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ance of a duty, makes a communication to another to whom he owes the duty; (3) where one who has an interest in the subject makes a communication relating thereto to another having a corresponding interest.

1. It is certain that the publication in question is not the report of the proceedings of a court or legislative body. The term "legislative body," in this connection, has not been extended to cover a city council meeting. Newell, Defam., Sland. & L. p. 260; Odgers, Sland. & L. p. 260. Doubtless, an official report of a city council meeting required to be published by law in the official city paper would be privileged; but that is not the present case. The report before us was not an official report. No official report of the meeting was ever made or published. The article in question was a mere voluntary report, published as an item of news; hence it cannot be protected as an official report of a council meeting probably would be, nor does the fact that the newspaper was in fact the official paper of the city cut any figure.

2. The publication, then, not being privileged as a report of the proceedings of a legislative or judicial body, the question arises whether it falls under either of the other two classes of publications above named which are entitled to a qualified or conditional privilege. The cardinal principle with reference to these last-named publications or communications is that they must be made in good faith, by one who owes the duty or has an interest in the subject-matter, to one to whom the duty is owing, or to one who has a corresponding interest. Now, as to the original communication made, or claimed to have been made, by Mr. Pratt to the common council, it might plausibly be claimed under the foregoing definitions that, if made in good faith by him believing it to be true, it was privileged. The council had proposed certain amendments to the city charter, and sent them to the legislature for action; and Mr. Pratt was explaining to the council the reason, as he understood it, why they failed to be acted upon by the senate. It can easily be seen that the argument in favor of the privilege in such a case would be worthy of very serious consideration. But the publication of those remarks to the world is an entirely different matter. . . . There was not only no duty, but there was certainly no tangible interest in the subject-matter on the part of the people outside of the plaintiff's district. Thus, it is very plainly seen that the publication, even if it could be considered as privileged when made to a citizen of Oshkosh who might be said to be interested in the subjectmatter, could not be made broadcast to the world, and preserve its privileged character. The publication is excessive. It must be confined to people to whom the defendant owes a duty to speak, or who have an interest with the defendant in the subject-matter. Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis. 321 [ante, No. 917]. . . . Judgment affirmed.

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SUB-TOPIC C. REPORTS OF OTHER DELIBERATIVE MEETINGS

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951. HENRY JEPHSON. The Platform, its Rise and Progress. (1892. vol. I, pp. 4, 418, 424.) . . . Down to the end of the seventeenth century the idea of any real political influence being obtained or exercised by means of the Platform, does not appear to have been thought of by any one. The Revolution of 1688 was effected without its instrumentality, or the slightest recourse to its aid, and during the reigns of William and Mary, and of Anne, public political meetings, or public speeches, were practically unheard of. . . . The first strivings of the people toward the Platform had become audible in our history while the great drama of the French Revolution was being enacted before an awestruck world. But they were promptly suppressed by Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts and seditious Meetings and Assemblies Acts, and sank back into despairing hopelessness. Years passed before they again attempted to amend their condition; then they broke out into violence and outrage (1812). But, that being worse even than endurance, they again essayed to speak. Circumstances had somewhat changed in the meanwhile. Among the causes which were contributing to make the public opinion of the Platform more powerful was the additional publicity given to its proceedings by its fellow-laborer in the struggles for liberty the Press, also now rapidly growing in influence and power. Without a published report of the speeches delivered from the Platform, their effect was restricted to the very limited number of persons reached by the voice of the speaker, and such reminiscences thereof as they could carry away to retail to their friends. But the wider circulation given to platform speeches by the Press extended their effect to an immeasurable extent, in some cases carrying the voice of the speaker to the uttermost parts of the country. From Prentice's History of Manchester we learn the beginning of the practice of publishing reports of meetings and speeches in an important part of the provincial Press: "To the occurrences of 1819," he says, "the people of Lancashire owe the system of giving regular and full reports in their local newspapers of all important public meetings and law proceedings. Previously, subjects of great consequence were dismissed in a single paragraph. A town's meeting in Manchester would be noticed much as follows: 'A large meeting was held in the Bull's Head on Thursday last, for the resolutions of which see advertisement in our front page."" And he adds: “The agitation kept up by the radicals, and the wanton stretch of power exercised by the Manchester magistracy, had excited so much attention that the conductors of the London Press thought it worth their while to send able reporters to the scene of action." Thus the Press, with its growing power and widening circle of readers, was giving its help to the Platform, and the Platform profited to an incalculable extent both in notoriety and in influence.

952. PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. (1888. St. 51 & 52 Vict.) § 3. A fair and accurate report in any newspaper of proceedings publicly heard before any court exercising judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously with such proceedings, be privileged: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter.

§ 4. A fair and accurate report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting, or (except where neither the public nor any newspaper reporter is admitted) of any meeting of a vestry, town council, school board,

board of guardians, board or local authority formed or constituted under the provisions of any Act of Parliament, or of any committee appointed by any of the above-mentioned bodies, or of any meeting of any commissioners authorized to act by letters patent, Act of Parliament, warrant under the Royal Sign Manual, or other lawful warrant or authority, select committees of either House of Parliament, justices of the peace, in quarter sessions assembled for administrative or deliberative purposes, and the publication at the request of any Government office or department, officer of State, commissioner of police, or chief constable of any notice or report issued by them for the information of the public, shall be privileged, unless it shall be proved that such report or publication was published or made maliciously: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter: Provided also, that the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceedings if it shall be proved that the defendant has been requested to insert in the newspaper in which the report or other publication complained of appeared a reasonable letter or statement by way of contradiction or explanation of such report or other publication, and has refused or neglected to insert the same: Provided further, that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed or construed to limit or abridge any privilege now by law existing, or to protect the publication of any matter not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit.

