itself, and hence, as no one has a right to force conviction upon us, no one has a right to dictate to us or controul our religious worship. If, however, it should be argued that although this right cannot belong to individuals because of their equality one with another, it may yet be delegated to the state, as the common functionary or protector commissioned to maintain the public peace,-M. Vinet answers this objection by thus defining the legitimate functions of the state or civil power. It is authorized to take care of and to support the morale of the social body, that is to say, to maintain public order and decency. This charge, however, implies no right to intermeddle with individual or domestic morality, and consequently no right over those religious or philosophical opinions which constitute its basis. When any one, therefore, makes a public profession of a particular religious worship or creed without any act which offends against public peace or order, he is out of the reach of the civil magistrate and in no wise accountable to him. If, on the contrary, a particular religion or worship violates the public order of society in any particular overt act, the state is authorized to check such an infringement, and to restrain that worship, or at least that part or act of it which offends against the peace of society; but even then it has no right to proscribe the exercise of that religious worship altogether, under pretence that it contains something contrary to the laws of society. It has cognizance only of acts, not of opinions. Still less has the state a right to require every one to adopt some sort of external profession of religion, if it should find some who on conscientious conviction decline to profess any. If, however, by acts or a public expression of indifference or disbelief in the opinions of others, an annoyance or social disorder is committed, the civil power resumes its right, and it may impose silence, only, however, in those respects in which an act of offence against the peace of society has been committed. The state, in short, stands on the same footing with conscience as every individual does, having no right over conscience itself or its acts, whether positive or negative, provided that these acts are not opposed to the execution of the laws or to the respect due to public morality. M. Vinet then proceeds to the supposition of the state being invested with this right, which he denies to be implied in its institution. Granting that it is empowered to preside over the conscience, to bend it according to its own discipline, that is to say, to impose any sort of what it calls truths, how is it to set to work? The task is possible as far as regards some sorts of truths: such, for example, as are self-evident, and which common sense cannot refuse to admit. It would undoubtedly be tyrannical and absurd to proclaim a state arithmetic or a state geometry; still, without setting up for an infallible arithmetician, the state could find some points in these sciences fixed and agreed on by all, which it might as well as not promulgate officially. In the case of religious truth, or axioms on the contrary, where shall we find the fixed point on which all agree? The very essence of this truth is its being matter of revelation or deduction, and not being evident to the senses. The state is neither a philosopher nor a theologian; but if it were, how many philosophers and theologians could be found who would exactly agree with it in defining a single point? Does it ever happen that two men hold precisely the same opinions on these subjects? To avoid this perplexity, the state must resolve on deliberating by itself, and abiding by its own opinion. Be it so: but then which of the thousand solutions, adopted by mankind from time to time, will it in the result make choice of, with regard to these impor tant and momentous questions? Suppose it to adopt Christianity as its standard of religious truth; still there are degrees and differences in Christianity. Will the state or will it not admit any one to be a Christian who does not believe the doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus Christ without any qualification? If it does not, the Socinian, the Pelagian, and many more professing Christians, are declared to be out of the pale of this law of the state. If, on the other hand, they are admitted, two sorts of truth are recognized as legal; the door is open to all kinds of dissent; and the end sought to be attained, is altogether missed. Take another supposition. Let there be a line drawn thus: say that only the Atheist and the Materialist shall be proscribed, because it may be assumed that there is not a particle of truth contained in their doctrines. Still this would be saying in other words, that the state not being able to decide what is the true religion, authorizes and establishes all, on consideration that every body shall profess some religion; but that those who refuse to profess any shall be punished. But are Materialists and Atheists the only persons who neglect