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of little men partly concealed, and Byd a vyz zifaith,
abounding with white bellies, with a Dyraid cogau tyngedawr.
noise of fame and loquaciousness Hoywez trwy groywez
about baptism, but their puny daggers Gwyr byçain bron odwyllyz,
will not pierce the swords of warriors: Torwenawl, tuç iolyz
it was not proper that I should desire Çwdyz ar vezyz,
them. Ardent is the mutual grasp Ni wan cyllellawr clezyvawr meiwyr: of the townsman, for he knows the Nid oez eizu y puçaswn.
excess of the fierce robber. There Maw angerzawl trevzyn,
were Welsh, Angles, Irish, and North Ac a wyr carez creuzyn.
Britons, with the Welsh hastening toCymmry, Eingyl, Gwyzyl, Prydyn, gether in the rising charge, when the Cymmry cyvred ag ysgyn,
white steeds (ships) were brought Dygedawr gwyzveirç ar lyn.
upon the lake. The north has been Goglez a wenwynwyd o hervyn, poisoned by a voluntary defiance, Oeçlur caslur caslun
from the glare of the hateful form of Oeçen Azav henyn.
the progeny of ancient Adam. Dygedawr trydy' i gyçwyn branes o third was brought to excite a flock of osgorz,
crows from the army, with a rising of Gwyrain meryz miled seithin, the sluggish brutes of disappointment Ar vor angor, ar gresdin.
upon a sea fit for anchorage, upon a Uç o vor uç o vynyz
hardened bottom. Over the sea and Uç o vor anial ebryn
over the mountains, over the sea is Coed maes tyno a bryn
a fertile desert, to which the woody Pob arawd
field and the hill will allure. Heb erglywaw nebawd,
Every oration, without any one to O vynhawg o bob mehyn.
listen to it, resembles a lofty-minded Yd vi vrithed
one in every ancient place. I have A lliaws gynnired,
been variegated with the multitude in A govud, am wehyn,
the mutual necessity which thou didst Dialu trwy hoywgredau. Preswylo · remember, in consequence of exhausYozeu Creawdyr, cyvoethawg ‘Zuw tion, to revenge for blind credulity. urzin.
He will obtain the purpose of the Pell amser cyn zyz brawd,
Creator, the puissant God of exalted Y daw diwarnawd
state. Long before the judgment day, A dwyrain darlleawd,
a day will come with the rising irraTerwyn tirion tir Iwerzon.
diation of instruction, ardent and ge1 Brydain yna y daw dadwyrain nial upon the land of Ireland. To Brython, ó vonez Rhuvain.
Britain then will come an exaltation Ambi barnodyz o anhyngres diau. of the Britons from the nobility of Dysgogan sywedyzion,
Rome. In that day the judge will be Yn gwlad colledigion :
free from prejudice on both sides. Dysgogan Derwyzion,
There is a prediction of astronomers, Tra mor tra Brython,
in the regions of the lost ones: there Hav ni byz hinon
is a prediction of the Druids, over the Bythawd brau brëyron.
sea beyond Britain, that summer will A’i deubyz o wanted,
not be continually serene with the Tra merin, tra ced?
frank barons. Will he come from ym brawd Brydain urzin, the exposed thrust, from the excess Ac ym gyfion cyfin.
of effusion, from the excess of treaNa çwyav yn goglud gwern,
sure? There are a thousand of my Gwerin gwaelodwez ufern,
brothers in Britain of exalted state, Ergrynay cyllestrig cäen,
and of my progeny in the borders. Can Wledig gwlad anorfen.
I will not proceed in the confidence of the alder trees, with the multitude in the deeps of hell. I will dread the sulphureous covering, from the Sovereign of boundless space.
GWILYM MAESYVED. VOL. I.
ART. I.-Systematic Morality; or a Treatise on the Theory and Practice
of Human Duty, on the Grounds of Natural Religion. By W. Jevons. Hunter. 1827. 2 Vols. 8vo.
The author of this very ingenious and valuable work has justly remarked in his preface, that notwithstanding the multitude of ethical treatises with which our language abounds, an important station still remains in a great degree unoccupied. The interesting and curious questions which occur in the theory of morals have been largely debated; on the proper definition and criterion of virtue, on the grounds of moral obligation, on the nature and origin of the moral sense, very different and apparently opposite opinions have been maintained by the most eminent philosophers. On the other hand, many writers have distinguished themselves in the more practical discussions of casuistry and natural law, but in a comparatively dry and upinteresting manner, without addressing themselves to the affections, or dwelling upon those motives which are peculiarly calculated to mend the heart and inspire the love of virtue. The persuasive part of moral science, if we may so denominate it, has been cultivated chiefly by the preacher and the essayist; and though much that is highly valuable may be derived from their productions, yet it is necessarily presented in a detached and desultory form.
