French and German, whose names would be likely to be misunderstood and misspelled, and the importance of promptly arresting them, and, to that end, of protecting officers in so doing would seem to furnish some reasonable grounds for adjudging that when the person who is really meant is arrested, though by a wrong name, such slight error, so harmless and so easily rectified, ought not to subject the officer to a suit. Should such an exception be sustained, it could only be probably where the name was unknown or concealed or falsely given, and the true party against whom the process was issued had been arrested. In such case perhaps the mythical John Doe, who appears here in the complaint, might properly be held to represent, the true name of the respondent. 3. But it is not necessary to settle that point, as there is another which is decisive of this case. Sheriffs and other officers are by statute empowered to require suitable aid in the execution of their office in apprehending criminals. Comp. Stat. chap. 13, sec. 11. When the defendant was called upon by the sheriff in this case to assist him in arresting the plaintiff, he was not at liberty to refuse. Nor could he demand of the sheriff an inspection of the warrant under which he was acting, in order to see by what authority he was proceeding, and whether in his judgment it would be safe to assist him. It was enough that he was the sheriff (or deputy sheriff), a known public officer, who called on him for aid in the execution of his office; it was his business to yield immediate obedience to the demand. The nature of the case requires that there should be no delay in rendering the requisite assistance; no nice inquiries into the written authority of the sheriff to do what he is doing. It is sufficient that the officer asks for aid in a matter in which he has by law a right to ask for aid, and that he is a known public officer. The person, who is thus called on, is protected by the call from being sued for rendering the requisite assistance. If the officer has no warrant, or authority that will justify him, he may be liable as a trespasser; but the person who is called upon for aid, having no means of knowing what the warrant is by which the officer acts, and who relies upon the official character and call of the sheriff as his , security for doing what is required, is clearly entitled to protection against suits by the person arrested. . . . In civil cases merely, the sheriff having no authority to call for such aid, when there is no breach of the peace or other criminal offence, the persons who interfere and aid the officers are said to be liable. Archibald's Practice, 853. But that would not affect this case, as it was for the arrest of a criminal. On this subject see also 9 A. & E. 840, 846; 1 B. & Ald. 652; 7 B. & C. 486; 3 Dowl. 678, Finch v. Cocken. Judgment affirmed. Action for false imprisonment. Before Judge EVE. City Court of Richmond county. January 2, 1906. Charles Blocker brought his action against John W. Clark, alleging that the defendant was the sheriff of Richmond county; that H. C. Hall made an affidavit that Charles Blocker had committed the offence of simple larceny, and on this affidavit a warrant was issued for the arrest of Charles Blocker and placed in the hands of Clark, and by him turned over to his deputy for execution. On the warrant appeared the following memoranda: "Weighs about 160 pounds; brown skin; five feet, ten inches, farm hand; lives in Tutt's Extension, on Woodlawn Road." On this warrant the deputy arrested the plaintiff. At the time of the arrest the plaintiff denied that he had committed the offence charged in the warrant, and protested that he was not the person for whom the warrant was issued. Notwithstanding this denial and protest, plaintiff was taken into custody, and the deputy refused to carry him before a judicial officer, but lodged him in jail, where he remained for four days. It is alleged that the plaintiff did not answer the description set forth in the memoranda, in that he was six feet three inches high, and was distinctly black, that he had not worked on a farm for ten years or more, but worked as a fireman for an oil company in the city of Augusta, and that he did not live and had never lived in Tutt's Extension, but in the city of Augusta some distance from that place, Tutt's Extension being outside the city in the village of Harrisonville, about a half mile distant from his place of residence. Upon being released from jail plaintiff reported to his employer, who told him that his place had been filled, as he thought he had gone to the chain-gang. He had been unable to secure work as remunerative as that which he had at the time of his arrest. Damages were laid in the sum of $500. The defendant filed an answer, in which he admitted that the arrest had been made by his deputy, but denied that the defendant protested his innocence, etc. The statement as to the remark of his former employer was also denied. The answer further alleged that it was the duty of the defendant to execute all legal warrants placed in his hands, and that the warrant was in all respects regular. He placed it in the hands of his deputy, and the plaintiff bore the same name as the person charged in the warrant, and the deputy making the arrest acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence and caution. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. William H. Fleming, for plaintiff. ... Joseph B. & Bryan Cuming and G. M. Beasley, for defendant. person COBB, P. J. (after stating the foregoing facts). It is absolutely essential to the validity of a warrant that the person to be arrested should be identified by the terms of the warrant. The usual method of identifying the person to be arrested is by the insertion therein of his name. It is not, however, indispensable that the name of the to be arrested should appear in the warrant, for a warrant may be valid although it may not contain the name of the person whose arrest is directed. But if the warrant does not contain the name, it must contain sufficient data to identify the person to be arrested thereunder; this may be done by stating his occupation, his personal appearance, peculiarities, place of residence, or other means of identification. 