above mentioned, were so heavy as to cause a man to bend under the weight thereof, and that his the said Sir John's wardrobe was very small and capable of being contained in a pocket handkerchief, and which said libel also contained, &c. &c. The declaration concluded by laying as special damage, that the said Sir John had been prevented and hindered from selling to Sir Richard Philips, Knt. for a large sum of money, to-wit, 600 1., the copyright of a certain book or work of him the said Sir John.

Garrow, for the plaintiff, allowed, that when his client came forward as an author, he subjected himself to the criticism of all who might be disposed to discuss the merits of his works; but that criticism must be fair and liberal; its object ought to be to enlighten the public, and to guard them against the supposed bad tendency of a particular publication presented to them, not to wound the feelings and to ruin the prospects of an individual. A man with a wen upon his neck perhaps could not complain if a surgeon in a scientific work should minutely describe it, and consider its nature and the means of dispersing it; but surely he might support an action for damages against any one who should publish a book to make him ridiculous on account of this infirmity, with a caricature print as a frontispiece.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH. . . . One writer in exposing the follies and errors of another may make use of ridicule however poignant. Ridicule is often the fittest weapon that can be employed for such a purpose. If the reputation or pecuniary interests of the person ridiculed suffer, it is damnum absque injuria. Where is the liberty of the press if an action can be maintained on such principles? Perhaps the plaintiff's "Tour through Scotland" is now unsalable; but is he to be indemnified by receiving a compensation in damages from the person who may have opened the eyes of the public to the bad taste and inanity of his compositions? Who would have bought the works of Sir Robert Filmer after he had been refuted by Mr. Locke? But shall it be said that he might have sustained an action for defamation against that great philosopher, who was laboring to enlighten and ameliorate mankind? We really must not cramp observations upon authors and their works. They should be liable to criticism, to exposure, and even to ridicule, if their compositions be ridiculous; otherwise the first who writes a book on any subject will maintain a monopoly of sentiment and opinion respecting it. This would tend to the perpetuity of error. Reflection on personal character is another thing. Show me an attack on the moral character of this plaintiff, or any attack upon his character unconnected with his authorship, and I shall be as ready as any judge who ever sat here to protect him; but I cannot hear of malice on account of turning his works into ridicule. . . .

Verdict for the defendants.

932. CAMPBELL v. SPOTTISWOODE

NISI PRIUS. 1863

3 F. & F. 421

LIBEL. The action was by the Rev. Dr. Campbell, editor and part proprietor of the British Standard and Ensign, religious newspapers, against the printer of the Saturday Review, for an article in that journal on the 14th of June last, commenting on certain letters and announcements in the plaintiff's paper. The letters were by the plaintiff, and entitled "Missions to China," and in the papers in which they appeared were appended thereto certain announcements and appeals to the religious public, in which the name of a Mr. Thompson often appeared, and of which the following, signed by the publisher, is a specimen:

"Co-operation is earnestly invited to aid in sending forth on all sides arguments and appeals, calculated to awaken compassion for the lost millions of the land of China." "The free circulation list now amounts to upwards of 20,000 copies, included in which are the following:" . .

...

In another of the list of subscribers for copies for distribution were the following, "R. G., 250 copies; A London Minister, 120; An Old Soldier, 100.". . . Upon these announcements and appeals the article complained of as libellous commented, and the following were the passages selected as the subject of complaint:

