the fair, and at once to gratify my vanity and amorous inclination. I value myself upon my spirit and courage, and skill in the use of weapons, and if honour calls me to the field, and my antagonist should happen to fall, the pleasures of revenge, it must be owned, are exquifite." I fhould be glad to know what reply it would be poffible to make to a man who should think, talk, and act in this manner; it would evidently be wholly fruitless, and even ridiculous, to attempt to make any impression upon him by expatiating upon the native beauty and excellence of Virtue; upon its utility in promoting the general interefts of mankind; and upon the confcious fatisfaction which would refult from the love and practice of it. This would be to use a language which he could not comprehend. The idea of Virtue, abstractedly confidered, for fuch a man, has no charms. The advancement of general Happiness is to him a matter of perfect indifference, and instead of a confcious fatisfaction in the practice of Virtue, he is confcious only of a fixed and unconquerable reluctance to conform to its dictates. Such a man has no relish for the refined pleasures of the moral fenfe, and it cannot be denied that he adds to his Happiness by indulging, to a certain degree at least, all his vicious propenfities. How is this then confiftent with the hypothefis, that the allotment of Happiness is never difproportioned to the moral characters of men? But perhaps it may be faid, that this is not a fair statement of the cafe, and

that all which is meant by recommending Virtue as the true fource of Happinefs is, that it will certainly be found fo by thofe in whom the moral fense has been early and diligently cultivated, whofe modes of thinking and habits of acting have been pre-difpofed from infancy in favour of Virtue, and in whom the benevolent affections flourish in full life and vigour; and I certainly do not take upon me to affirm, that the world affords not any fuch examples. I am fenfible, that the faculty of aflociation is of a nature at once fo powerful and fo flexible, that by an early and fkilful direction of it, it is very poffible fuch an ardent and difinterested love of Virtue, fuch a noble and animating principle of benevolence, may be generated in the foul, that, leaving the very idea of a future ftate out of the queftion, all the allurements of vice united would, to a man actuated by fuch exalted fentiments, appear contemptible in comparison of the pleasures to be derived from Virtue; but then it is evident, from the nature of the cafe, that this must be a very rare and fingular instance, almost amounting to a prodigy; and that a few fuch examples are by no means fufficient to establish the truth of the general maxim, that the virtuous are happy in proportion to the degree of Virtue they poffefs, nor indeed is it neceffarily to be inferred that a man fuch as we have in contemplation, who has arrived to the highest degree of perfection of which humanity is capable, must be therefore eminently happy, but only that he would, in confequence of

the

the exquifite delicacy of his moral feelings, incur a greater degree of mifery by any occafional deviation into vice, than by a refolute adherence to Virtue, whatever perfonal inconveniences might refult from the practice of it. Indeed, from the very nature of Virtue, it is easy to demonstrate that it cannot, in all fituations and circumstances, be the interest of individuals invariably to adhere to it; for the effence of Virtue confifts in regulating our conduct by fuch principles as are best calculated to advance the general Happinefs. Now as it frequently happens that the Happiness of the individual stands in direct oppofition to that of the public, it is the perfection of Virtue in individuals, in fuch cafes, to facrifice their own Happiness to that of others; but if we do not advert to that recompence of reward of which a future ftate of retribution affords us a profpect, how can fuch a facrifice be rationally expected, or indeed how can it be rationally made? Here then is the grand, the remedilefs defect of that system of morality which extends not its views beyond the prefent life. Self-love and focial are not the fame, i. e. are are not neceffarily connected; and this defect becomes only the more apparent, from every attempt to palliate or disguise it, or to substitute any other principle in the place of that just, solid, and permanent foundation of human conduct, a regard to our own true interest.

The most celebrated fect of heathen philofophers, I mean the Stoics, it is well known, preposterously

posterously endeavoured to establish a system of perfect Virtue upon the bafis of pride. By an inflexible adherence to her most rigorous dictates, they boasted, that they not only acquired an elevation of mind far fuperior to the bafe and ignoble vulgar, for whom they did not pretend that this fyftem was calculated; but that they were raised to an equality with the Gods themfelves. They even afferted, that Virtue was not only the chief good, which their rivals, the Peripatetics, were content to maintain; but that it was the fole good; and that the truly virtuous man must neceffarily be fupremely happy in the enjoyment of that good in all poffible situations and circumstances, even whilst actually burning in the brazen bull of Phalaris. But philosophers of modern times, to do them juftice, are not chargeable with any fuch excefs of virtuous extravagance. Mr. Hume, who throughout his Treatife on Morals argues upon the fuppofition, that the prefent life includes the whole of our existence, is extremely embarraffed with this difficulty; he cannot indeed avoid touching upon it, but he takes care to do it as gently and cautioufly as poffible. It is remarkable, that, like the fashionable preachers of the present day, he paints Virtue in the most charming colours. "Nothing appears," to ufe his own language," but gentlenefs, humanity, benefi"cence, affability. She talks not of useless auste"rity and rigours, fuffering and felf-denial: fhe "declares that her fole purpose is to make her

votaries,

"votaries, and all mankind, during every instant "of their existence, if poffible, cheerful and "happy; nor does the ever willingly part with any

pleasure, but in hopes of ample compenfation "in fome other period of their lives. The fole "trouble which she demands is, that of just cal"culation, and a steady preference of the greater

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happiness." This is a most pleasing picture of Virtue, and who, without reluctance, can difpute the justness of the resemblance ;—it is however, like most other portraits of great artists, a flattering likenefs. Truth and falfehood are indeed fo artfully blended in this defcription, that fome degree of attention is neceffary in order to separate them. "The fole trouble which Virtue demands is, that of just calculation;" but upon what data is this calculation to be founded? Upon the supposition of a future ftate? Then Virtue ceafes to be that fmiling, gay and enchanting goddess described by Mr. H. She affumes another countenance, not indeed destitute of beauty, but of a fevere and awful kind; her deportment is martial, and her air majestic; not a Venus, but a Minerva, armed with helmet, fpear, and fhield. In plain language, we cannot become really and truly virtuous at fo cheap a rate as fuch flattering reprefentations would feem to indicate. It requires great faith, great fortitude, great refolution, and, however unpleasant the words may found in our ears, great fuffering and felf-denial, to attain to any very superior degrees of Virtue. The grand maxim which

we