1. When the warrant contains the name of the person, the officer executing the same must rely upon the name alone, and cannot justify the arrest of a party whose name is other than that appearing in the warrant, even though he is the person intended. Voorhees on Arrest, §§ 39-40. A warrant issued against John Doe, "the person carrying off the cannon," was held not to justify the arrest of Levi Mead, although he was taken in the act of carrying off the cannon, and was the person intended. Mead v. Hawse, 7 Cowen, 332. A warrant issued for Robert J. Williams was executed by arresting Spencer Riley, and it was held that all concerned in the arrest were trespassers, although Robert J. Williams and Spencer Riley were one and the same person; in such cases it is incumbent upon the officer seeking to justify the arrest to show that the person was as well known by the one name as by the other. Johnson v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97, 137. See also cases cited in note to Eames v. State, 44 Am. Dec. 291. A warrant was issued against John Hoye, and Richard Hoye was arrested thereunder; the officer was held liable for plaintiff's imprisonment, notwithstanding it appeared that Richard Hoye was the person against whom the warrant was intended to issue. Hoye v. Busch, 29 E. C. L. 649, 1 M. & G. 775. See also West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78. It will thus be seen that an officer arresting one not bearing the name set forth in the warrant acts at his peril, and will be held liable as a trespasser, even though the person actually arrested was the person intended to be charged, unless he makes it appear that such person was as well known by the name appearing in the warrant as by the other name which he bore. . . . If the person named therein is arrested, the officer is justified in making the arrest, notwithstanding it may thereafter appear that the person arrested was not the person intended, and that a mistake was made in the name inserted in the warrant. The prosecutor who made a mistake as to the name might be liable to the person unlawfully arrested, but the officer would be blameless. The officer may take into consideration any information that he may receive outside of the terms of the warrant, in order to locate the person named therein, but his duty at last is to arrest the person named. ... The memoranda in the present case were not part of the warrant; and if the officer had arrested a person of the exact description contained in the memoranda, he would have been a trespasser, if that person did not bear the name of Charles Blocker, and was not well known by that name. If the memoranda had been a part of the warrant, the officer would have been a trespasser in following the memoranda in making the arrest, if the person arrested was not named Charles Blocker. 2. If there be two or more persons of the same name within the bailiwick, the officer must make diligent inquiry as to the identity of the person named in the warrant; and if he make such inquiry and arrest a person of that name in good faith, believing he is the person named in the warrant, the officer is also protected. If there has been a mistake made as to the name in the warrant, and the prosecutor is responsible for such mistake, the prosecutor might be liable, but the officer would be blameless. We are aware of the importance of the question involved as to the responsibility of an officer executing a warrant where there are two or more persons bearing the name stated in the warrant. If it should be held that the officer is protected when he acts in good faith, although the wrong person may be arrested, cases will arise where a person who is innocent will be deprived of his liberty, and will have no redress for the wrong. On the other hand, if it is held that the officer acts at his peril, the administration of the law through the execution of warrants is impeded, and criminals may escape on account of the timidity or caution of the officers. We are aware that the rule that the officer in such cases acts at his peril has been laid down by courts of respectable standing; but we think that the rule of good faith is more consonant with our system. . . . If good faith will protect an officer who deprives a citizen of his liberty under a void warrant, it would seem for a stronger reason that it should protect an officer who is armed with a valid warrant, and who after exercising due diligence, acting in perfect good faith, makes a mistake as to the identity of the person named in the warrant. . . Judgment reversed on other grounds. All the Justices concur, except FISH, C. J., absent. ... 1065. CHARLES VINER. A General Abridgment of Law and Equity. "Trespass." (2d ed., 1793, vol. XX, p. 457.) . . . If a bailiff of a court, upon summons to him directed, attaches the party by the goods of another man, trespass lies against him; for he ought to take conusance of the goods of the party. (11 H. IV, 91.) . . . The same law if a sheriff upon an execution takes the goods of a stranger. (11 H. IV, 90 b.) In case 1066. COм. v. KENNARD. (1829. 8 Pick. 133.) PARKER, C. J. of a seizure or an attachment by an officer, who comes to take them on a precept against another person who has no right or interest in the goods, the officer in such case would be a trespasser; for he does not act under any precept against such owners, nor is he commanded to take their goods. Actions of trespass against officers thus transgressing are among the most common actions in our courts, and they depend upon the same principle as actions of assault and battery, or false imprisonment, by one who is arrested on a writ or warrant against another person. In such case there is no authority for the arrest, and the person making it, whether by mistake or design, is a mere trespasser. And the same facts which would sustain an action of trespass by the person arrested, will justify any resistance which may be necessary to defend his personal liberty, short of injurious violence to the officer. We cannot distinguish between an officer who assumes to act under a void precept, and a stranger who should do the same act without any precept; for a command to arrest the person or seize the goods of B, is no authority against the person or goods of A. And an officer without a precept is no officer in the particular case in which he so undertakes to act. The officer must judge at his peril in regard to the person against whom he is commanded to act. This is said to be hard, but it is a hardship resulting from the voluntary assumption of a hazardous office, and considering that in all cases of doubt the officer may require indemnity before he executes his precept, the hardship is imaginary. 1067. BUCK v. COLBATH SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1865 3 Wall. 334 COLBATH Sued Buck in one of the State courts of Minnesota, in an action of trespass for taking goods. Buck pleaded in defence, that he was marshal of the United States for the District of Minnesota, and that having in his hands a writ of attachment against certain parties whom he named, he levied the same upon the goods, for taking which he was now sued by Colbath. But he did not aver that they were the goods of the defendants in the writ of attachment. On the trial, Colbath made proof of his ownership of the goods, and Buck relied solely on the fact that he was marshal and held the goods under the writ in the attachment suit. The Court refused to instruct the jury that the defence thus set up was a sufficient one; and the plaintiff had a verdict and judgment. This judgment was affirmed on error in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and the defendant brought the case here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. . . . ... Mr. Peckman, for the marshal, plaintiff in error. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court. . . . How far the Courts are bound to interfere for the protection of their own officers, is a question not discussed in the case of Freeman v. Howe (24 How. 450), but which demands a passing notice here. In its consideration, however, we are reminded at the outset, that property may be seized by an officer of the court under a variety of writs, orders, or processes of the court. For our present purpose, these may be divided into two classes. |