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every species of restraint and controul, and place your entire dependence upon those principles of virtue which you have previously and anxiously inculcated, and upon that sense of honour which is so powerful in youthful minds; which is so happily calculated to aid and strengthen virtue when it meets her, and which, as the poet ob. Terves, often“ imitates her actions where she is not.” I own I place but little stress upon those external accomplishments and graces
of behaviour which fome suppose only to be acquired in foreign Courts. To me the most pleasing manners are such as are truly English; and I have known many persons, who have never feen Versailles or the Louvre, who possess an elegance and urbanity not to be exceeded by those who have been presented at every Court in Europe. Foreign manners are by no means congenial to the taste of the English; and when the behaviour of thofe who have been accusa tomed to good company is apparently changed; in confequence of their residence abroad, it is generally changed · for the worse. I speak not of those who are commonly called travelled coxo combs, and who are fo justly the subject of universal ridicule, but the behaviour of even men of sense and fashion, when they have in any degree contracted the air and manners of foreigners; is, generally speaking, fo far displeasing. What may be thought grace at Paris, at London may appear grimace; and it must be confeffed that
travellers of real knowledge and merit are some. times apt to assume an air of superiority and felf-importance, than which nothing can be more disgusting, or can tend more to excite the contempt of others, who have employed their time to, perhaps, at least equal advantage in their native country
Upon the whole it appears to me, that a longer time spent at the University, with occasional excursions to the Continent, would be far pre ferable to the prevailing custom of wandering about Europe for two or three years successively, till in many instances an unaffected pleasing Englishman becomes metamorphosed into a conceited and aukward foreigner :- At least it would be happy for the Continent, and much for the credit of our own country, if a stop was put to that egress of riotous and dissipated English youth, which at present is fo justly a subject of complaint abroad; and who, to the evil dispositions they carry out with them, add the follies and vices of every different clime and country which they visit. When such men make it their boast tħat " Europe they faw," let them recollect that “ Europe faw them too;" and they will have little reason to indulge any emotions of vanity derived from this imas ginary source of fuperiority.
Remarks on the XXI. Chapter of Locke's Essay on
ERHAPS no writer can be named, of an.
cient or of modern times, to whom mankind are under more extensive obligation than Mr. Locke. By his Effay on Human Understanding, he has effected what may well be called a complete revolution of opinion in metaphysics. Metaphyfics, which had so long and fo juftly lain under the reproach of bewildering the understanding in a maze of words destitute of real meaning :-Metaphysics, which had so long discoursed in an unintelligible jargon, became in the hands of Mr. Locke a most interesting and important branch of true philosophy. By his Treatises on Government and Toleration, he fixed the civil and religious rights of mankind upon a firm and immoveable basis; and in his Theological Works he exhibited the reasonableness of Christianity, and the folidity of the evidence upon which our holy relia gion is founded, in a clear, perfpicuous, and convincing point of view. No one can hold the name and the memory of that great man in higher
veneration than myself; but at the same time I would no more submit to take any opinion upon trustfrom Mr. Locke than from Spinoza or Hobbes; and whenever I discern, or think I discern, an error in the writings of a man of such distinguished eminence, I am the more desirous of its being properly animadverted upon and confuted, in order to prevent its acquiring a sanction from the reputation of its Author. This is the only apology I think necessary for hazarding a few observations upon
that celebrated chapter of Mr. Locke's Effay, which treats “ Of Power," so far as relates to his representation of the nature of the Human Will, and of the Liberty or Necesfity of Human Actions. The clearness and precision of Mr. Locke's ideas, on those various subjects which he has undertaken to discuss, are, notwithstanding the frequent embarrassment of his style, so justly and universally acknowledged, that one cannot but be astonished at the obfcurity and perplexity in which this interesting topic, under his management of it, seems involved; and it is impoffible to point out a more striking contrast than this chapter on Power, by Mr. Locke, forms to the “ View of the doctrine of Philofophical Necefsity,” by Dr. Hartley; which I regard as a masterpiece of composition, and from which it is evident that the most profound reasonings never need to lose fight of those indispensable requisites of good writing, conciseness, fimplicity, and perspicuity. I cannot but suspect that Mr. Locke entered upon the investigation of this celebrated question with
reluctance, and that he deviated into obscurity and inconsistency in treating upon it, from an apprehension of incurring the odium of favouring the philosophical system of Mr. Hobbes, who had some years before very ably defended the hypothesis of Philosophical Necessity in an express treatise upon the subject, and who was perhaps himself indebted for his accurate knowledge of it to the writings of Spinoza. Now it is well known that Spinoza and Hobbes were reputed Atheists, and the doctrine of Necessity was, at the time Mr. Locke wrote, almost universally confounded with Fatalism, which was justly regarded as totally irreconcileable with the doctrine of a Divine Providence, and equally at variance with the natural and moral attributes of the Deity. However unworthy of a great Philofopher, I have little doubt but that Mr. Locke, in the investigation of this question, was considerably influenced by the prevailing prejudice against this tenet. I believe it biassed his judgment, fo far as to prevent him from admitting the principle in its full extent, though he has admitted all the premises which are necessary to arrive at the conclusion ; and I fear it induced him to adopt the disingenuous artifice of using ambiguous language, in order to disguise the impreffion which it is evident the arguments of the Necessitarians had really made upon his mind. In a word, he appears neither to have attained to clear ideas upon the subject, nor to have expressed the ideas he had with any degree of precision or perípicuity. The free agency of man may be con.