It is the object of the work before us to supply in some measure this deficiency in our systematic treatises, and in many respects it is well adapted to its purpose. Though, for many reasons, we cannot but deeply regret that the author has thought it necessary to confine bis views to natural religion, yet the truly rational inquirer, who has been accustomed to look to Scripture both for his rule of life and for his most powerful motives to follow it, will not be displeased to find to what an extent the light of unassisted nature coincides with that of revealed truth. In some instances he may perhaps be induced to think that her pictures, when fairly examined, are defective not so much in distinctness as in brilliancy; nor will he value at a lower rate the discoveries of the gospel, when he perceives, that while they make little change in the outline, they clothe it with more glowing and attractive colours; that reason, as far as her powers can reach, presents to our view the same objects as her heaven-born sister, who has merely extended the design, and thrown over the whole a celestial radiance. The attentive reader, however, of “Systematic Morality,” will immediately perceive that the author is greatly indebted, not only for the vividness, but the distinctness and accuracy of his delineations to the light of revelation. He will not fail to be forcibly struck with the difference between that exercise of reason which is employed in exploring our way through intricacies where we have no other clue to guide us, and that which merely satisfies us that what others have told us is true,—that what has already been accomplished by other means has been done well. If we are desirous to ascertain the reliance to be placed on natural religion, we must examine what she has been able to effect when left entirely to her own resources, as they are exhibited in the writings of those who had no means of checking her decisions by an appeal to higher authority.
After some very judicious introductory remarks on the importance and
value of moral science, the author proceeds to distribute his subject under three principal divisions, in the first of which he proposes to treat of those more general questions relating to the origin of the moral sense,—the nature, definition and criterion of virtue, and the obligation to practise it, which constitute what may be called the theoretical department of ethics ; in the second, under the title of Practical Morality, he gives a detailed view of particular duties; in the third, he treats of the means of cultivating and improving the moral principle. To this last he has given the title of Disciplinary Morality.
Previous to the discussion of the first of the above questions, namely, that relating to the moral sense, Mr. Jevons enters much at large into an investigation of the nature of the affections in general; rightly conceiving that they are so analogous in their origin, and so intimately connected together, as to render it difficult to carry on the analysis of any one successfully, without a reference to the rest. A knowledge of the nature and la vs of the affections is also necessary to the practical moralist, since otherwise it seems scarcely possible to lay down judicious rules for their government and direction. In pursuing this analysis, he proceeds in a great masure on the Hartleyan principle of association, though without adopting much of the peculiar phraseology by which that eminent philosopher is distinguished, and which has perhaps deterred from the study of his writings many of those in whose esti-, mation elegance of expression is of more value than accuracy of thought. According to this view of the origin of mind and its affections, all our intellectual pleasures and pains are ultimately deducible from those of the body. The human infant, in the first instance, is a mere animated machine, a crcature of matter and sense, alive to no feelings but those which result from present impressions. All his pleasures, and consequently, for a while, all his desires, have a reference solely to bodily gratifications, and terminate in self. It is not long, however, that he continues in this state of insulation. From ihe first moment of his existence, he is dependent on the unceasing care and attention of others; the pleasurable emotions, therefore, which are excited by the supply of his various wants, are associated with the idea of those about him, and thus are gradually unfolded the germs of the social and benevolent affections. By the operation of the same principle the intellectual faculties also are successively brought into being. Even the use of the senses themselves implies the exercise of the nascent powers of the understanding.
“The process of learning to see is one which requires the constant exercise of memory and judgment; for the perceptions of distance, bulk, and tangible properties by the eye, are not, as is now universally acknowledged, the original perceptions of that sense, but the associated knowledge which it has acquired under the tuition of Touch. The new-born infant, though endowed with all the organs of sense, is incapable even of that simplest excitement which arises from the observation of external objects. We are apt to expect that the little stranger, surrounded as he is by so many novel objects, should feel immediate wonder and interest in all that he beholds. But we forget that his attention has not yet extended beyond his more acute and immediate feelings; that the sensations conveyed by his eye and ear are all as yet confused and indistinct; and that it is only by slow degrees that he even learns to recognise by means of those sensations the objects of his earliest and most pressing wants. The very power, therefore, of observing external objects, implies a certain developement of mind, and those pleasures of excitement which have been already mentioned, partake as much of the nature of mental as of sensible pleasures. Indeed, the mental faculties, in their first exercise, are nothing more than certain modes or necessary results of sensation, and even when they are em
ployed on subjects apparently the most remote from sense, a close analysis of their operations will still shew their derivation from that humble source. Admitting this, we may easily understand why the laws of sense are the laws also to a certain extent of intellect; and why ihe easy exercise which is gratifying to the corporeal faculties, is in like manner gratifying to those of the mind. Whatever stimulates attention and attracts observation; whatever imparts new ideas, or excites a train of thought; whatever recalls former perceptions with distinctness to the memory, or opens a field in which imagination may range at large, must naturally be a source of pleasure, because it is action and excitement that constitute our very life; and if to live be grateful, these must necessarily be grateful in the same degree.”—Vol. I. pp. 26-28.