the outward conformities of religion? There may be, for instance, a Deist who professes what is in accordance with all the great. moral truths of Christianity; must he, unless he conforms to some ceremonial of worship, be persecuted or proscribed? Would you protect the Jew or the Armenian, or even the Indian who worships a God under nobody knows what absurd incarnation, while the man who thinks with Plato or Marcus Aurelius should be put out of the protection of the laws? Nothing could be more absurd. There is then no medium. The state, if it would not outrage common sense, must make no difference between differing opinions on matters of religion or philosophy, whatever they may be. It must grant equal liberty, equal protection, to all sorts of belief or disbelief, as matters of opinion. What, it may be said, is the Atheist then to be protected? M. Vinet says, Yes! and here the honesty of his conviction is put to the test. An Atheist is in his eyes a monster, and he calls him so involuntarily, yet he claims for him toleration and protection; and it is only in the event of his seeing such a person practising, by overt acts, what we may consider the consequence of his principles, and committing actions destructive of the peace and order of society, that he would consider himself justified in departing from his neutrality, and then only to restrain the acts, not the opinions. In short, M. Vinet contends, that the nature of religious opinion precludes the possibility of the state's determining, with certainty and justice, which is the best, and can, therefore, adopt no one form of worship in preference to another; and secondly, that, if it had the power, liberty of conscience would forbid the right to exercise it. This is the theory from which M. Vinet proceeds to the policy of its application. He supposes that it may be asked, admitting that social morality and forms of religion are distinct, Is there not a necessary connexion between civil order and religion? The state is not an abstract existence without passions or prejudices; it is an assembly of men who, as men, have their opinions. How then, it may be said, can it be expected that when possessed of power they should not and ought not to employ it to protect the faith which they adopt? Besides, in so doing, they may be actuated by the best motives; among governments there may, perhaps, be some who consult the good of the governed. May not, therefore, one who is convinced of the efficacy of religion on the morals of men, and who is convinced that the religion he professes is pure, mild, and full of good fruits, give it his encouragement, protect it, and seek to make it prevail over all others? VOL. I. U Be it so!-The state and every good man would wish such a religion to triumph. Its influence is the best remedy for the evils which disturb society. But the question then arises, What is the best means of attaining the end desired? Is it best to declare this religion, the religion of the state? Beware, says M. Vinet; if you do, you wither it at the root. You may see its ranks swell in numbers, but what signify numbers? A thousand hypocrites are not worth one honest believer. Power may propagate opinions, but propagate only to destroy. The conscience is not reached, the surface only is touched. This is not the conquest which is desired; it is faith that is wanted, not conformity; piety and sincerity, not the parade of ceremonials. Power too, however justly administered, has and makes itself opponents, and these opponents insensibly range themselves against the religion which power establishes. The friends of the state adopt its faith in sycophancy, its enemies reject it from a spirit of opposition. Even for those who resist prejudice of either sort, religion loses some of its charms when allied to power; truth itself is suspected when imposed upon us authoritatively, and one almost feels a pleasure in resistance.-Woe to truth when it comes with such allies. When resistance becomes a point of honour, hesitation swells into decision; and incredulity is magnified. into heroism.-The ministers, too, of religion become puffed up with pride and the feeling of power. Little by little they forget their station; they cease to care about convincing, and begin to persecute; peace and charity are far from their lips.