Sir Hugh Cairns and Mr. Dickinson appeared for the respondents, and Mr. Rolt and Mr. Fischer, for the appellants. . At the conclusion of the arguments, his Lordship reserved his judgment. Dec. 21. The LORD CHANCELLOR. Upon a review of the numerous cases which have been decided in this Court on the subject of trade marks, there appears to be some uncertainty and want of precision in the language of different Judges as to the ground on which a Court of Equity interferes to protect the enjoyment of a trade mark, and also on the question whether the right to use a trade mark admits of being sold and transferred by one man to another. . . . The true principle therefore would seem to be, that the jurisdiction of the Court in the protection given to trade marks rests upon property, and that the Court interferes by injunction, because that is the only mode by which property of this description can be effectually protected. The same things are necessary to constitute a title to relief in equity in the case of the infringement of the right to a trade mark, as in the case of the violation of any other right of property. But when the owner of a trade mark applies for an injunction to restrain the defendant from injuring his property by making false representations to the public, it is essential that the plaintiff should not in his trade mark, or in the business connected with it, be himself guilty of any false or misleading representation; for, if the plaintiff makes any material false statement in connection with the property he seeks to protect, he loses, and very justly, his right to claim the assistance of a Court of Equity. The question then arises, what amounts to a material false representation? . . . Where any symbol or label claimed as a trade mark is so constructed or worded as to make or contain a distinct assertion, which is false, I think no property can be claimed on it, or, in other words, the right to the exclusive use of it cannot be maintained. To sell an article stamped with a false statement is, pro tanto, an imposition on the public, and therefore, in the case supposed, the plaintiff and defendant would be both in pari delicto. This is consistent with many decided cases. These observations seem to apply to the case now to be decided. The plaintiffs are an English company formed in 1857, with limited liability, for the purpose of making and selling an article called leather cloth. They bought the business from an American company, which was formed for the purpose of carrying on this manufacture at New Jersey, in the United States of America, and at West Ham, in the County of Essex. The name of that company was "The Crockett International Leather Cloth Company." The original inventors and manufacturers of this article called "leather cloth" were a firm of Crockett & Co., in the United States, who, on the formation of the International Company, ceased to carry on a separate business, and became shareholders in the company, but have since resumed business and are now manufacturers of leather cloth in the United States. The International Company by its agents obtained, in the month of January, 1856, an English patent for tanning the leather cloth, and having done so they devised an elaborate label to be attached to the goods manufactured by them, which being in a circular form has its circumference formed of the words "Crockett International Leather Cloth Company, Newark," with the initials "N. J. U. S. A.," meaning New Jersey, United States of America, and also the words "West Ham, Essex, England." These words and letters form the periphery or outer rim of the circular label. Within this circle at the top is the word "Excelsior," below which is an eagle with expanded wings, and beneath the eagle are printed these words "Crockett & Co. Tanned Leather Cloth. Patented Jany. 24, 1856. J. R. & C. P. Crockett, Manufacturers." The International Leather Cloth Company carried on business as leather cloth manufacturers, both in the United States and in England, until May, 1857. They used the stamp or label which has been described as a trade mark, affixing it to the goods they manufactured. In May, 1857, the plaintiffs' company was incorporated, and the International Company sold and assigned to the plaintiffs the business carried on by them at West Ham, together with the English letters patent, and full power and authority to use all and singular the trade marks that had been used by the International Company in their business in England. From the time of this sale the plaintiffs have carried on, and now carry on, at a manufactory at West Ham the manufacture of leather cloth according to the process originally introduced by Messrs. Crockett & Co., and they have constantly used the label which has been described, stamping it on their goods of the first quality. In August, 1861, the defendants were incorporated for the purpose of carrying on the manufacture and sale of leather cloth. They have used as a trade mark on goods made by them of the first quality a stamp or label which certainly appears to have been formed upon the model of the plaintiffs' trade mark.. ... The plaintiffs' label or trade mark, however, contains the following assertions or representations: First, that the articles so stamped are goods of the Crockett International Leather Cloth Company. Secondly, that they have been made or manufactured by J. R. & C. P. Crockett. Thirdly, that they are tanned leather cloth. Fourthly, that the articles are patented by a patent obtained in January, 1856; and, lastly, that they were made either in the United States of America, or at West Ham, in England. Each of these statements or representations is untrue when applied to the goods made and sold by the plaintiffs. Of these several untrue statements the most material is the false representation made by the plaintiffs' label, that every piece of cloth so stamped or branded is tanned, and included in the patent of January, 1856, which was a patent for tanning leather cloth; whereas it is clear upon the evidence that the goods made and sold by the plaintiffs are not tanned unless specially ordered, and that to the great bulk of the plaintiffs' manufactures the words “tanned and patented" are unduly applied. . . . There is a homely phrase, long current in this Court, that a plaintiff must come into equity with clean hands. That is not the case with the present plaintiffs, whose case is condemned by the principles to which they appeal, and I must therefore reverse the decree of the ViceChancellor and dismiss their bill; but, as I do not approve of the conduct of the defendants, I dismiss it without costs. (This decision was affirmed on the plaintiffs' appeal to the House of Lords, 11 H. L. Ca. 523.) 702. LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. PARKER SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 1890 131 Ill. 557, 23 N. E. 237 APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District; - heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. FRANK BAKER, Judge, presiding. Mr. Pliny B. Smith, for the appellant: . . . The accident was the result of the violation of the deceased of an ordinance of the town of Lake. Conduct of an employee which will make a railway company liable in damages, will be a bar to an action for an injury resulting to the employee himself. . . Mr. John McGaffey, and Mr. John T. Richards, for the appellee: The fact that the train was [run by the deceased] more than twelve miles an hour, in violation of the ordinance, will not defeat a right of recovery. . . . Mr. Justice WILKIN delivered the opinion of the Court: This is an action on the case, brought by appellee, against appellant, for negligently causing the death of her husband, John C. Parker. There are two counts in the declaration, but in the usual form, except that the second fails to allege that the deceased left, surviving him, next of kin. The negligent act by which death was caused is in both counts charged to be leaving a certain switch open, whereby the engine then driven by deceased was diverted from its track, and caused to collide with another engine on a side-track. A trial in the Circuit Court of Cook county, the Hon. FRANK BAKER, Judge, presiding, resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellee, for the sum of $5,000, and costs of suit. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District that judgment was affirmed, and appellant now prosecutes this further appeal. . . . The theory of appellee's case is, that the employees of appellant had negligently left the switch open, and in a condition dangerous to trains approaching from the south; that deceased was in the exercise of reasonable care as he approached the same, and therefore appellant is liable. The first of these positions is not controverted by appellant. The second is strenuously denied, and upon its determination the result of the case rests. . . . Appellant also offered in evidence an ordinance of the town of Lake, through which the train in question was running when the accident occurred, prohibiting passing trains from running at a greater rate of speed than twelve miles an hour. Counsel say the accident was the result of the violation of this ordinance, and therefore, as a matter of law, there can be no recovery. If the premise was correct, the conclusion would be inevitable. But who is to determine the fact as to what caused the accident? It is remarkable that throughout the argument of this case on behalf of appellant the open switch is lost sight of entirely. That was the fatal cause of Parker's death. The only question is, Did his conduct so far contribute to the accident as to bar recovery? While it is true that the omission of a duty imposed by positive law is negligence per se, yet such negligence becomes actionable, as a rule, only when it causes or contributes to the injury complained of (Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Van Patten, Admr., 64 Ill. 510). So in this case, while it may be said that running the train more than twelve miles an hour, in violation of the ordinance, was negligence per se (and the Court below so instructed the jury), yet the question of fact remains, Did that negligence so far contribute to the injury as to preclude a recovery by appellee? . . . We find no substantial errors in this record, and the judgments of the Circuit and Appellate Courts will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court of The Third District; heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Piatt county; the Hon. W. G. COCHRAN, Judge, presiding. This is an action of trespass on the case, brought on April 7, 1899, by the defendant in error, a minor, suing by his next friend, Hollis D. Fuller, against the plaintiff in error, who, at the time of the commencement of the suit, was also a minor, but since the trial has attained his majority. The action was brought to recover damages for a personal injury. The trial below before the court and a jury resulted in verdict and judgment in favor of defendant in error for the sum of $1,500. An appeal was taken to the Appellate Court, where the judgment of the Circuit Court of Piatt county has been affirmed. The present writ of error is prosecuted from such judgment of affirmance. ... The facts were substantially as follows: On February 2, 1898, defendant in error and plaintiff in error were attending school in DeLand, Piatt county. Plaintiff in error lived at the home of his father in the country, and defendant in error with his mother in DeLand. On the evening of that day there was a wedding at the residence of Daniel Hirsch, living about two miles from DeLand. On the evening of that day some ten or twelve boys, including the parties to this suit, living in the neighborhood of DeLand, met at the school house pursuant to a previous arrangement to engage in a "charivari" of a newly married couple at the house of Daniel Hirsch, living about a half mile distant from the school house. They took from the school house a bell, and provided themselves with bells, pans, ploughshares, revolvers, and a shot-gun, and other implements for making a noise. They reached Hirsch's home in a body between nine and ten o'clock. There, with a shot-gun, revolvers, ploughshares, sleigh-bells, dinner-bells, etc., they approached near the house, where the guns and pistols were discharged, and the other instruments were put in motion, and all the noise was made which they could make with such instruments. Considerable excitement and commotion were created in the house among the women. The hired man came to the gate of the yard, and asked them not to fire off fire-arms, as it would frighten the horses of the guests there hitched. Both defendant in error and plaintiff in error participated in this 'charivari," and were so engaged at the time the injury complained was received by defendant in error. Plaintiff in error fired his pistol six times into the air over his head, then put in three more cartridges all the cartridges he had -- and then held the pistol above his head in his right hand, pointed upward and pulled the trigger three times, but the last cartridge did not explode. While he was either in the act of bringing the pistol down, or unbreeching it, it exploded and shot defendant in error in the face near the eye. . ... Reed & Edie, and Herrick & Herrick, for plaintiff in error: . . . The general doctrine that courts of law will not permit a party to prove his own illegal acts in order to establish his case is well settled, and therefore a party who acts in defiance of law has no just claim to its agency in obtaining redress for the damage he may have sustained in the course of his illegal transactions. Tipton & Tipton, for defendant in error: To deprive party of redress because of his illegal conduct, the illegality must have contributed to the injury. . . . Mr. Chief Justice MAGRUDER delivered the opinion of the Court: . . Section 56 of division 1 of the Criminal Code provides, that "whoever wilfully disturbs the peace and quiet of any neighborhood family, by loud or unusual noises, or by tumultuous or offensive language, threat |