It is by a developement, on the whole very judicious and successful, of this leading principle, so wonderfully fertile in the extent and variety of its applications, that our author pursues the analysis of the affections, and is enabled to dispense with all that multitude of original instincts, senses, and innate faculties, which make so conspicuous a figure in the theories of many eminent metaphysicians. If by these terms nothing more be meant than that the constitution of the human being is originally such that the circumstances in which he is placed necessarily tend to promote the growth of certain affections, and among others the sentiments with which he regards virtue either in himself or others, and that along with great diversities in the details, there is a remarkable general analogy in these sentiments ;-if this be all that is meant, perhaps the difference which apparently prevails among philosophers on this subject may be one rather of expression than of real opinion. Many, however, appear to have carried their notion of original instincts to a much greater length than this, and hence at the same time that they admit the general influence of the associative principle, greatly underrate the extent and importance of its operations. “In what manner," says Mr. Stewart, “the association of ideas should manufacture out of the other principles of our constitution a new principle stronger than them all, it is difficult to conceive.” Certainly this is a wonderful result, and one which we should scarcely have anticipated; but yet it is the undeniable fact, and that in cases which have never been made the subject of dispute. The love of money, which every one admits to be factitious, and to derive its origin from the perceived instrumentality of money to procure for us a great variety of other things originally agreeable, frequently supersedes those very desires which gave it birth. If this happens in one case, it may happen in another, it may happen in all; and thus it may be true that the pleasures and pains of sense, and desires originally referring only to bodily gratifications, furnish the materials out of which are gradually formed the most refined tastes, the most intellectual trains of thought and speculation, the most comprehensive, disinterested and spiritual affections. To the manner in which the investigation, proceeding upon this basis, is carried on by Mr. Jevons, we have little to object, and we fully assent to all his leading conclusions; but our limits will not admit of our entering into a detailed examination of it, and we shall therefore content ourselves with recommending it as a pleasing specimen of ingenious metaphysical analysis, applied to a subject of considerable practical value, conducted in such a manner as to be interesting and satisfactory to those who are less conversant with philosophical discussions, at the same time that it is founded upon the soundest principles of mental science.
The second and third chapters of the first book are devoted to an inquiry into the proper definition or criterion of virtue, and into the grounds of
moral obligation. It is to a want of sufficient attention to the distinction between these two very different questions, that the paradoxes and controversies which have disgusted many with this branch of ethical science, may, in a great measure, be ascribed. The question, “what is that common quality which belongs, or is supposed to belong, to whatever is called virtuous," has received various answers, most of which, when attentively examined, will be found ultimately to coincide; and all of them, when fairly applied, will be found to indicate the same or nearly the same objects. They differ, however, materially in distinctness, precision and facility of application. Conformity with the will of God, wherever that will can be clearly ascertained, must evidently supersede all others; and here the believer in revelation enjoys the unspeakable advantage of a guide in which he feels that he can repose implicit and unhesitating confidence. But to the moralist who confines himself to natural religion only, or even to the Christian, in those cases, if there be any such, to which the gospel rule does not immediately and precisely apply, ihe will of God cannot serve as a criterion of virtue. In such cases, we must learn what is virtuous by the application of some other test, and then its acknowledged conformity to the will of God will furnish the decisive motive or obligation to practise it. Such a test Mr. Jevons finds in the utility of virtue, or its tendency to promote the general happiness. The principal objection to this doctrine is the alleged difficulty of applying in practice the criterion recommended ; a difficulty, however, which, though its existence must be admitted, has certainly been exaggerated beyound all truth or reason by several very eminent writers. The manner in which it has been misunderstood by some, and perverted or misapplied by others, has exposed this doctrine to no small portion of undeserved suspicion and prejudice ; which have been occasionally increased by the unfortunate ambiguity of several terms frequently employed by its supporters, in a sense to which the bulk of mankind are less accustomed. It is justly observed by our author, that no other criterion can be considered as altogether free from the same objection, because no other in its detailed application by different persons has ever led them invariably to the same results.
The inquiry into the nature of moral obligation has been more perplexed by theoretical reasoners than any cther in ethical science. The obscurity which sometimes appears to hang over that subject, perhaps arises in a great measure from the circumstance that the obligation has almost always been considered with relation to the beings on whom it is imposed, and not to the source or authority from which it emanates. The distinction between an inducement, as a matter of prudence, and an obligation, as a matter of duty, is obvious on the slightest reflection; but no intelligible account can be given of this distinction without an immediate reference to the idea of dependence on some superior being, who is enabled to connect the observance of his laws with the attainment of some object of essential importance to the agent. This object, in the case of moral obligation, can be no other than the greatest present or future happiness of the agent, connected with the practice of virtue by the declared will of God, or (what comes in fact to the same thing) by the course of nature or of providence. - The necessity of a reference to a future state in order to a perfectly satisfactory account of this subject is distinctly admitted by Mr. Jevons in the following passage :
“ The sum, then, of our argument is this,—that no given course of conduct can be pronounced either conducive or adverse to the present happiness of an