should enter into appellee's product, appellant had the reciprocal right of seeking the aid of fellow moulders to prevent that end. . The decree is modified by striking out "persuasion" and "persuading" from the 4th and 7th paragraphs; further modified by adding after "picketing" in the 5th paragraph "in a threatening or intimidating manner;" vacated as to the 1st, 8th, 9th, 10th, 14th and 15th paragraphs; affirmed as to the 2d, 3d, 6th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th and the modified 4th, 5th and 7th paragraphs. Costs of this court to be divided equally. 854. WILSON v. HEY SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 1908 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928 APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District: - heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph County; the Hon. CHARLES T. MOORE, Judge, presiding. The appellees, John E. Wilson and John T. Wilson, are partners, and have been engaged in business many years in Sparta, a city of. Randolph County, having a population of 3,000 at the last census. Their business has been that of liverymen, hackmen and draymen, and they have owned and used a large number of teams, wagons and vehicles furnished to the public for hire. . . . There have also been in Sparta organizations or unions of laborers, . . subordinate unions to the Sparta local union of the American Federation of Labor, which is a general organization combining all trades and callings, and there is another organization known as the Sparta Central Trades and Labor Assembly, composed of delegates from each of the subordinate unions. At various times since 1900 there have been difficulties between the appellees and the labor unions, and the team drivers' union has demanded of the appellees the employment of none but union team drivers on their teams or on any hack or omnibus. . . . On April 14, 1904, the appellees and officers of the team drivers' union signed a contract, in which the appellees agreed "to work only union team drivers on all teams; also to employ Federation members at all other work as helpers." The contract contained this further agreement on the part of appellees: "In case no union man can be had from either union we can employ another only for a short time, and if he or they work for more than one day we agree to retain one dollar on his or their application to join the A. F. of L. No. 7231, or the Team Drivers' Union No. 109." In November, 1904, there was a new difficulty between the parties growing out of that contract. The dispute was over the claim that appellees had not retained the proper amount of money fron non-union employees. Appellees claimed that there was only one dollar due on a man named Dude Wilson, and that was paid, but the union claimed that appellees owed five dollars on account of non-union men. Appellees refused to pay the four dollars, and the team drivers' union put them on what was called the "unfair list" and reported such action to the local union of the Federation of Labor and the Trades and Labor Assembly. The Trades and Labor Assembly endeavored to have appellees yield, and upon their refusal the assembly appointed a committee of three to inform the business men generally, in Sparta, a part of whom had been in the habit of having appellees haul their freight and who were accustomed to deal with them, that The members of the various unions appellees were on the "unfair list.' ceased to patronize appellees, and some of those to whom notices were given did the same. There were some who paid no attention to the notice but continued to employ and deal with appellees as before. . . . A committee called on the undertaker who owned the hearse and notified him not to use appellees' team to haul his hearse at a funeral, and the notice was complied with. A similar notice was given in another case. Appellees filed their bill in this case in the circuit court of Randolph County setting up these facts, and making the appellants, who are the unions and their officers, defendants, and praying for an injunction against interfering with the appellees, their servants or employees, from boycotting the appellees, their teams or vehicles or business, and from giving notices with the intent or calculated to deter the public from doing business with them. . . . A decree was entered finding the allegations of the bill and supplemental bill to be true, granting an injunction substantially as prayed for in the bill against putting appellees or their employees on the "unfair list" and from boycotting appellees, or going to or sending committees to their customers to induce or compel them to withhold their trade from appellees, and from menacing or interfering with their business in furtherance of the conspiracy against them. The facts are not in dispute, and the argument for appellants was based on the proposition that nothing wrong or unlawful was done. O. A. Harker and A. E. Crisler, for appellants. . . . One man may lawfully refuse to deal with another, and this right, which one man may exercise singly, many may agree to exercise jointly and make simultaneous declaration in that regard by voluntary association. . . . So long as the members of a union employ no other means to deter persons from dealing with an employer or one antagonistic to the union except persuasion and the withdrawal of patronage there is nothing illegal in their action. . ... H. Clay Horner, for appellees. The common law seeks to protect every person against the wrongful acts of others, whether committed alone or by combination, and an action may be had for injuries done which cause another loss in the enjoyment of any right or privilege or property. Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 614. The contracts which appellees were morally intimidated into signing, to employ none but union men, are against public policy and void. . . . Boycotts, though unaccompanied by violence or intimidation, are unlawful. ... Mr. Justice CARTWRIGHT, [after stating the case as above:] The rights of labor unions and the extent to which they may lawfully go have been pretty fully explained in O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, and Franklin Union v. People, 220 id. 355. The right of laboring people to organize for the purpose of promoting their common welfare by lawful means is fully recognized. They may refuse to work for any particular employer, and may obtain employment for their members by solicitation and promises of support in trade and otherwise; but in the accomplishment of their purpose they must proceed only by lawful and peaceable means, and they have no right to make war on other persons. It is not wrong for members of a union to cease patronizing any one when they regard it for their interest to do so; but they have no right to compel others to break off business relations with the one from whom they have withdrawn their patronage, and to do this by unlawful means, with the motive of injuring such person. Such means as giving notices which excite the fear or reasonable apprehension of other persons that their business will be injured unless they do break off such relations or cease patronizing another are wrong and unlawful. If the notices given or things done have the natural effect of exciting such reasonable fear and apprehension and accomplish the result intended, it is immaterial that they are not accompanied by direct threats. In this case . . it was understood by those who received the notices that, if they continued to trade with appellees and did not break off existing business relations, they would incur the hostility of the unions and their own business would suffer. The evidence shows that in this case, at least, the words "unfair list" were a euphemism for a boycott, and, of course, it does not change the nature of an unlawful thing by substituting an inoffensive for an offensive name. . . . In the case of Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, there was an agreement of the appellants to injure and destroy the business of the appellee, and she recovered the damages resulting from their acts in the execution of that purpose. The Court there laid down the fundamental principles governing such cases, and held that every man has a right, under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or capital according to his own will; that one who invades that right without lawful cause or justification commits a legal wrong, and the damage inflicted by the use of intimidation, obstruction or molestation with malice is without excuse, and actionable. Counsel seek to distinguish that case from this one for the reason that existing contracts were [there] broken; but that was not the whole of the appellees' case nor the only ground upon which she was permitted to recover. . . . In the later case of London Guarantee Co. v. ... Horn, 206 Ill. 493, it was held that procuring the discharge of Horn from an employment which was terminable at will, where the motive was to injure him and to secure a benefit to the guarantee company, gave rise to a cause of action. . . . Here was a small place in which there were a number of unions, embracing a considerable part of the population, and the ruinous effect of a boycott and a withdrawal of their patronage from customers of appellees unless such customers should break off all business relations with appellees can readily be seen and understood. It is urged that the injunction as allowed is too broad, for the reason that appellants are enjoined from putting appellees on the "unfair list." If the only purpose of putting one on the "unfair list," and the only effect, were to notify members of the union of the fact so that they might withdraw their patronage, the injunction would be too broad; but the evidence in the record is that the purpose of that list is not so limited and that its purpose and effect is to establish a boycott, and in that view it is not too broad. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. 855. PIERCE v. STABLEMEN'S UNION, LOCAL No. 8760. (1909. 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324; injunction asked against strikers picketing the plaintiff's livery-stable; the strike was called because the plaintiff refused to unionize his stable.) HENSHAW, J. We think that to-day no Court would question the right of an organized union of employees, by concerted action, to cease their employment (no contractual obligation standing in the way), and this action constitutes a "strike." We think, moreover, that no Court questions the right of those same men to cease dealing by concerted action, either socially or by way of business, with their former employer, and this latter act, in its essence, constitutes the primary boycott. But what acts organized labor may do, and what means it may adopt to accomplish its end, without violation of the law, have presented questions of much nicety, over which the Courts have stood, and still stand, widely divided. It would not be profitable to discuss and analyze these widely divergent cases. It is sufficient to formulate briefly the principles adopted in this State, many of which have recently found elaborate expression in the case of Parkinson v. Building & Trades Council of Santa Clara (Cal.), 98 Pac. 1040. 1. The right of united labor to strike, in furtherance of trades interests (no contractual obligation standing in the way), is fully recognized. The reason for the strike may be based upon the refusal to comply with the employees' demand for the betterment of wages, conditions, hours of labor, the discharge of one employee, the engagement of another any one or more of the multifarious considerations which in good faith may be believed to tend toward the advancement of the employees. 2. After striking, the employee may engage in a "boycott," as that word is here employed. As here employed, it means not only the right to the concerted withdrawal of social and business intercourse, but the right by all legitimate means of fair publication, and fair oral or written persuasion induce others interested in, or sympathetic with, their cause to withdraw their to social intercourse and business patronage from the employer. They may go even further than this, and request of another that he withdraw his patronage from the employer, and may use the moral intimidation and coercion of threatening a like boycott against him if he refuse so to do. This last proposition necessarily involves the bringing into a labor dispute between A and B, C, who has no difference with either. It contemplates that C, upon the request of B, and under the moral intimidation lest B boycott him, may thus be constrained to withdraw his patronage from A, with whom he has no controversy. This is the "secondary boycott," the legality of which is vigorously denied by the English Courts, the Federal Courts, and by the Courts of many of the States of this nation. Without presenting the authorities, which are multitudinous, suffice it to state the other view in language of the President of the United States, but recently uttered: "A body of workmen are dissatisfied with the terms of their employment. They seek to compel their employer to come to their terms by * striking. They may legally do so. The loss and inconvenience he suffers he cannot complain of. But when they seek to compel third persons, who have no quarrel with their employer, to withdraw from all association with him by threats that, unless such third persons do so, the workmen will inflict similar injury on such third persons, the combination is oppressive, involves duress, and, if injury results, it is actionable." President Taft, McClure's Magazine, June, 1909, p. 204. Notwithstanding the great dignity which attaches to an utterance such as this, which, as has been said, is but the expression of numerous Courts upon the subject-matter, this Court, after great deliberation, took what it believed to be the truer and more advanced ground, above indicated and fully set forth in Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, etc., supra. In this respect this Court recognizes no substantial distinction between the so-called primary and secondary boycott. Each rests upon the right of the union to withdraw its patronage from its employer, and to induce by fair means any and all other persons to do the same, and, in exercise of those means, as the unions would have the unquestioned right to withhold their patronage from a third person who continued to deal with their employer, so they have the unquestioned right to notify such third person that they will withdraw their patronage if he continues so to deal. However opposed to the weight of federal authority the views of this Court are, that they are not unique may be noted by reading National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648; Lindsay v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 707, where the highest Courts of those States formulate and adopt like principles. . . . 3. We are thus brought to consider the method of "picketing," the use of which appellants contend is a legal weapon in their hands. . . If the strikers have the right, as above indicated, to withdraw patronage themselves, and by fair publication, written and oral persuasion, to induce others to join in their cause, and finally by threat of like boycott, to coerce others into so doing, their rights go no further than this. . . . The two classes of persons to whom we have adverted, and whose rights necessarily become involved where a picket or patrol is established, are, first, the rights of those employed, or seeking employment, in the place of the striking laborers; and, second, the rights of the general public. (1) It is the absolute, unqualified right of every employee, as well as of every other person, to go about his legal business unmolested and unobstructed, |