them are a little scandalised at the liberty Mr. Greyson has taken with "angels," in the very existence of whom they do not believe. Others still are chiefly shocked at the want of "charity" and "sympathy" towards those curious 'secularists", who tell you, not simply that they do not believe in a God, but that they sincerely believe that it would be a bad thing for the world if there were one, even though Infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness!

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One passage, and only one, the Editor has omitted. It is that in which the Irish Lecturer shows, in so brusque a manner, the inadequacy of the Decalogue (as a moral test) to a being in the supposed condition of Adam in Paradise. The lecture was really given by an Irishman of much wit and humour; though it is true that, as Mr. Greyson did not hear it, he could only obtain part of the Irish Adam's answers, and supplemented the rest, as in the letter. The passage has been repeatedly quoted; exclusively, however, by that portion of the press which is more or less the representative of "free thought "in religion, and always with the profession of being greatly shocked at it. It is not, assuredly, out of regard to such critics that the passage is omitted, but because it also gave umbrage to a few others, whose religious susceptibilities are proved in a less equivocal way than by gleefully and ostentatiously reprinting what they are professedly much shocked at! The former, like old prudes, are delighted to spread the scandal which they hold up their fans about; the latter sincerely reprobate the passage, and therefore spread it not. The Editor, indeed, thinks even these unjust to the "Irish Lecturer," and rather too much disposed, in their ultra-reverence for "angels," to forget that "angels" are our "fellow-servants," and in no respect entitled, according to our plain Protestant notions, to any sort or degree of religious homage.

The Editor, however, omits the passage in deference to their feelings; though he cannot conceal his conviction that the "Irish Lecturer " (who was a real person, and no fetch of Mr. Greyson's) put his argument very clearly, to ordinary apprehension, by the very form he adopted. It would have been much better if our sceptical acquaintances, instead of going into an hysterical fit of devout horror, had replied to the substance of the argument instead of quarrelling with the form of it.

The letter touching the absurd Secularist who avowed, not only that he was an Atheist, but that a God, under any notion whatever, even that of Infinite Wisdom, Power, and Love, would be a bad thing for the universe, has called forth very emphatic anathemas from certain critics of the ultralatitudinarian school, on account of its want of charity! One of them declares that he would sooner be the Secularist in question than the author of such a letter; another asks whether Mr. Greyson cannot suppose a person perfectly sane and perfectly sincere in such a declaration, and thinks that the reception even of such an "astounding paradox" may be the fruit of a " Divine" as well as a "Satanic" discipline. "Is it not, in fact," he says, "good that some men should know what it is to the heart to believe itself alone? Is it not even desirable that if man could find his highest purity and virtue in self-reliance, he should do so? Is it not a most Divine discipline that he should be robbed, not only of the 'motives' to virtue which religion gives, but of the living help which trust gives, if he can indeed fancy himself a self-dependent being?" To all which most pure and thrice-distilled nonsense-which would just as well make every folly and crime of man a "Divine discipline," since there is nothing that God cannot turn to good, however evil in itself—the Editor of Mr. Greyson briefly answers, that there are moral paradoxes, just as

there are paradoxes of other kinds, which it is as impossible to suppose a rational creature conscientiously to accept, as to suppose that he believes a part to be greater than the whole; -and the above appears to be one of them. It is not the case of a man, let the reader observe, who is simply an Atheist ; that is intelligible, though millions have doubted whether there ever was an Atheist; but of one who says he believes that if there were an all-perfect God, the universe would be worse off than if there were none! This is the paradox, the belief in which this singular writer believes may be part of a Divine discipline. The unmanly indulgence towards errors of the most pernicious kind, which certain writers delight in, and which they baptize by the name of charity-though it is no more like charity than a drunkard's maudlin tears are those of rational emotion — has a direct tendency to encourage every coxcombical paradox to which overweening pride and vanity can prompt the sceptical mind. For some errors-and that now in question is one of them— indignant contempt, and not slobbering sympathy is the proper treatment. In the name of common sense, let us be permitted to call some assertions incredible. If a man says that he really believes a part to be greater than the whole the sun to be brightest at midnight — an infinitely good God to be an infinitely bad thing for the world—it is impossible not to believe him either insincere or not in his right senses; and that last supposition is the most charitable of the two.*

The Editor would have greater respect for this writer's charity if he did not so exclusively reserve its sympathies for unbelief and scepticism. One would wish that it should be now and then a little displayed towards those who have not

* It is observable that many of our most indulgent critics are making this supposition in M. Comte's behoof; his "Catechism of Positive Religion," in truth, hardly leaves them any other alternative.

reduced their creed to the extreme tenuity of his own; though it is quite natural that his chief sympathies should be in the opposite direction. It would be also as well if one who makes such pretensions to " charity" would not forget (which he sometimes does) the claims of the humbler virtues of urbanity and courtesy.

Another critic is very indignant at Mr. Greyson's having called a youth who denies all distinction between right and wrong a "young idiot; " and begs to know whether the followers of Bentham and Paley (mistaken though they may be) ought to be so designated? The attentive reader will perceive that the writer was not thinking of Paley or Bentham at all ; but of such youths as Thrasymachus of old, in Plato's republic, (they have not entirely died out even in these days,) who hold that there is no distinction at all between right and wrong, whether founded on a "utilitarian" basis or otherwise; who believe that there are none of the "general rules" of Paley to be observed as matter of obligation; and that whatever we can do we are at liberty to do, deterred by nothing but fear of detection and punishment. Paley and Bentham, it is quite certain, believed in a moral distinction of actions, and in moral obligation, however unsatisfactory their theory of the derivation of such conceptions.

PREFACE

ΤΟ

THE FIRST EDITION.

FROM a large mass of Mr. Greyson's "Letters" the following have been selected for publication. It may be inferred that the Editor thought them worthy of it; whether the public will think so, the public only can determine.

That all readers should concur in approving the whole can hardly be anticipated. Some will think the volumes contain an excess of grave matter—some, an excess of light. It is fortunate for an editor when objections are diametrically opposed, as it may be hoped they will neutralise one another. At all events, each reader, finding something he likes, may forgive something else he may wish away.

It may be permitted me, however, to say that one principal reason for admitting so many of the lighter letters, has been to relieve and diversify graver matter, and allure to its perusal. Their specific levity, it is hoped, may assist in buoying up and keeping afloat those more ponderous letters which. might otherwise have gone at once to the bottom.

By many in all ages, and by as many in this age as in any, Truth is regarded as a medicine which should be disguised in