-But this is not all; the state's quarrel becomes theirs; the state meddles with religion, and they in return meddle with the state; it gives them the support of soldiers, and they repay the obligation with sermons; thus the pulpit becomes a political tribune, and where then is religion? Thus, then, M. Vinet argues, the interest of religion and the interest of society (which has need of religion) concur in recommending that the state, as a state, should have none. It would not be Atheistic on that account, as some pretend. Atheism implies certain opinions, and the state should have none; it neither denies nor maintains any thing. Confining itself to its legitimate province, it should regulate only the purely civil transactions of the community, granting to all its members equal rights whatever be their opinions; and as to modes of worship, it should give free liberty to all, without salarying any, without favour, prerogative, or preeminence to any. By the force of emulation, and the free collision of opinion and reason, truth will ultimately prevail, and then, at least, its triumph will be pure, honourable, and useful, for it will be the triumph of truth, and of truth alone. A dream it is, it will be said, of days to come: and so M. Vinet admits; but, as he contends, no idle Utopia. There are still many countries where it might not be prudent thus to emancipate all religions, but it is not the less on that account the end towards which the honest and faithful believer, as well as the sound politician, should aim; since it is the only sure road of keeping alive active and honest zeal in the cause of religion, at the same time that it preserves the peace and harmony of society. 1 CRITICAL NOTICES. T ART. IV.-A Discourse preached at the Dedication of the Second Congregational Unitarian Church, New York, Dec. 7, 1826. By W. E. Channing. New York, 1826. 8vo. pp. 57. Reprinted in England under the following title: The superior Tendency of Unitarianism to form an elevated Religious Character. A Discourse, &c. Reprinted from the New York Edition. Liverpool, F. B. Wright: London, Teulon and Fox, R. Hunter, and D. Eaton. 1827. 12mo. pp. 41. THIS is a very remarkable Sermon, and has caused, as we are informed, a considerable sensation in America. Its object is to shew the superiority of Unitarianism to all other forms of Christianity as a means of promoting" true, A deep and living piety." Not content with repelling an accusation constantly brought against the opinions which we receive as scriptural and true, Dr. Channing boldly carries the war into the territories of our opponents, exposes the evil tendency of their most favourite doctrines, and establishes by comparison the superior interest and value of our sentiments. The subject is well chosen in reference to the occasion on which the discourse was delivered, and, in his mode of treating it, the author has displayed the intellectual power, the depth of feeling, the energy of expression, and at the same time the gentleness of spirit, which have secured for his former writings such deserved popularity. Taking as his text Mark xii. 29, 30, Dr. Channing first observes, that the building is dedicated "to the worship of the only living and true God, and to the teaching of the religion of his Son Jesus Christ." His remarks on the dedication service, to which some have made objections, are excellent and of very extensive application. They are worth the attention of those who object to services at the settlement of Christian ministers. “We are not among those who consider the written word as a statute book, by the letter of which every step in life must be governed. We believe, on the other hand, that one of the great excel lencies of Christianity is, that it does not deal in minute regulation, but that, having given broad views of duty and enjoined a pure and disinterested spirit, it leaves us to apply these rules and express this spirit according to the promptings th of the divine monitor within us, and according to the claims and exigencies of the ever-varying conditions in which we are placed. We believe, too, that reve lation is not intended to supersede God's other modes of instruction; that it is not intended to drown, but to render more audible the voice of nature. Now nature dictates the propriety of such an act as we are this day assembled to perform." Having observed that the building is dedicated to the Unitarian doctrine, "and to Christianity interpreted in consistency with it," he gives the conviction, that this system "is peculiarly the friend of inward, living, practical religion," as the great motive for zeal in its propagation, and thus introduces the proper subject of his discourse. We cannot withhold from our readers his explanation of what he claims for Unitarianism: "In speaking of Unitarian Chris tianity as promoting piety, I ought to observe, that I use this word in its proper and highest sense. I mean not every thing which bears the name of piety, for under this title superstition, fanaticism and formality, are walking abroad and claiming respect. I mean not an anxious frame of mind, not abject and slavish fear, not a dread of hell, not a repetition of forms, not church going, not loud profession, not severe censures of others' irreligion; but filial love and reverence towards God, habitual gratitude, cheerful trust, ready obedience, and, though last not least, an imitation of the ever active and unbounded benevolence of the Creator." The remarks on the various influences which modify the evil effects of erroneous creeds, are in their principle truly philosophical, in their spirit delightful, and in their expression beautiful. We hardly know how to abridge, yet we must not give the whole passage. "I mean not," he says, "in commending or condemning systems, to pass