"The doctor refers frequently to Mr. Thompson as his authority so frequently that we must own to having had a transitory suspicion that Mr. T. was nothing more than another Mrs. Harris, and to believe, with Mrs. Gamp's acquaintance, that there never was no such person." "To spread the knowledge of the Gospel in China would be a good and an excellent thing, and worthy of all praise and encouragement; but to make such a work a mere pretext for puffing an obscure newspaper into circulation, is a most scandalous and flagitious act, and it is this act, we fear, we must charge against Dr. Campbell." ... "The well known device is resorted to of publishing lists of subscribers, the authenticity of which the public have, to say the least, no means of checking. 'R. G. takes 240 copies;' 'A London Minister,' 120; 'An Old Soldier,' 100; and so on. Few readers, we imagine, will have any doubt in their minds as to who is the 'Old Soldier." "Whatever may be the private views of the editor of the Ensign, there can be no question that his followers are sincere enough in the confidence they repose in his plan." . . . “Dr. Campbell is just now making use of it for a very practical purpose and to-morrow some other religious speculator will cry his wares in the name of Heaven, and the mob will hasten to deck him out in purple and fine linen." . . . "In the meanwhile, there can be no doubt that he is making a very good thing indeed of the spiritual wants of the Chinese." . . .

Bovill, for the defendant, put in several numbers of the plaintiff's paper with a view to show, that, on the face of them, they would warrant such comments as had been made upon them.

Parry, Serjt., in reply, pressed that the article imputed to the plaintiff that he fabricated letters, or put forth fictitious subscriptions, as decoys to induce the public to subscribe. At the close of the case,

COCKBURN, C. J. (to the jury). . . Particular passages are complained of as libellous; and it is said that they impute to the plaintiff that he acted on sordid and base motives, and that therefore he is entitled to damages. . . . It is said, on the other hand, that this was only legitimate criticism and discussion of the fair merits of this scheme of the plaintiff's, with a view to show that it was idle and absurd and must end in disappointment and delusion, and that the Review had a right so to comment upon it.... But the question is, whether the one or the other of the two views suggested of the effect of the article is correct. Is the effect of these passages merely to comment on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's proposal, or do they impute, not only that it was delusive, but that it was induced by the base and sordid motive of promoting his own pecuniary interest? . . . It is perfectly lawful for a public writer to say that it was an idle scheme, and that it was a delusion to suppose that by forcing these papers into circulation by free distribution the great cause of missions would be promoted, and, in short, to denounce the whole scheme as pernicious and delusive. And if you think that this is all which has really been done in this case, then it is within the fair and legitimate scope of criticism, and then you ought to find your verdict for the defendant.

But the question is, whether the writer has not gone beyond these limits, and whether he has not gone the length of imputing to Dr. Campbell, not merely that he has proposed a delusive and mischievous scheme, but that he has done so with the sordid motive of abusing the confidence of the public on subjects the most holy and sacred, and for the pitiful purpose of increasing the subscriptions to his newspaper. you think that, then the case assumes a different character.

If

It is argued, that the circumstances were such as not only to entitle the writers of the Review to criticise in a hostile spirit the scheme of the plaintiff, but also to impute to him sordid and base motives in putting it forward, for that it is obvious that it could do good to nobody but the proprietors of the paper. I own, however, that my view of the law does not accord with this. A public writer is fully entitled to comment upon the conduct of a public man, and this was a public matter and a fair subject of comment. But it cannot be said that because a man is a public man a public writer is entitled not only to pass a judgment upon his conduct, but to ascribe to him corrupt and dishonest motives. That, in my view, is not the law, and the privilege of comment does not go to that extent. Take the case of a statesman. His public conduct is open to criticism in speeches or in writings. But has any one a right to say that he has sold himself, or that he has been inspired by base and sordid motives, unless prepared to justify those allegations as true? Take the case of a general in command of a fortress, who has

surrendered it earlier than the necessity of the case, in the opinion of others, required. His conduct in so doing would be open to the most severe criticism, but would there be a right to say that he had betrayed the fortress into the hands of the enemy for a corrupt consideration? Surely not. . . . If you think that the only effect of the article was fairly to discuss the proposal of the plaintiff, then find for the defendant. If you think that the effect is to impute base and sordid motives, then your verdict ought to be for the plaintiff.

Verdict for the plaintiff for 50l., the jury finding, specially, "that the writer in the Saturday Review believed his imputations to be well founded."

THIS was an action for an alleged libel which the plaintiff said had been falsely and maliciously published, and had greatly damaged his reputation as an artist. The defendant pleaded that the article complained of was privileged, as being a fair and bona fide criticism upon a painting which the plaintiff had exposed for public view.