For the purposes of this section “public meeting" shall mean any meeting bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful purpose, and for the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public concern, whether the admission thereto be general or restricted. . . .

953. BARROWS v. BELL

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1856

7 Gray 301

ACTION of Tort for a libel. Writ dated March 1854. . . . The answer admitted the publication; but denied that the article was libellous, false or malicious, and alleged that the first part of the publication, as far as the words "as it has done in the premises," (at the end of the sixth paragraph,) was a true and correct statement of the official proceedings of the Boston Medical Society and of the lawsuits brought against them, and that the defendant, as one of the committee appointed to defend those suits, caused the publication to be made, as he believed he had a right to do. . . . At the trial before METCALF, J., the plaintiff proved the publication and the extent of the circulation of the journal, and rested his case. The defendant proved the proceedings had respecting the plaintiff by the Medical Society of which the following is the material part: At a meeting of the councillors of the Society, "Doctor Carpenter moved the following votes: Resolved, That all homoeopathic practitioners are, or should be, denominated irregular practitioners, and, according to the by-laws of this Society made and provided, ought to be expelled from membership.

Resolved, That Ira Barrows, of Norton, now a member of this Society, ought to be, and by a vote of this Society is, expelled from membership, for the following reasons: 1. For being guilty of dishonorable conduct. 2. For being the maker and vendor, at sundry different times, of certain and several quack medicines. 3. For being an irregular practitioner, having adopted the homœopathic or infinitesimal, or loaf sugar system." On motion of Doctor Bigelow, the first resolve was laid upon the table; and on motion of Doctor J. B. S. Jackson, the resolves relative to Doctor Barrows were referred to a committee of · three. . . . On that report, the councillors, after a hearing of the parties, unanimously recommended to the Society the expulsion of Doctor Barrows, "on the ground of gross immorality, in having broken his solemn pledge given to Dr. Carpenter." And the Society, after discussion at its meetings at Worcester and at Boston, adopted this recommendation by a vote of more than two-thirds. . . . The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the judge reported the case, as above, to the full Court.

C. B. Farnsworth & R. Mathewson (of Rhode Island), for the plaintiff. The defence set up in the answer, as to the first portion of the libel, constitutes, if proved, no legal justification of the publication. Proceedings before the Massachusetts Medical Society not being judicial proceedings, the publication of them is not privileged, though the proceedings themselves might be. No report of proceedings, other than judicial or parliamentary, is privileged. . . .

T. D. Eliot & T. M. Stetson, for the defendant. The first part of the article was only a true account of certain legal proceedings had in consequence of the plaintiff's expulsion from the medical association. The publication therefore falls within the class of privileged communications.

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SHAW, C. J. The present is an action of tort, brought to recover damages for a publication alleged to be a libel upon the plaintiff, consisting of an article published in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, under the direction of the defendant. . . The result then of this charge was, that if the publication, as far as it went, was a true, just and fair statement that such a charge of fraudulent transaction had been made to the Medical Society against the plaintiff, a member thereof, and determined and decided by them, and this report of the proceedings was made for the proper purpose of informing the medical profession and the public of the result of those proceedings, then it was justifiable, and not libellous. And the question now is, was that direction right? The plaintiff insists that it was not.

The ground now taken by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that the defence of the first part of the publication, if proved, constitutes no legal justification of the publication, is stated more broadly, and in more unqualified terms, than the authorities of the English common law will warrant. The general rule is, that any statement of wrongs

and grievances, made by a party alleging himself injured thereby, though they affect the reputation and credit of another, if made to a tribunal or body having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, to inquire into the proceedings and redress the grievance complained of, if found to exist, are not libellous; and that a fair statement of these proceedings when they have been acted upon and decided, made with an honest view of giving useful information, and where the publication will not tend to obstruct the course of justice and interfere with a fair trial, is not a libellous publication. . . .

We have stated above that we think the English rule, holding that, to justify the publication, the proceedings must be directly judicial, or had in a court of justice, is stated too broadly. 7 Gray, 301. . . . Whatever may be the rule as adopted and practised on in England, we think that a somewhat larger liberty may be claimed in this country and in this Commonwealth, both for the proceedings before all public bodies, and for the publication of those proceedings for the necessary information of the people. So many municipal, parochial and other public corporations and so many large voluntary associations formed for almost every lawful purpose of benevolence, business or interest, are constantly holding meetings, in their nature public, and so usual is it that their proceedings are published for general use and information, that the law, to adapt itself to this necessary condition of society, must of necessity admit of these public proceedings, and a just and proper publication of them, as far as it can be done consistently with private rights. This view of the law of libel in Massachusetts is recognized, and to some extent sanctioned, by the case of Commonwealth v. Clapp, and many other cases.

The Massachusetts Medical Society were not a private association; they were a public corporation, chartered by one of the earliest Acts under the Constitution, which was amended and their powers confirmed by several subsequent Acts. Sts. 1781, c. 15; 1788, c. 49; 1802, c. 123; 1818, c. 113. The charter invested the society, their members and licentiates, with large powers and privileges, in regulating the important public interest of the practice of medicine and surgery, enabled them to prescribe a course of studies, to examine candidates in regard to their qualifications for practice, and give letters testimonial to those who might be found duly qualified. They were authorized to elect fellows, and vested with power to suspend, expel or disfranchise any fellow or member, and to make rules and by-laws for their government. No person could be a member, but by his own act in accepting the appointment. This society was regarded by these legislative Acts as a public institution, by the action of which the public would be deeply affected in one of its important public interests, the health of the people. The plaintiff, by accepting his appointment as a fellow, voluntarily submitted himself to the government and jurisdiction of the society in his professional relations, so long as they acted within

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