sentence on their professors. I know the power of the mind to select from a mul tifarious system, for its habitual use, those features or principles which are generous, pure and ennobling, and by these to sustain its spiritual life, amidst the nominal profession of many errors. I know that a creed is one thing as written in a book, and another as it exists in the minds of its advocates. In the book, all the doctrines appear in equally strong and legible lines. In the mind many are faintly traced and seldom recurred to, whilst others are inscribed as with sunbeams, and are the chosen, constant lights of the soul. Hence, in good men of opposing denominations, a real agreement may subsist as to their vital principles of faith; and amidst the division of tongues, there may be unity of soul, and the same internal worship of God. By these remarks I do not mean, that error is not evil, or that it bears no pernicious fruit. Its tendencies are always bad. But I mean, that these tendencies exert themselves amidst so many counteracting influences; and that injurious opinions so often lie dead through the want of mixture with the common thoughts, through the mind's not absorbing them and changing them into its own substance; that the highest respect may, and ought to be cherished for men in whose creed we find much to disapprove." We shall first enumerate the particulars in which the superiority of Unitarianism for the promotion of piety is maintained, and in which its tendency is contrasted with that of the opposite system. 1. It presents to the mind one, and only one, Infinite Person, to whom supreme homage is to be paid. 2. It holds forth and preserves inviolate the spirituality of God: here are some admirable remarks on the effect of Trinitarianism in materializing and embodying the Supreme Being. 3. Unitarianism presents a distinct and intelligible object of worship, a Being whose nature, whilst inexpressibly sublime, is yet simple and suited to human appre hension. 4. It asserts the absolute and unbounded perfection of God's character. 5. It accords with nature. 6. It opens the mind to new and ever-enlarging views of God. 7. It promotes piety by the high place which it assigns to piety in the character and work of Jesus Christ. After ably illustrating this point, and shewing the inconsistency of piety and devotion with supreme Godhead, the author indulges in a short digression to observe, "that we deem our views of Jesus Christ more interesting than those of Trinitarianism. We feel that we should lose much, by exchanging the distinct character aud mild radiance with which he offers himself to our minds, for the confused and irreconcileable glories with which that system labours to invest him. According to Unitarianism, he is a Being who may be understood, for he is one mind, one conscious nature. According to the op. posite faith, he is an inconceivable compound of two most dissimilar minds, joining in one person a finite and infinite nature, a soul weak and ignorant, and a soul almighty and omniscient; and is such a Being a proper object for human thought and affection?" 8. Unitarianism promotes piety by meeting the wants of man as a sinner. This is one of the most interesting and striking portions of the Discourse. The author attempts to shew what a sinner needs; how Unitarianism fully supplies his wants, and how completely the doctrines of the Trinity and Atonement, notwithstanding their high pretensions, fail in this respect. The following passage will doubtless very much shock believers in the commonlyreceived doctrine of Atonement, and that it was likely to have this effect, the au thor has shewn that he was himself sensible; but, anxiously as we should avoid any wanton or useless attack on the religious feelings, or even prejudices, of others, we cannot but think in this instance that the effect will be useful, for we are persuaded that it is the doctrine which shocks, not any thing unjust in the representation of it; and we hope that many who were misled by mysterious language, and a reference to circumstances different to any thing which falls under their own observation, may be brought to perceive the real character of an error most injurious to the Divine perfections and pernicious in its influences on human minds: "This doctrine of an infinite substitute, suffering the penalty of sin, to manifest God's wrath against sin, and thus to support his government, is, I fear, so familiar to us all, that its monstrous character is overlooked. Let me then set it before you in new terms, and by a new illustration; and if in so doing I may wound the feelings of some who hear me, I beg them to believe, that I do it with pain, and from no impulse but a desire to serve the cause of truth. Suppose, then, that a teacher should come among you, and should tell you, that the Creator, in order to pardon his own children, had erected a gallows in the centre of the universe, and had publicly executed upon it, in room of the offenders, an Infinite Being, the partaker of his own Supreme Divinity; suppose |