, sympathy. Next follow the passions, peculiarly so called, or those more violent emotions or perturbations of mind which are excited by evils and injuries; and the course is completed by a view of the religious affections.

Into this extensive detail we do not propose at present to examine minutely; but we can safely recommend it as containing a valuable fund of practical good sense, which few can study with the attention it deserves, without being made both wiser and better. At the same time, while we readily admit that the views of moral duty here advanced are established and enforced by such arguments as will approve themselves to the natural man, if he be also candid and unprejudiced, yet it is abundantly manifest, on the one hand, that they are vastly superior to any rule of life which could be derived from the writings of heathen philosophers, and on the other, that the author himself is obliged in many instances for the correctness of his principles, not to natural religion, but to the unspeakable advantage which he has derived from a religious education, and an early familiarity with the Christian Scriptures. Often avowedly, and perhaps oftener still unconsciously, through the force of habit, he has recourse to Scripture, if not for authority, at least for arguments and illustrations. Among other examples of a purer morality than has ever been actually framed by mere human reason, we may refer to the view which is given of humility, of patriotism,

of suicide, and the forgiveness of injuries. They are such views as are fully justified by the light of revelation, and even by sound reason, if men can only be induced to apply it to the investigation of these most important points, unfettered by prejudice, passion, human authority or popular outcry; but they are for the most part in direct opposition, not only to the doctrines maintained by the most celebrated Greek and Roman moralists, but also, we are constrained to add, to the maxims generally prevalent in the more refined society of self-called Christian communities, from whose code of morality such notions, or any notions which have not been sanctioned by the stamp of fashion, would be rejected with utter contempt. The slightest opportunities of acquaintance with the class of society to which we allude, may suffice to convince any one that Christianity, as such, has had no concern in the formation of those rules by which their conduct is generally guided; rules which have seldom even so good a foundation to rest upon as the authority of heathen philosophers, but are too commonly influenced by the passions and prejudices of the gay, the thoughtless, and the profligate.

The following passage may be taken as a specimen of our author's manner of treating an argument of this kind:

"The tendency of pride to invite affronts, and to produce a preternatural sensibility to the smallest slights, has already been pointed out;* and it is obvious that, if such be the source of the injuries complained of, the duty which they call for is not forgiveness, but the correction in ourselves of this wrong disposition. Supposing, however, our injuries to be real and unprovoked, what, let us consider, is the spirit with which it is best to meet them. To submit with perfect calmness to every insult; to regard those who unjustly hate, despise, or slander us, with the same feelings with which we regard the rest of mankind, is evidently more than either reason requires, or human nature allows us to expect. To be altogether insensible to feelings of resentment under circumstances of gross provocation, argues a certain meanness of spirit, which we cannot but despise. There is a calm and dignified displeasure, which, in such circumstances, is not only allowable, but commendable. There is a mode of coolly chastising insult or repressing petulance, which justly commands our admiration. But whenever our displeasure borders upon passionate resentment, or refuses to be mollified by the repentance or concessions of the offender; whenever our resistance or chastisement of injury goes beyond the strict necessity of the case, and degenerates into the mere retaliation of evil; the bounds of justice and duty are then transgressed. I say the bounds of justice are transgressed; for what is justice as respects the punishment of offences, but the principle which requires that a certain measure of suffering should be inflicted with the sole view of preventing their recurrence? To inflict suffering for no other reason than because an offence has been committed, without a view to any ulterior object, is mere vengeance or retaliation,-a principle which ought to be marked with the strongest censure, whether it operates in private or in public punishments; whether acted upon by men, or ascribed, in their systems of theology, to the great Supreme. It can be no other than a selfish or malignant feeling, which prompts to the infliction of suffering for its own sake. Whenever, therefore, feelings of sincere contrition are manifested, the end of punishment is in general already attained, and he who, not satisfied with that contrition, desires still to make the offender suffer, or exacts from him acknowledgements and submissions beyond what are reasonable, can only be actuated by a vindictive spirit, and becomes himself chargeable with wrong. Some, indeed, there are who say that they forgive, and yet retain a lurking enmity, which they still find means of indirectly gratifying, by continually reminding the

"Vol. I. p. 335."

offender of his fault, and seeking every occasion to revive his painful feelings of remorse or shame. Such conduct is obviously only another mode of taking revenge, and only the more detestable and cruel for being disguised under the appearance of forgiveness. The man of truly forgiving spirit not only abstains from further punishment on observing the signs of sincere repentance, but casts off all animosity. He seeks to bury the wrongs repented of, as much as possible, in utter oblivion, and carefully avoids the slightest hint or allusion which may awaken the memory of them in the mind of the contrite offender.

But the exercise of a forgiving spirit is not by any means confined to those cases where repentance is manifested and the power of punishment is possessed. The greater part by far of the injuries we suffer are such as admit of no redress, and leave no hope of repentance, or even acknowledgement of error, in those who inflict them. The resentment in this case excited can only in general operate as a source of disquiet to the heart in which it dwells, disposing it to brood continually upon the torturing thought of its wrongs, to view them in a light of the greatest possible aggravation, to thirst for opportunities of vengeance, or to imprecate evil from any quarter upon the head of the offender. The spirit of forgiveness subdues these malignant and disquieting emotions. It prevents the mind from ruminating upon injuries sustained, and disposes it to soften them by every reasonable excuse. It suggests the possibility of good intentions, though appearances seem to indicate the contrary; of some mistake existing in the mind of the offender, or of some previous provocation unwarily given on our part, which may justify in his own eyes his injurious conduct. If this supposition cannot be admitted, it allows due weight at least to every other extenuating plea which candour may suggest, and at the worst, regards the offender with pity rather than resentment, as the slave of evil passions, through which he is himself by far the greatest sufferer. Nay more; if opportunities present themselves of rendering a service to the offender, the man of forgiving spirit will not withhold the good which it is in his power to do, but will rather rejoice to make this generous requital for the wrongs he has sustained. Not satisfied with being not overcome of evil, he will overcome evil, if he can, with good; disposed at all times to return benevolent wishes and kind offices for malicious treatment; to judge charitably of those who judge uncharitably of him; to bless those who curse him; to do good to those who hate him; and to pray for those who despitefully use and persecute him.”—Vol. II. 115-119.

pp.

The last chapter of this book, which treats of religion and the regulation of the religious affections as derived from the light of nature, is perhaps the most elaborate disquisition in the whole work, and contains a view of this interesting inquiry which is highly ingenious and in many respects original. The first section is devoted to a statement of the evidences and doctrines of natural religion, and contains a pleasing general view of the argument for the being and providence of God, the effect of which is to shew, that the doctrines of pure and rational Christianity are in all respects conformable to the conclusions which sound philosophy would lead us to deduce from an attentive observation of the phenomena of the universe. Hence it cannot

be highly satisfactory to the advocates of revelation, who are naturally much gratified to observe the solicitude evinced by the most able and enlightened votaries of the religion of nature to establish its entire coincidence with the leading doctrines of the gospel. We have afterwards a very able and interesting review of the natural arguments for a future state. That it is perfectly satisfactory we are far from acknowledging, and after bestowing upon it the most attentive, and we trust impartial examination, we see no reason for departing from the conclusion to which former statements of this argument had brought us; namely, that it can only be considered as esta