Mr. Serjeant Parry and Mr. Petheram appeared for the plaintiff; the Attorney-General and Mr. Bowen for the defendant.

In opening the case, Mr. Serjeant Parry said Mr. Whistler, the plaintiff, had followed the profession of an artist for many years both in this country and abroad, and Mr. John Ruskin, the defendant, held the highest position in Europe and America as an art critic. Mr. Whistler was the son of an eminent military engineer, a citizen of the United States, who for many years was engaged in superintending the construction of the railway from St. Petersburg to Moscow. Having passed some years of his life in St. Petersburg, the plaintiff went to France and Holland, where he studied his profession, and he also acquired a great reputation as a painter in America. He was also an etcher and in that capacity had likewise distinguished himself. He occupied a somewhat independent position in art, and it might be that his theory of painting was, in the estimation of some, eccentric; but his great object was to produce the utmost effect which colour would enable him to do and to bring about a harmony in colour and arrangement in his pictures. Although a man adopted such a theory and followed it out with earnestness, industry, and almost enthusiasm, yet it was no reason why he should be denounced or libelled. In the summer of 1877 the plaintiff exhibited several of his pictures at the Grosvenor Gallery; and shortly afterward there appeared in a pamphlet, edited and chiefly written by Mr. Ruskin, entitled "Fors Clavigera," an article in which he criticised the modern school of art. He said, “Sir

Coutts Lindsay is at present an amateur both in art and shopkeeping. He must take up either the one or the other business if he would prosper in either;" and then, referring to Mr. Whistler, he wrote as follows:

"Lastly, the mannerisms and errors of these pictures (alluding to the pictures of Mr. Burne Jones), whatever may be their extent, are never affected or indolent. The work is natural to the painter, however strange to us, and is wrought with the utmost conscience of care, however far to his own or our desire the result may yet be incomplete. Scarcely as much can be said for any other pictures of the modern school; their eccentricities are almost always in some degree forced, and their imperfections gratuitously, if not impertinently, indulged. For Mr. Whistler's own sake, no less than for the protection of the purchaser, Sir Coutts Lindsay ought not to have admitted works into the Gallery in which the ill-educated conceit of the artist so nearly approached the aspect of wilful imposture. I have seen and heard much of cockney impudence before now, but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask 200 guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public's face."

The learned counsel contended that these words could not, in any sense, be said to be a fair and bona fide criticism, and coming as they had from so great an authority as Mr. Ruskin they had, in fact, done the plaintiff a great deal of injury in his profession and in the public estimation.

...

The Attorney-General said that after the evidence for the plaintiff he should be compelled to call some witnesses well acquainted with the principles of art to give their opinion on the plaintiff's pictures; but the question for the jury was, whether Mr. Ruskin had or had not criticised the plaintiff's productions in a fair, honest, and moderate spirit. The critic might use strong language, and even resort to ridicule without exposing himself to the charge of acting maliciously. Perhaps some people would extinguish critics altogether; but they had their value; and what would become of the fine arts if there was no incentive to excel? . . . The whole article complained of was a sweeping condemnation of the modern school, and, as regarded Mr. Whistler, pointed out that his conceits and extravagances did not redound to his credit and that he was careless of his name and fame when he offered such things for sale. It was objected that Mr. Ruskin had written, "I never expected to hear a coxcomb ask 200 guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public's face," but the term "coxcomb" was applied to him as an artist, and not as a man. What was a “coxcomb"? He had looked out for the word, and found that it came from the old idea of the licensed jester, who wore a cap and bells with a cock's comb in it, and went about making jests for the amusement of his master and family. If that were the true definition, Mr. Whistler should not complain, because his pictures were capital jests, which had afforded much amusement to the public. Mr. Ruskin had lived a long life without being attacked. No one could say that he had purchased his praise, and no one had attempted to restrain his pen through